


THE IDEALS
OF FRANCE
—
CHARLES CESTRE

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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THE IDEALS OF FRANCE

By


CHARLES CESTRE

Chargé du Cours de Littérature et de Civilisation
Américaines à la Sorbonne



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INTRODUCTION

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan University in the class of 1864, showed his lifelong interest in the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizenship by long periods of service as a member of the Board of Education of his home city, and as member of the boards of trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University.

It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by himself and family to Wesleyan University were combined to form a fund whose income should be used "in defraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers, preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college faculty," it should have been decided that the primary purpose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by a distinguished speaker, "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsi-

bilities of citizenship," and to provide for the publication of such lectures so that they might reach a larger public than the audience to which they should, in the first instance, be addressed.

To give the fourth course of lectures on this Foundation, the Committee for its administration selected Charles Cestre, professor of American literature and civilization in the University of Paris.

The recent renewal, by reason of the Great War, of the intimate relations between the United States and France, established nearly a century and a half ago, makes especially appropriate a fresh interpretation of the ideals of France to Americans. Professor Cestre's historical survey of the principles underlying the *entente cordiale*, published in England and this country under the title "France, England, and European Democracy, 1215-1915," made patent his ability to speak with deep significance both in the field of citizenship and in the field of international relations. His long residence in this country and his continued study of our literature, his accurate scholarship, and

his rare felicity of expression, made his selection natural. The event has more than justified the anticipation and it is with pleasure that we present the lectures to a wider audience.

WILLIAM ARNOLD SHANKLIN,
DAVID GEORGE DOWNEY,
ALBERT WHEELER JOHNSTON,
FRANK EDGAR FARLEY,
HENRY MERRITT WRISTON,
Committee.

FOREWORD

THESE lectures were conceived and for the most part written in France, in 1921, after President William Arnold Shanklin had honored me with an appointment as George Slocum Bennett lecturer at Wesleyan University, for the month of February, 1922. In their final form, the lectures owe much to the cordiality and eager responsiveness with which they were received at Wesleyan University. The steadfast attendance of the students, the appreciation of the faculty, the loyalty of the Middletown public encouraged me to speak of the inner thoughts and feelings of France with greater freedom and frankness than I should have dared to do on the authority of the press-paragraphs relating to France immediately after the Washington Conference.

Three short months have elapsed. The book comes from the press in an atmosphere already cleared of the misunderstandings and somewhat hasty judgments formed

from insufficient evidence or from misapprehension of France's situation. May this outline of France's contribution to world-civilization in the past throw a light on the faithfulness of France to the highest ideals of mankind in the present! France is a friend of peace, a staunch supporter of international amity, a colaborer with all noble nations in the work of unification and harmonization of the human race. Let the world effect the unity of feelings and the harmony of aims which are the necessary steps toward the safe working of the concert of nations; let every nation recognize her obligations and assume her just share of burdens: France will not fail to take the initiatives and responsibilities inherent to a policy of peace, as she has done with steady consistency in the last fifty years of her history.

The welcome, both warm and discreet, of the students of Wesleyan University, the personal friendliness and intellectual sympathy of the faculty, spiritual companionship at the hands of President Shanklin, encouragement and support, generous and delicate, from Dr. David G. Downey, are

precious memories that crowd my mind as I send away the last proof-sheets and close, in fact but not in heart, one of the most gratifying phases of my efforts to establish, now as ever, the best relations between America and France.

April, 1922.

C. C.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION

LECTURES

For the Promotion of a Better Understanding of National Problems and of a More Perfect Realization of the Responsibilities of Citizenship.

FOURTH SERIES—1921-1922

I

THE TEMPER OF FRANCE

I COULD not have chosen for the general theme of these lectures "The Contribution of France to the Ideals of Mankind" if I had not known beforehand what a friendly audience I was going to address. I should not treat a topic which might seem to place me in the position of a praisegiver to my own country but that I was sure of the kind construction you are to put on my words. You are an American audience, and the word "American" conveys to the French mind the most pleasing and encouraging thoughts, the most moving and comforting feelings. Not only did America join the world-conflict for the cause of right and justice with all her strength and valor, in an absolutely disinterested spirit, but she rushed into the fray (we have her word for it) to render France the good turn France had done her in 1776. Her meaning was inclosed in the historical

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phrase uttered by General Pershing: "Lafayette, we are here!" A Frenchman addressing an American audience is conscious of speaking before an inner circle of friends whom he feels he may trust. I need not then demur saying what I have to say about my country, simply and cordially, as in a family gathering, sure that you will take my words in a kindly spirit.

Do not fear, on the other hand, any attempt on my part to boast or to impose upon you one-sided truths or to swell the truth to undue proportions. Boasting is repugnant to French taste and habits: whatever may be thought of us, the one accusation which, I think, can hardly be moved against France, is that of megalomania. French heads may be misshapen in various ways, but, by general consent, they are not swollen heads. If, therefore, I am led by my subject sometimes to speak of France eulogiously, I hope I can advance good reasons for it, or else that you will not ascribe it to any intention on my part to trumpet the worth of my country beyond what is historically true or philosophically plausible.

In treating this subject I place myself on the ground taken by the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, the founders of the cosmopolitan view of the relations between nations. They were the first to extend their survey of human morals, manners, and characteristics beyond the boundaries of one country and encompass the whole human species within their ken. They, the apostles of the Rights of Man and of the law of progress, considered that "enlightenment" (on which the Rights of Man were based and whence flowed progress) resulted from the joint efforts of the civilized countries, each bringing her contribution to the common treasure of notions, doctrines, principles, and viewpoints, the ideal of each reacting on the thought of all, owing to the more and more frequent communications from one center to another. This cosmopolitan view of the genesis and growth of civilization was adopted later by Goethe, who acknowledged his debt to the French philosophers and joined them in calling for an ever-increasing interpenetration of men's minds, antiquity being the common master of all and every

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modern people modestly offering their best to serve the interests of the human community. What the French styled "cosmopolitanism" (and Goethe called "culture," equally pacific in spirit) suggested in France to Abbé de Saint-Pierre his *Project for Perpetual Peace*, and later in Germany to Immanuel Kant his *Proposal for Perpetual Peace*. How far this culture and pacific disposition of the older Germany (then at one with the spirit of French literature and thought) from the *Kultur* of the modern Prussianized Germany, arrogant, haughty, self-centered, contemptuous, which meant to compel the world to bow to its tenets after having crushed it under its iron heel!

After the war, as before, France wishes for nothing else but to lend her ears to the voices from parts of the world where noble nations have built great and enduring civilizations, asking in return only to make her voice heard, in all humility, one among many, with what advantages she may derive from the antiquity of her history, the spiritual strength of the truths she has brought to light, and the persuasiveness and win-

someness of expression her writers may have reached.

Before I approach my chief subject, I feel bound to justify, as it were, the very choice of the theme, by envisaging the French spirit in its general aspects, as it has remained true to itself or has developed by natural growth or under pressure of experience, in the distant or the more recent past. I should like to-day to take a broad survey of the temper of France, and, if I can, substantiate by a few broad considerations the claims of France to be considered as a land of idealism.

It may not be amiss, before everything else, to dispel the prejudices that are still lingering in some quarters concerning France. In the eyes of a certain number of people, Paris (even after her gallant bearing under the air-bombardments and the threat of imminent assault) is still the "gay city"—which is not all meant as a compliment. It is not unusual still to hear (although with less insistence than of old) the French metropolis denounced as "the modern Babylon." I do not mean to contend that the forms of vice or of loose living Paris is accused of

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harboring are not to be found there. What is noticeable is that they are discovered by foreigners—including, I surmise, a few Americans—while the French have to be told of their existence. That is, gay life of the objectionable sort in Paris runs its course outside the path of honest working, well-meaning citizens. It is to be sought on purpose by those who, having come to Paris to idle away the time, hardly mix with the regular, plain, and, as such, typical elements of the population. A few places of amusement, of a nature that moral theory reprobrates (and actual practice, in every country, tolerates) do not always in Paris mysteriously close their doors or shyly disguise their front window, as sometimes happens elsewhere. How can this be accounted for?

In the first place, there is a certain conception of liberty to which the French are very much attached. They may not have succeeded very well in securing for themselves political liberty (at least they are often reminded of it by the obtrusive, off-hand ways of the so-called public servants, playing the masters in the name of very

searching administrative regulations). But they claim a wide range of freedom as regards individual conduct. Does it mean that they intend to misuse that freedom? Not so. They wish to feel that, if they steer clear of rocks and sand-banks, they owe their safety to none but themselves. They are ready to assume the responsibility of possible misdeeds, as they want to reap the benefit of intended right-doing. In every Frenchman there is an artist, who, even deprived of the gift of expression, takes intense pleasure in the exercise of the creative instinct, were it only in shaping the course of his own life. He ascends the steep slope of life with the zest of the Alpine climber who trusts his strength and experience and refuses the guidance of a professional. He runs more risks. He may end his career prematurely; but if he succeeds, he tastes one of the greatest joys in life and feels elated by the very hardships of the trial.

Because of this desire for freedom and of this artistic bias the French object to laws that impose on all uniform rules of conduct and rebel against police interference in pri-

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vate life. On the same grounds, public opinion adopts broad standards of judgment that overlook petty slips provided the heart be good. I do not mean to contend this is the best mode of behavior; society may fare better when a solid structure of *caveats* and *vetos* frames in the stream of private doings. The French claim for their system the merit of spontaneity and sincerity, and think, in it, there is room for a certain mellow philosophy of life which is not devoid of charm. They do not contest the point of view of their opponents; they only ask them one or two questions. Is not the openness of some places of pleasure (which at least keeps them within the limits of decency) better than secrecy broken into by periodical outbursts of scandal? Does not the severity with which French life is sometimes judged come from a habit of mind which lays more stress on outward respectability than, as may happen, on the actual value of the deed? Are not some fits of virtuous indignation, after all, simply the result of a difference in ways of looking at things—human nature being very much the same the world over with re-

gard to weakness in presence of temptation and dereliction of duty?

This brings me to the second reason that may account for the unguardedness or audacity, as some think, of French manners. The French, in some respects a very punctilious and fastidious people, take in as part of their philosophy of life some facts of nature that other nations, with a different education or turn of mind, shrink from looking in the face. Yet such facts will crop up and have to be faced, for instance in war time or where social investigators have to carry on their inquiries. The French do not fall into the error of declaring nature good: they have too nice a sense of the discrimination of values and too much respect for the dignity of man not to know that there is a nature opposed to nature, and that the physical ought not to take precedence over the spiritual. But while abandoning none of the rights of the spirit, they allow for some irrepressible instincts and impulses which it is better to make room for (and thus watch and control) than to ignore and then see some day burst into ugly distempers.

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French literature, as the expression of the national bias toward moral individualism and discreet naturalism, has often fallen under the same arraignment as French manners. Here, again, differences of points of view ought to temper the severity of critics. Are the French very much more to blame than Shakespeare in his less guarded passages? The French are nearer the point of view of the Renaissance than that of the Puritan Anglo-Saxon world of to-day. The French novel has been accused of innovating what is sometimes called the abominations of the sex-motive. Let us remember that intellectual habits and literary fashions will often change the attitude of the public toward such matters. When Flaubert wrote *Madame Bovary* (a masterful analysis of the devastations wrought in a woman's life by romantic passion) France was not ready to accept such a daring exposure of the secrets of the female heart: the work was prosecuted in the courts. To-day Flaubert seems tame in comparison with some modern writers. The evolution gone through by France is now in process in America. The

point of view of the vanguard novelists on this side the Atlantic has met the French point of view—just at the moment, I must add, when the French, finding the adventures of irregular love to grow monotonous from constant repetition, are shifting the stale theme and taking interest in new fields of human psychology.

With this broad acceptance of nature, French writers have deemed it their right—and sometimes their duty—to treat without any timidity all the phases of human passions. Their interest in exceptional passions is not to be accounted for because they despise the dictates of morals, but because they find there a richer field of observation and an ampler source of emotion. In the conflict between goodness and truth they decide for truth—thinking that, all things considered, the recognition of the primacy of truth may be the surer, if not the apparently smoother, way to goodness. A distinction must be made between the writers of uncontested genius or talent and the scribblers who sometimes usurp the favor of the public, at any rate of that part of the public

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less prompt to detect cheap tricks or vulgar sleight-of-hand. The latter find booksellers, especially beyond the frontier of the Rhine, to disseminate their noisome trash. Thus have French "yellow-backs" acquired a suspicious reputation in imperfectly informed circles abroad.

There remains to examine the case of such a writer as Zola, for instance. A true artist, a keen searcher of the recesses of the human heart, a powerful painter of life in its minute variety and epic grandeur, a master of phrase and verbal coloring, he committed the one mistake (for which his time was as much responsible as himself) of introducing into his novels episodes too much like clinic cases and descriptions fit only for privately printed reports of nervous pathology. That this was an error of taste, and an indiscretion of judgment under the influence of scientific views wrongly forced into literature, but no sign of an ignoble nature or a loathsome personality, appeared clearly when, in the name of truth and by reason of the same cult of science, he raised his voice in accents heard throughout the world to rescue the innocent

Captain Dreyfus from the toils of forgers and rouse hoodwinked courts-martial to respect of the inalienable rights of citizenship and liberty.

Zola is not the monster that he has been represented to be; the French novel is not the hot-bed of corruption that prejudiced moralists denounce; the French drama redeems its audacities by a keenness of psychological analysis and (paradoxical as it may seem) a moral earnestness, highly praised by those who view life steadily. Life is not a collection of Christmas *bergerets* or of illustrations for Sunday schools. French literature eschews the conventional representation of edulcorated facts and of chubby faces on a background of periwinkle blue. That French literature is written for mature and full-grown readers, not for youth to whom *maxima debetur reverentia* will explain many things. I do not wish to extol French production, but simply to point out that, with its due share of weakness and blemishes, on the whole it is instinct with a consistent and virile spirit, where the trained mind distinguishes a frank yet discriminat-

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ing attachment to nature, a bold yet refined preference for truth, a choice for individual experience and personal determination in the arduous task of character-building and the finding of the law. My aim is chiefly to suggest that, whatever peculiarities or, as some think, perilous idiosyncrasies the French may show, none of their drawbacks is an obstacle to an idealistic attitude toward life. There is no antagonism between love for truth and spiritual aspiration. France, in her past history, in her recent record, in her art and literature, in her characteristic moods, has always been an idealistic nation. From France, as from a sanctuary, radiated great ideals, to which the French people, by their noble enthusiasm, their emotional *élan*, their unselfishness and geniality, imparted a force of impact that carried them home to the hearts of all the friends of humanity.

Like a pyramid raised on a triple foundation, French idealism rests on the triple basis of sentiment, reason, imagination.

Sentiment is not only a quality of French literature; some of its most significant manifestations are also to be met with in life. It

takes rise in the family and thence spreads over the field of private or social activity, pervades the thoughts and acts of individuals, as such or as members of the community, extends beyond the national boundaries, wherever French initiative makes itself felt to help the world build its destiny.

What an absurd notion has been hawked about in English-speaking countries, that the French have no word for "home." They might lack the word and have the thing. But what more beautiful word than "*chez-soi*," used in every-day conversation, and "*foyer*" used in more lofty style? Those of your soldiers who have entered French *foyers* (and they were many) know their pleasant coziness and delicate intimacy. Above all, there breathes about them a gentle, sweet, comforting atmosphere of sentiment. The French woman, whatever her intellectual, artistic, or social qualities, whether she is a leader of conversation in her *salon*, an able musical performer, an arbiter of taste, an initiator of community activities, is essentially a mother. In the

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provinces, where life flows away in quiet evenness, the care of the household and the education of the children take up the best of her time, until it is the grandchildren who come in and lay claim to her attention. In Paris and the large cities, whose bustle will not leave the woman free to devote herself exclusively to the home-cult, she nevertheless reserves a due share of her time for companionship with her husband and heart intercourse with the children. French children are much at home, being kept there by long daily school exercises and having few calls for outdoor sports. The mother supervises their work, lightening, if need be, the intellectual strain, creating by her love a glow of sweet sentiment about the youthful brood. The feelings flow from heart to heart, filling the home, where they mix with the memory of the past generations. The family house, which has sheltered the births and deaths of parents and forbears, is sacred to a Frenchman. Unless pressing necessities wrench him from his native place, he will stick to it and make the best of his opportunities where he was born, not choosing

lightly to give up the sweetness of the sentiments associated with the *foyer*.

With the peasants—the hardy tillers of the soil, owners of their plot of land, who are the backbone of the country—the home feeling extends to the very earth from which they draw their sustenance and create the best part of the wealth of the country. With what benign patience or cheerful alacrity they do the work of the fields—men, women, and children—not as an irksome task but a labor of love! For, in doing it, they strengthen in themselves the feelings of ancient piety, that, through the earth, bind them to their lineage of plowmen ancestors. With what pride the farmer, of a Sunday, takes a leisurely walk about his property to watch the progress of his crops and judge of the result of his pains! So many generations have toiled on those fields, that they are impregnated with human feelings—gratefulness, reverence, sympathy, admiration, love—dimly felt by those who come as heirs and successors of the departed. The peasants of the French countryside have fine natures, spontaneously attuned to the higher spir-

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itual values, permeated through obscure channels by the waves of civilization rippling away from Paris and the large cities. In the nineteenth century, universal free education and democracy have made the country people conscious citizens without stripping them of the time-honored feelings and traditional piety that steam up from the soil with the breath of the dew and hover round in the gentle warmth of the home.

One must keep in mind those refined delicate feelings to understand how difficult it is for France to-day to forgive or forget the wanton havoc wrought by the Germans on one fifth of the French territory. In the first months of the war, when the invaders thought that "degenerated" France would collapse under the crushing blow, the Teuton soldiery carried out cheerfully the frightful orders of their lord, summed up in his letter to Francis Joseph on the eve of the conflict: "We will wage war on all, old men, women and children, burn down villages, raze farmhouses to the ground, leave the land desert and reeking—this is the way to make the war short, and, all considered, to

conduct it humanely." What the French have suffered during four years and a half of the terrible ordeal, what they are still suffering in the devastated regions, is hard to realize. Yet the refugees, that had dispersed to the non-invaded parts of the country, have been flocking back to the old villages, the old fields, the ghosts of their homes, the sites of the churchyards. Even before they could expect to have their houses rebuilt they have hurried back, in spite of the discomfort, the exposure, the solitude, the sad want of the amenities of existence. Taking shelter in caves or in dug-outs, erecting hasty shanties for their cattle, they have, in three years, restored the whole devastated area to cultivation. They wanted to mark, were it by a signpost, the place of their homes, to make their own plot of earth (the soil consecrated by the labor of their fathers) smile again with verdure and harvests, to bring in life triumphant with the train of feelings that give it worth and beauty.

In those feelings centered round the home and the glebe lies the source of French patriotism. The complex assemblage of

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thoughts, memories, ideals, and hopes that makes up this patriotism rests at bottom upon the elemental attachment to the mother earth, loved with an intensity where meet the loves of sixty generations. This explains why French patriotism as a unifying force in the formation of the national character and of the body of the nation appeared early in the course of the history of the country and found its herald and prophet in a frail, heroic peasant girl martyred for her faith in the heavenly behests and in the future of France, all meekness and pity, and all spiritual strength and moral energy, who, first of a long line of patriots, set the example of individual sacrifice for the triumph of the noble cause of home and country.

Many powerful feelings have gathered about that central worship of the soil to produce in its purity and fervor that wondrous devotion to *la patrie*, as a living entity, which finally sprang forth in 1914 and stemmed at the Marne the furious onslaught of two million invaders on a front of two hundred miles. There lives in French hearts a spontaneous piety (in the nature of a spiritual

instinct) for the civilizing mission to which France has ever dedicated herself. She stopped the invasions of the Huns, of the Teutons, of the Arabs, of the Northmen. Those of the barbarians who had settled on parts of her soil she assimilated and turned into Christians and chivalrous men-at-arms. When the Norman barons, flushed with the conquest of Britain, grew ambitious of making her an appendage of the kingdom over the Channel, France resisted for a hundred years, finally maintaining her independence and glorious traditions. Henceforth her hard task, attended by many sacrifices, consisted in thwarting the attempts of all proud conquerors at establishing their hegemony over Europe. She fought Spain in the Pyrenees and in Flanders, Austria in Lorraine and in Lombardy, imperial Germany under the very walls of Paris, with the purpose, while saving herself, to save the individuality and personality of other nations, so that the harmonious diversity, favorable to liberty, to intellectual and moral progress and to the higher values of life, should be preserved.

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When she herself erred—which she does not deny—there was often an excuse for her vagaries. Before Louis XIV became intoxicated with the fumes of victory and conquest, he had fought to protect France and gain for her boundaries set by nature. Were the French people responsible? Autocracy ruled without limitations. The nobles went where they were led; as for the peasants, they died of famine, while the bells rang for victory and the poets sang the greatness of the Sun-King. French letters, French thought, French social refinement attained their perfection in that age—which to some extent is a compensation for political blunders. Thought, thus roused to the full sense of its power, was soon to take precedence over authority and to usher in revolt against tyranny.

One century later, the victorious armies of France were again pouring over Europe—citizen-armies this time, confident that they were spreading democratic faith through enslaved countries, in the spirit of a crusade against despotism and the powers of darkness. Revolutionary France had been at-

tacked by the banded tyrants of Europe, threatened with chastisement and destruction for disturbing the awful quiet of ignorance and servitude. She put her foes to flight and pursued them on their own soil, calling on the peoples to free themselves, planting liberty-trees in delivered cities and enlisting foreign recruits eager to fight for the regeneration of the world. Militarism waylaid her on her glorious road: Napoleon from Consul of the Republic made himself Imperator, with ambitions which might have roused a Brutus to a desperate deed, had he not skillfully concealed under democratic simplicity and lip-respect to republican forms his tyrannous dispositions. France was deceived. Shall we say it was her excuse or her misfortune? Both. Napoleon the man carried about him such a magnetic power that fifty years after the heyday of his success a scion from his stock, reviving the great memories of the epic years, usurped a popularity he owed only to his great uncle's name. Napoleon III was an idealist who sincerely played the game of a dictator professing devotion to republican principles.

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He led France to the help of Italy fighting for her independence and her unity. He even favored the movement toward unification which had begun in Germany, fooled by Bismarck and Moltke, who cunningly dissimulated the imperialistic designs of Prussia. The result was the cruel defeat of 1870, which caused France to huddle upon herself, cherishing and correcting her idealism, no longer for any rash adventures on perilous paths, but with the firm purpose to brace herself for a trial in which she foresaw, with prophetic insight, that the future of civilization and of democracy, the very fate of the world, was at stake.

France has been true to her mission. French patriotism, a spiritual instinct, purified from the taints that, at former troubled periods, had dimmed its luster, has risen to the supreme heights of sacrifice and vigor. It has kept all the force of impact which made the armies of the Revolution irresistible, but with nothing of the older romantic wildness. The French have evinced in the trenches, under the stress of invasion, in face of unprecedented devastations and atroci-

ties, a patience, a constancy, a concentrated energy, of which foreign nations did not deem them capable. Their idealism was no longer all *élan*, but also considerate anticipation of long thought out achievements, resolute will sustained by tranquil trust in immanent justice, virile hope for results matured by dint of effort, reasonableness in expectation and in action. Reasonableness has not driven out of their souls "reason"—in the properly French sense of love for general ideas and attachment to abstract truth. They still worship the great principles which their philosophers in the eighteenth century handed on to Jefferson and the inditers of the Declaration of Independence, twenty years later to be inserted more fully in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and now inscribed on the front of public buildings in the cities and villages of France.

The French principles, born of speculative reason, vitalized by spiritual imagination, translated into action by strength of feeling, from the first assumed the form and force of religious dogma. Less prone than the Anglo-Saxons to conceive visions of the

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immaterial world, the French are religious in the sense that they give their faith, ardent, active, entire, to values that transcend experience. With the mind's eye, they visualize a state of perfection intellectual, moral and social, capable of becoming a powerful incentive to noble and generous conduct. As devotees to ideal truth, they were apt, at a period of strange exaltation like the Revolution, to mistake the constructions of the intellect and the imagination for possibilities of actual fact and to reach out prematurely, with intemperate eagerness, toward the objects of their desire. The daring of the men of the Revolution proceeded from the mixed spiritual and practical character of their idealism. They founded a new religion, as splendid as the prophecies of the seers of Judæa, but which no longer postponed the boon of equality, the glory of justice until the life beyond. They thought man's reason and will had brought about the day of judgment; they believed they were heralding the millennium for humanity. Hence the radiant enthusiasm of the volunteers of 1792, whom Wordsworth saw with admiration sac-

rifice the joys of home to fly to the frontier for the defense of the saintly cause of French liberty and the liberation of the world. Hence the thrilled expectation of the workers in the great task and of those who laid their trust in

“France standing at the top of golden hours
And human nature seeming born again.”¹

Hence the exultant joy of the zealots of the new faith, when

“The Herculean Commonwealth had put forth
her arms
And throttled with an infant godhead’s might
The snakes about her cradle.”²

The French experiment in ideal politics could not but be attended with disappointment. Abstract truth and rational perfection are not the safer constituents of workaday institutions. The French had to acquire at great cost knowledge of the true nature of political action and efficient reform. They had to learn that the masses are not pri-

¹Wordsworth, *Prelude*, VI, l. 339-340.

²*Ibid.*, X, l. 390-392.

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marily led by reason but impelled by passion or swayed by habit; that traditional institutions born of hard necessity, compromises struck unconsciously as the best working makeshifts, have their good sides and ought not to be too suddenly cast aside and replaced by pure conceptions of the mind. Ideals, even genuine and embodying supreme truths, can with difficulty be carried massively from theory into practice.

Yet the French could proudly claim to have awakened the reason of mankind, to have made the call of morals imperative in public as well as private affairs, and vindicated the spiritual dignity of man, as such, whatever his class or condition. They had set in motion by their faith and example pregnant truths concerning political justice, the relations of men with one another within the commonwealth and without, a juster distribution of the good things of the earth, which could not fail to make progress, gradually lay their imprint on the constitution of all lands, and cause civilization to take a great leap forward. The enemies of the French Revolution had said with contempt,

“Once a Jacobin, always a Jacobin!” France has shown that with Jacobin faith it was possible to do constructive and permanent work.

France is gratified to think that her principles of liberty, equality, fraternity, after having helped the American colonies, in 1776, to take cognizance of their own will, influenced American democracy through Jefferson in 1800, and again through Sumner in 1856, when the last effort had to be made to formulate the full program of the antislavery movement. The doctrine and example of France furthered the progress of popular government in England, aided the emancipation of South America, of Belgium, of Greece, of Italy, encouraged the claim of Poland and the other Slav nationalities, and, in 1848, implanted what there could live of democratic aspirations in Germany.

The idealism of the French, purified by the ordeal of inner troubles and outer reverses in the course of a long and full century, has taken in the hard lesson of facts and no longer admits of the petulant san-

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guineness that caused them to believe, in 1792, that their fervid enthusiasm could work miracles. French idealism to-day is strongly tinged with realism. We hail universal truth as the shining beacon on the summit, which kindles at the horizon the dawn of hope. We bend our steps toward that luminous patch of the heavens, measuring the while the ledges to be scaled and keeping contact with the experience of the past. Thus we hope to be able to cover the distance permitted our generation. As much liberty for individuals and nations as is compatible with the obligations that ought to bind citizens in the commonwealth, peoples in the world-concert; as much equality as will further the ascension of the masses, yet not smother the natural or acquired superiorities of the *élite*; trust in the goodness of human nature in the races or nations that have shown themselves worthy of such trust by their capacity of self-control and their receptivity to the lessons of experience, yet distrust of those who have proved naturally akin to the brute or have suffered themselves to be brutalized by unrepressed passions;

willingness to forgive injuries and forego just revenge, yet with the firm resolution to hold impending punishment over the heads of guilty individuals or nations that offer no sign of repentance or make no move to repair the wrongs done; love of peace, even at the cost of sacrificing well-founded claims, but provided peace be not a fool's paradise, where the well-meaning would be constantly in danger of being assaulted unawares—such are the principles which the modern realistic idealism of France rallies to, broad and disinterested principles, recognizing duties as well as rights, cherishing faith in the brotherhood of men to the exclusion only of the reprobate or obdurate, entailing burdens (as all noble tasks do) with the hope that all nations, on whatever side of the Atlantic, will not fail, in time, to understand that fraternity among men or peace among nations can be secured only at the cost of definite commitment or entanglement—the word matters little. One ought not to be the slave of a word when new facts, new aspects of international relations, new dangers looming at the horizon, as well as

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splendid new promises, have changed the face of the world.

Mixed reasonableness and enthusiasm is the keynote of modern French idealism. What the philosophers of the eighteenth century called reason—that is, the faculty of conceiving broad notions and drawing out of the data of experience truths of universal import, of setting laws to thought and conduct—stands in the background, regulating ways of thinking and pointing by anticipation toward the high goal which ought to be reached for the sake of justice and for the general good of mankind. In the foreground stands reason in the modern sense; that is, the faculty of composed and considerate thinking, weighing possibilities, taking stock of means of realization, spying obstacles, guarding against surprises, keeping a due sense of proportion; in brief, reconciling everyday wisdom with bold flights of thought.

Reason in the latter sense has always been one of the French characteristics—when the fever of some exceptional crisis did not keep it in abeyance. Reason, when it could exert

itself normally, has been productive of some of the best achievements of the French genius. Reason is the secret of the excellence of the French classics. It consists essentially in intellectual clarity, moral balance, and an effective exercise of the will at the service of the best tendencies of the mind, without want or excess. French reason is not satisfied with any notion, either philosophical tenet, psychological surmise, literary motive, or scientific law, unless it has been traced to a simple idea corresponding to a fundamental fact or essential relation, immediately evident to the mind. Any dialectical construction, nice analysis, elaborate working-out of a principle must be established on a solid basis. All developments, rich as they may be in subtle observations, specific details, colorful or affecting variety of expression, must partake of a leading general truth. In this manner, Descartes, who applied to philosophy the method of mathematics and made moral sciences possible by extending to them the law of evidence, may be said to be the inspirer of French classicism.

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French reason is less attracted by the mystery of life than by the effort of man's mind to translate into intellectual terms the data of life. This explains why French poetry (allowance being made for striking exceptions) is richer in psychological observations and thought values than in imaginative flashes, spiritual insight or startling transpositions from the material into the immaterial. French literature is supreme in prose, and, among prose works, in the moral essay, character-drawing, the drama, and the novel. In those literary genres the best French writers have not tried to shine by strokes of originality or flights of fantasy, but by the temperateness, balance, and universality of their thought. They discover new viewpoints, that seem familiar as soon as expressed, so fundamentally in accord they are with the very essence of man's intellectual nature. The personality of the author lies in the finesse of his observation and his keen sense of measure that keep his conclusions from extravagance as well as from tameness. His manner of constructing his thought respects the necessary grada-

tions and transitions which lead the reader gently to easy comprehension. The plan of his development is made slightly apparent, without clumsy or obtrusive insistence, as a guiding thread for those who undertake to follow him. He does not aim primarily at satisfying the craving for novelty or for the strange; he eschews obscurity, which seems to some to reveal the incommunicable and unveil the infinite. His ambition is to contribute to a richer knowledge of man or of society, to set off nice distinctions or relations, to draw into relief unnoticed circumstances or neglected consequences of individual or collective action, to go deeply into the study of manners, ways of thought, modes of feeling, with a view to extracting from those materials elements of human truth, of accurate description, of instructive comment, of fine moralizing or dramatic presentation. This is why the best French writers do not appeal only to the French public but to the wide audience of cultivated readers in all countries. In all times French works were extensively circulated or translated. French ideas spread in the world

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soon after they had made an impression in France. French taste, French form, French literary and artistic creations are eagerly watched, sought and imitated everywhere. The influence of France abroad is more massive than that of any other country because of the volume and the average excellence of its production, above all, because of its communicableness, its social radiance, its natural sympathetic and attractive quality, that gives it a charm—something of the charm that foreign visitors discover about the French people, when they have learned the language and come to know the manners of the country. Shall we be allowed to define this quality—the charm of essential humanity?

The great French author, universally and incontestably recognized as a world classic, Molière, is the very embodiment of reason. He belonged to his time and to all times. He threw ridicule on the singularities, pettinesses, aberrations or pretensions of his contemporaries, and, while doing so, struck at the very root of human foibles and shortcomings, as they have always existed and will

probably ever exist. Nothing more natural than his plays, which, in spite of marked changes in the ways of life, seem to depict scenes that might have taken place yesterday. Yet how deeply thought out those smoothly running, winsome, fresh, gay comedies! There is a purpose in all of them either of redressing a warped moral attitude, of exposing some ugly distortion of the mind or of the heart, of laying bare some willful dissembling or sly pretense. The mirth is delicate and effective, refined and simple, ingenious and unconstrained, above all true to life and to nature. The keen look of Molière searches the human heart with such thoroughness and seriousness of intent, under the light play of intrigue and pleasantry, that we are often moved to pathos in the midst of laughter. Molière, an equal master of comic effect and of tragic emotion, above all typifies the triumph of common sense. Whether vice is denounced or conceit rebuked, intemperate passion corrected or departure from the ways of nature ridiculed, exaggerated politeness mocked or even honest eccentricity or untimely virtue dis-

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couraged, common sense carries the palm. The plays of Molière, after three hundred years, still draw the largest audiences to French theaters; for the French recognize in his reason, measure, dislike of excess (either stoic strain or loose indulgence, finicalness or vulgarity) the very constituents of the French temper.

The good people of France behave, in the walks of daily life, as Molière would have had them to. They are neither addicted to lust of gain, nor niggardly chary of their purse; they like dainty cheer, but rarely lapse into gross appetite. They look upon nature as a gentle guide, yet do not trust her blindly nor retire behind a grim front of preciseness; they think love makes good marriages, yet will temper the passion of youth by the prudent advice of age and will see to it that a suitable correspondence of education, fundamental assumptions and situations cement the hearthstones; their women have conquered the right to independence and initiative, yet do not raise clamorous claims to equality with men, satisfied with exerting the legitimate influence that ac-

crues to them as the more sensitive and more persuasive half of the human species. In many a field of activity the French, as a nation, strike a happy mean, a note of reason and moderation, partly the effect of a natural gift, partly the ripe fruit of twelve centuries of civilization, of a rich production in art and literature, of reflective habits, careful education, and refined social manners.

In the field of what we might call practical philosophy French intellectual and moral equipoise produced works, like those of Montaigne and of Montesquieu, which have won universal fame by their justness, delicacy, and humane mellowness. Montaigne the humanist, who, with charming spontaneity and shrewd knowingness, first bared his *ego*—not the *ego* of passion, but of contemplation, experience, wisdom in the making—taught the world the great social truth that, in spite of the differences of time, race, or environment, man is essentially similar to man in his doubts or certainties, his pains or joys, his repugnances or admirations, wherever civilization has spread its influence. Because of his gentle humanity

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and broad sympathy Montaigne attracted the attention of Shakespeare, stimulated the emulation of Bacon, became one of the teachers of Emerson, and has remained in cultivated circles a familiar author, whom the readers look upon as their friend, nearer to their hearts than many friends in the flesh.

As Montaigne renewed, modernized, and humanized the science of man, Montesquieu founded the science of society. Like Montaigne, possessed of the rare gift of geniality, he knew how to instill his fine and attractive personality into a work of observation, of reflection, and of constructive doctrine. Keen penetration associated with sober judgment, minute attention to facts united to a broad outlook on original causes and remote consequences, noble idealism backed by a staid sense of the possibilities of the real, make the *Esprit des Lois* not only the pioneer book of all modern social science, but, in spite of the great advance of that branch of learning, the classic work to which students of sociology refer as a permanent source of knowledge and inspiration. It is more than a great book marking a stage in the progress of

world-thought, it is a working philosophy of government and of collective life. France registers with no small title of honor that Montesquieu's doctrine of the "separation of powers" (suggested by English precedents, but elaborated for the first time with logical thoroughness and definite consistency by the author of the *Esprit des Lois*) has become the very center and soul of the American Constitution. Thus an empirical device, touched up by French reason and vitalized by the political genius of America, has secured for your country a century and a half of prosperous, equable, and just public life. Montesquieu's scientific idealism, by natural affinity, nicely fitted in with the practical idealism of George Washington. France and America joined hands under the ægis of liberty.

French methods have not always been so guarded as the best-balanced French doctrines or the more reasonable French moods intimate. France, the country of humanism and enlightenment, is also the land of the crusades, of the Revolution, of socialist schemes and political Utopias. I surmise

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my countrymen to cultivate so sedulously the humane arts and the homely virtues, in order to keep their imaginations and passions under control, feeling they are apt to be swept by terrible waves of enthusiasm, when roused by powerful causes. In the humdrum tasks of daily life the French discipline their ebullient souls, giving zest to life by literary tastes, intellectual alacrity and the art of social intercourse. But there lies in their innermost natures a pent-up flood of passionate feelings and aspirations, which great individual or national crises may cause to well out in stormy waves. Hence the *saeva indignatio* of Agrippa d'Aubigné at the time of the Wars of Religion or of Emile Zola at the time of the Dreyfus affair; hence the romantic soul-riot of Diderot and of Alfred de Musset; hence the reforming fervor of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the epic grandeur of Victor Hugo; hence the visionary longing of Fénelon and the passion for justice of Proudhon. Is it too much to say that in no country has the collective soul more zealously responded to appeals for great actions? The *Marseillaise*, the cry of

the soul of France, uniting in its broad and deep strains the threnody of wounded patriotism and the universal war cry of liberty, has become the world song that all men utter in mixed anguish and joy. In quieter times, to give expression to the radiant mood of union, good will, and brotherly feeling among men, Lamartine's "Marseillaise of Peace" ought to be sung, in foreign countries as well as in France, at school festivals and solemn celebrations of the rising dawn of world citizenship. James Russell Lowell's noble lines to the French poet and statesman in 1849 deserve to be quoted, as showing how readily America responds to the warmth of French idealism:

"Thou who gavest politics an epic strain,
 And actedst Freedom's noblest lyric,
 This side the Blessed Isles, no tree
 Grows green enough to make a wreath for
 thee. . . .

"Ideal France, the deathless, the divine,
 Will be where thy white pennon flutters. . . .
 Bard, who with some diviner art
 Hadst touched the bard's true lyre, a nation's
 heart.

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"Swept by thy hand, the gladdened chords,
Crashed now in discords fierce by others,
Gave forth one note beyond all skill of words,
And chimed together: We are brothers!
O poem unsurpassed! it ran
All round the world, unlocking man to man."

The French were sometimes led astray by the very heat of their enthusiasm. At least, they have profited by the lessons of history. They have lived down the dangerous illusion that war, even idealistic and disinterested, even attended with epic glory at the bidding of a Napoleon, can be the vehicle of civilization. War may for a moment force a redeeming creed on a reluctant, belated world; but the sufferings it entails, the evils it unleashes, the soul-brutalizing it inevitably involves sweep away what beneficent effects it potentially contained. Hero-worship may be an informing force in the history of a nation, but there lurks in it the menace of the hero's getting metamorphosed into the grinning figure of an immoralist, trampling men's bodies and hearts to reach the object of his inordinate ambition.

How changed from the France of 1800,

the France of 1914! No trace left of what foreign critics called her fickleness and excitability. The French accepted the war imposed upon them by a maddened foe as a terrible trial that was to be lived through, for the preservation of the fatherland, dear to them for her beauty and fostering bounty, and for the sake of all that a long line of ancestors had made her: a spiritual entity, a creative force, a pillar of world-civilization. One generation sacrificed itself to allow the generations of the future to live free, with honor and with at least some guarantee of security. It was not a war of splendid battles fought in the open, with individual deeds of valor in the eyes of an admiring army; but an obscure underground scuffle, with treacherous death lurking on all sides. The French never faltered during four years and a half, sustained by devotion to a pure cause, by love of country and by the hope that their sacrifice would further the establishment of durable peace in the world.

France, with a comparatively small population, has borne more losses than any of her allies or associates. She has been impover-

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ished to a greater degree than the wealthier nations that gave her their help. Yet when the foe—the exquisitely cruel, scientifically destructive foe, of the doctrine of “war by terror” and of the practice of war to ruin competing industry—gave up the game as unprofitable, France, bleeding, devastated France, Paris reeking with the fumes of the bombardment, the million and a half French mothers in mourning and the million mutilated soldiers, warded off revenge and rallied to the moderate settlement of the frightful conflict, to the peace, not of reprisals, but of justice, proposed by President Wilson.

Now, there appears as much difficulty to settle the peace as to win the war. Germany is divided between sticklers to the old régime and republicans of recent date in such an uncertain proportion that her new-fangled institutions of liberty are in peril. The so-called German heroes of the war (who returned home laurel-crowned, abusing the credulous patriotism of their compatriots) are still exalting militarism and autocracy or writing books of hate. With a prosperous industry (undevastated by the war), a huge

export trade, no unemployment, Germany eschews the payment for the damage she has wrought on French soil. Hidden stocks of arms and ammunition are periodically discovered. But for the presence of a French army on the left bank of the Rhine, France feels she would never get a pfennig or have her frontier safe. How painful for her to hear such reasonable measures of mere precaution taxed in some quarters (whence she did not expect such unmerited severity) with the spirit of militarism and imperialism!

France cherishes the ideal of peace. She is sick of war. Her most eager desire is to devote herself to reconstruction and to the organization of the after-war equilibrium in the world. She is ready to assume her share of burdens, spurning any selfish advantage. Who, knowing the wisdom France has given proofs of as a nation in the last half century, her moderation in the parleys at Versailles, the greatness of her sacrifices for the salvage of civilization, will think it fair to lay on her, in the name of a vague pacifism, the accusation of retarding or imperiling the peace of the world?

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Those who have visited France since the war have seen her at work to reclaim her soil plowed up by the shells and poisoned by gas, to rebuild her factories wantonly pulled to the ground or burned to ashes, to repair her cathedrals, her town halls and private homes, and place the country again in a position to produce the means of life, to reopen the ways of trade, and to cultivate the humane arts she prizes above all things. They have not heard a word of hate. What complaints may have reached their ears are about the cruel necessity where France finds herself to advance eighty billions for reparations, lost property, care and upkeep of the maimed, pensions to widows and orphans—an enormous outlay (in addition to the untold sums spent during the war), which Germany owes her and has shunned paying by wily evasion and intentional financial anarchy.

France asks only for the legitimate means of giving scope to her national temper, which inclines her to home-life, attachment to the soil, pious respect for her traditions and ancestral legacy of art, sociability and temper-

ate action, and her worship of ideal values, for herself and for a gentler intercourse between nations. What she most cares about, after the terrible hardships of the war, borne in common, is to keep in their purity and noble disinterestedness her friendships with her allies and associates in the struggle for justice and democracy, above all with the sister-republic beyond the ocean, for which she entertains more than benevolent feelings, actual gratefulness, love, and trust that, when the hour comes, America will decide to play her full part in the maintenance of peace and the enforcement of justice to all, for all, in accord with all the well-meaning nations, and, if need be, against any renewal of the monstrous crime of lèse-humanity.

II

THE IDEAL OF FAITH AND CHIVALRY

THE influence of a country spreads in many ways. In primitive times force was the great agent of civilization. As the world progressed toward a more polite state, physical power could not keep its supremacy unless backed by the intellect and guided by the conscience. It is the most ancient law of the world—and, we may say, the most awful mystery of social life—that spirituality always takes precedence over mere animality. Man is man. The tribe distinguishes itself from the horde by the pre-eminence of the spirit, however rudimentary or imperfect, in our judgment, its first manifestations.

When the Western world was beginning to recover from the downfall of the Roman Empire, France was the first organized and cultured country in Europe. Her civilization radiated north and south, east and west,

like warmth from a glowing hearth, until cognate forms of civilization developed in Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain, partly influenced by France, partly returning influence on France, prompt to seize and assimilate whatever addition to her humanity might come to her from abroad.

It was never by conquest alone that France prevailed, although conquest may have preceded the peaceful diffusion of her manners, laws, literature, art, and principles of higher life. Now groups of men—like the knights, clerics, and jurists who accompanied William the Conqueror to Britain, nurtured in French thought and imbued with French idealism—were the founders of sister civilizations. Now her literary creations, like the *Chansons de Geste*, the Romances of the Round Table, the Romance of Reynard and the Romance of the Rose, with all their naïve beauty and moral wealth, roused numberless imitations. Now her art wonders, like the cathedrals, embodying as they did the purest aspirations of mankind in those days, became models universally reproduced. The University of Paris, in the

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thirteenth century, attracted students from all countries and started, in imitation, the whole movement of higher education in the world. The monks of Citeaux and of the Grande Chartreuse (the Cistercians and Carthusians) swarmed all over Christendom in affiliated monasteries or attracted to them the most influential churchmen of other countries, as Thomas à Becket, who took refuge for some time at the Abbey of Pontigny, in Burgundy. Great waves of enthusiasm, taking rise in France, like the crusades, swept over all the West, and as long as they remained pure of disintegrating elements preserved the characteristic features of French inspiration. But still more than any other particular event, precise influence of movements of thought, forms of art, types of literary work, or personal ascendancy of group or class, the soul of France soared above the plains and hills of her gentle soil and winged her way on the sun rays and air-breaths, raining light, sweetness, high-mindedness, or precious encouragement wherever she flew. The spiritual radiance which she thus scattered abroad rose from the blood of

her martyrs—Saint Denys of Montmartre (*mons martyrorum*), Saint Quentin of Picardy, Saint Sernin of Toulouse, Saint Trophime of Arles, Saint Benigne of Dijon, and so many others; from the piety and charity of her saints—Saint Martin of Tours, Saint Germain of Auxerre, Sainte Genevieve of Paris, Sainte Odile of Alsace; from the wisdom of her scholars—Abeilard, Rémi of Auxerre, Gerbert; from the valor of her heroes—Roland, Charles Martel, Godfrey of Bouillon, du Guesclin, Bayard, and the pure, naïve and wise, timid and undaunted, strenuous and ecstatic martyred Joan of Arc; from the greatness of Charlemagne and the sanctity of Louis IX. There took shape in the Middle Ages a luminous figure of France not so powerful as impressive, not so towering as winning, persuasive, and ennobling—a model and an inspiration.

Ours is not to trace the marks of French influence under the many garbs and guises it assumed in foreign countries—an endless and somewhat elusive task—but to try and sketch the image of mediæval France as it was seen ideally by the contemporaries from

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the tenth to the fifteenth century, as it shines in the eyes of the modern world and will remain forever—a thing of beauty. It is an ideal countenance; for the reality of flesh and blood was often defaced by the grossness of manners, the cruelty of behavior, and the failings of individuals. How could it be otherwise at a time when the authority either of church or king was but precarious, when ambition and greed were free to break loose, when war was a regular institution and famine and pestilence endemic evils, and when the lives of human beings counted for little? France had her share of plunder, rape, and bloodshed; she sinned by omission and commission, and heaped upon herself a burden of responsibilities painful to rehearse and dire to think of. In many senses the Middle Ages were the Dark Ages. Yet is it not significant that so pure rays of light shone in that gloom, that so bright features glowed, hailed by the moderns as beacons on their path? Are we not entitled to believe that it was a great race which in so untoward circumstances, in the teeth of so many obstacles, built for itself an ideal struc-

ture of moral worth, humanizing virtue, and ennobling beauty?

All the idealism of the French Middle Ages, in its intrinsic value and power of contagion, centers round two cardinal forces often associated yet distinct in their nature and in their effects: faith and chivalry. Christianity was the great civilizing influence in the Middle Ages. Nowhere did it gather greater impetus than in France. It found the aboriginal population, the Celts, prepared to receive its deeper meaning. The Celtic tribes of Gaul practiced a mystical religion closely associated with the sense of awe that pervades dark forests, bare summits, and bleak heaths. The Catholic priests raised their chapels and crosses on the sacred sites where the Druids worshiped their forest and mountain deities. The monks built their monasteries on the heights where the massive Druidic altars, called dolmens, had been raised. Many legends of fays and elves were transformed into stories of angels and saints. The same sacred fountains worked miracles, now in the name of the true God. The great number of Gallic martyrs before

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the Roman masters submitted to the spiritual hegemony of the Christian religion, testifies to the fervor of the apostles.

When the church had finally gained strength and power, its sway was made easier and firmer by the elaborate centralized organization established in Gaul by the Romans. The ecclesiastical hierarchy reproduced the administrative scheme of the Roman colonial government: there was a bishop wherever a *præfectus* commanded, and a diocese wherever there had been a *municipium*. How great was the spiritual and moral ascendancy of the early bishops—both shepherds of their flocks and evangelizers of the heathens—may be seen from the story of Germain of Auxerre.

Germain was a Gallo-Roman nobleman of the fourth century invested with the authority of *præfectus*, not hostile to the religion of Christ but indifferent to its precepts. His chief occupation was hunting and feasting. When he came back from the forest, his train loaded with quarry, he had the heads of the boars and stags cut off and hung on the branches of a tree that stood on

a mount overlooking the town. Bishop Amator had often publicly chidden him for his idleness and rough ways, but he laughed such objurgations away and went on killing game and carousing. One day as he was proceeding with his unholy trick at the tree he had a vision that well-nigh stunned him: God on high revealed himself to him and forbade him, in anger, to persevere in his reprobate behavior. Nevermore after this would Germain touch his bow and arrows nor indulge in any profane occupation. He became the most pious neophyte of Bishop Amator's, gave up his charge, left his castle, and, in time, rose to the dignity of a bishop and the honor of canonization. His bones were laid in the crypt of the church at Auxerre, named after him, and nine centuries later, when the pious zeal of the city raised a Gothic cathedral, now one of the best known in France, the scene of Germain's conversion was carved in stone on the tympanum of the west portal for the edification of the people—so vivid the story of his salvation by direct intervention from above had remained in the minds of his compatriots. A

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famous church in Paris was named after him, and he has ever been prayed to as an intercessor and saint in heaven.

Supernatural revelations were frequent occurrences in those days, always received with awe, and often inducive to generous deeds. It is to a vision that the foundation of the famous Abbey of Mont Saint Michel was due. The place where the basilica stands to-day was not an island in the early Middle Ages, but a promontory ending with a steep, massive cliff covered by a forest and called Mount Tumba. In the seventh century the bishop of Avranches, on the border of Normandy and Brittany, called Aubert, of the noble family of the Genets, used often to reflect with sadness on the sorry plight into which the church had fallen. The dignitaries had lost the pious zeal of former days. They no longer practised abstinence nor sought poverty, with the high purpose of setting the example to their weaker brethren and showing the way to deserve the eternal reward; they had become feudal lords, as eager for battle and pillage as any of the barons. They ruthlessly exacted heavy

tithes from the poor husbandmen and unscrupulously wrenched their estates from helpless vassals; the care of their fold and the welfare of souls were often the least of their preoccupations. Fervor and zeal had taken refuge in the monasteries, where the monks lived abstemiously, devoting themselves to charity and good works, and going about the country to exhort the people to Christian fortitude, and not unfrequently to shame the clergy into truer fulfillment of their sacred calling.

Bishop Aubert, a real nobleman and a dutiful vicar of Christ, often thought of those things and retired to the forest of Mount Tumba for prayer and quiet meditation. One day a deep gloom fell on the forest and out of the gloom a light shone, in which the Archangel Saint Michael appeared in dazzling armor holding his sword of flame. He pointed to the summit of the mountain, and lo! it seemed to Aubert that a crash came, ruining the isthmus, and that on Mount Tumba, thus made an island, a beautiful church rose, gleaming brightly in the sun on a background of shimmering ocean

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blue. The vision came several times, at various intervals, the bishop, deeply disturbed, trying to understand the meaning of that warning from Heaven, sometimes also doubting whether it might not be a trick of the evil one. A last time the vision came as a storm wind had suddenly begun to blow, violently turning the pages of the Holy Bible that the bishop had laid on his lap. The book remained open at a page where the flaming sword of the archangel pointed to a verse, and the bishop read (Rev. 12. 7): "And there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon: and the dragon fought and his angels, and prevailed not. . . . And I heard a loud voice saying in heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of our Lord, and the power of his Christ." This time the command was plain. God ordered the bishop to fight against indifference, corruption, and profane pursuits inspired by Satan—just as Michael had fought against the dragon—and to use as the instrument of his holy propaganda a militant order of monks, for whom he was to

build a convent and a church on Mount Tumba.

When, after several years, the bishop was ready to begin the work, the isthmus, undermined by the waves, crumbled into the ocean, and the high cliff alone remained, where now stands the Abbey consecrated to Saint Michael, famous in all Christendom, a monument to the pious faith in which Christian France endeavored to live in accordance with the precepts of the religion of Christ.

It was that religious faith—in those days the chief instrument of civilization—which from the first gave Gallo-Roman Gaul a decided superiority over the barbarian invaders, and later made France (after she had assimilated the Teutonic adventurers and rovers) the great propagator and staunch defender of Christian civilization in the West. It was a Gallo-Roman army in the fifth century that barred the way to the barbarous and murderous horde of the Huns under Attila, “the Scourge of God.” The victory was won in the Catalaunian Fields, north of the Marne (in the same plain where the destructive inroad of the modern Huns

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was stemmed by the French in 1914 and their second assault foiled and turned away by the combined French and Americans in 1918).

Three centuries later Charles Martel, founder of the Carolingian dynasty, drove back the Mohammedans, who, after invading Spain, had moved northward to Poitiers. France saved Christendom from the conquest of the Arabs.

Charlemagne sought the Moors even in the inaccessible mountains of Spain. It was when coming back from the victorious expedition, that the rear guard of the French army, commanded by the emperor's nephew, Roland, was attacked, as the legend would have it, by a huge army of Saracens, informed of their passage by the traitor Ganelo. The brave last fight of Roland and his Christian death became the subject of the *Chanson de Roland*, of Europe-wide fame, the vehicle of French worthiness and French chivalry, and the first rude French literary creation, soon to be circulated among all the peoples and nations of the Occident.

German historians have tried to appro-

priate the great figure of Charlemagne and monopolize the "Song of Roland" as a production of the Germanic genius. They forgot that the venerable emperor, of Frank origin, was thoroughly gallicized and spent the best of his reign in bending to his imperial power the Saxons, whom he considered as idolatrous and hateful barbarians. How can the sacrilegious scholars account for the fact that the emperor, as well as the heroes Roland, Oliver and the twelve peers in the *Chanson* call themselves French and express their love for their country in the touching phrase, *la doulce France*? In many passages we are reminded that it is only "those of France" (and not any of the auxiliary chiefs from other lands) that decide on the operations of war in council.

Charlemagne was the "most Christian emperor," the wise and pious ruler who heard mass early in the morning, and, riding at the head of his host, with Archbishop Turpin by his side, revolved the great purpose of sweeping the pagans out of the West. The poem was written three hundred years after the actual events, in the eleventh century,

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that saw the crusades. It was conceived in the spirit of the crusades, and though Roland did not wear the red cross over his armor, he was worthy of those who bore the holy sign. The great host of one hundred thousand men is returning home (stanza lviii) :

“High are the peaks and murky the valleys,
Dark the rocks and terrible the defile.
On that day, laboriously, the French cross the
pass.
For fifteen leagues around the din was heard.
Then, when they are making for the noble
country
And descry Gascony, the land of their lord,
Of their estates and their fiefs they have remem-
brance,
Of their daughters and their gentle ladies.
No one but sheds tender tears.
But more than all Charles is stirred,
For he left his nephew in the defiles of Spain.
In his anguish he cannot repress his tears.”

Those fighters are depicted not only as heroes and saints but as men, and for this reason become dramatic characters. When Oliver, who first perceived the deep masses of the enemy bristling with spears, announced that they were rushing in menacing

streams from all the surrounding mountains and outnumbered the French more than twenty times, Roland and Turpin and the peers—and prudent Oliver himself, who first advised his friends to sound his horn but proved no less intrepid than the rest—thought only of their duty and the noble mission given them to protect the rear of the army at whatever cost to themselves. They knew that they were going to die, but they found assurance against any weakness of the flesh in their sense of knightly honor and in their piety. The archbishop gave them a supreme exhortation (stanza cxv) :

“Seigneurs barons, no cowardly thought!
 In the name of God I call upon you to stand firm,
 That no fair-hearted man shall gibe us in a song.
 Let us die fighting!
 It is certain we shall die here,
 And after this day we shall not be living;
 But there is one thing I warrant you—
 That holy Paradise shall be open to you all,
 And you shall be rested there among the saints.”

When the French, assailed from all sides, are reduced to a handful, Roland decides to blow his horn, for which there can be

no dishonor now, when all human effort has been spent and those who remain gashed with wounds feel helpless against odds and treason. By calling back the emperor and his great host, Roland will at least have it that the pagans, fleeing in terror, will not rob him of his sword Durandal and will let the dying breathe their last in peace. He bids farewell to his dying companions (stanza cxliii):

“Seigneurs barons, God have mercy on you!
 Let him receive your souls in Paradise,
 And let them rest among the holy flowers.
 Never were seen more worthy vassals:
 You have served me long,
 You have conquered many lands for Charles.
 It is for this dire end that you have been spared!
 Land of France, thou art a most sweet land,
 But this disaster makes thee desert!
 French barons, God help you, who has never
 failed anyone.”

Roland has strength enough left to go about the battlefield in search of the bodies of the twelve peers, which he brings up one after the other before the archbishop wounded to death to receive his benediction.

He can then address himself to preparing for his own end, which is near. His last words are a prayer:

“O true Father, who hast never lied,
Who rais'dst up Saint Lazarus from death,
And Daniel from the lions sav'dst,
Save my soul from all the perils
For the sins that in my life I did. . . .”

Then, as the true liegeman of God, he raised his right-hand glove toward heaven:

“Saint Gabriel received it from his hand;
Then upon his arm his head declined,
And, with folded hands, he passed to his end.
God sent him his angels cherubim,
Saint Raphael, and Saint Michael of the peril of
the sea;
Saint Gabriel also came with them.
The soul of the count they bear to Paradise.”

With its imperfections of form, its simplicity verging on bareness, its scanty plot and jejune psychology, this earliest of European literary productions is instinct with human tragedy, great with chivalrous feeling, and edifying for its sincere faith. The knightly and the Christian feelings are constantly united. Feudal loyalty is idealized

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and made symbolical of heroism and holiness. By chivalrous honor the barons are made capable of the noblest virtues; by pious fervor they are led to do whatever can be achieved over and above the acts useful to king and country. Chivalrous virtue meant bravery in battle and the eager acceptance of self-sacrifice, either with a shade of prudence, as in the case of Oliver, or with a dash of rashness, as in the case of Roland, but ever without any taint of anything mean, without any low trick to deceive the enemy or take him off his guard. The knight might be terrible in battle, but he showed himself pitiful for a fallen enemy. He would have lost the esteem of his companions and debased himself in his own eyes if he had not boldly and grandly risked his own life while dealing deadly blows. Resorting to cunning or feint, or taking advantage of a disabled foe, was as degrading as theft or treason. Courage was to be daring and noble. Fair play and self-respect—the laws of the French *chevalier* and of the English *gentleman*—have remained to this day the redeeming features of war (as war

was understood by the Allies in the last world conflict, and before it was turned by the Germans into a hideous butchery and an orgy of frightfulness).

Chivalry throughout the Middle Ages, from Roland to Bayard, was the great school of honor, devotion to one's companions and one's country, fairness to others, even to one's enemies—indeed, as far as circumstances and prevailing manners permitted, a school of humanity. Nay, a higher motive often urged those men to rise above themselves and humanity: they were stirred to the depths by the divine call of religion. Fair dealing and self-respect, associated with Christian faith and fervor, became a passion, moving men to acts of disinterestedness and sacrifice which were triumphs over the lower self and the ordinary ways of nature. It is the ring of that passion, beautified by visions of supernal splendor, which pervades the "Song of Roland" and makes it not only a French but a Christian epic. The poem derives also from the same source a character of catholicity which the mere national motive, however lofty, would fall short of im-

parting to it. As Christians the French of the eleventh century already felt and thought *sub specie æternitatis*, a feature which persisted later when they became the great apostles of "reason." The "Roland" is a song for the French and for all the world, spreading far and wide its high ideal of chivalrous honor, self-denial, sacrifice for a great cause, and calling up that ecstatic vision of eternal bliss which attends great deeds achieved for a higher purpose than selfish or merely national interest—for the universal edification and spiritual elation of mankind.

The eleventh century is the age of the first crusade, when, under the impetus of French enthusiasm, thousands of Christians marched to the Holy Land to rescue the sepulcher of the Lord from the hands of the infidels. We have some difficulty in picturing how powerfully the life of the Spirit swayed the souls of men in those days, and how mightily worked the influence of concrete symbols. It was in France that the life of the Spirit waxed strongest for a space of four hundred years, and that the beauty of

religious symbolism reached its most splendid expression. Faith and the imaginative power of faith expressed themselves in the miracle-deed of the crusades and in the miracle-work of the cathedrals. Italy produced the unparalleled creation of a masterful genius—Dante's *Divina Commedia*. France produced her poem of sudden enthusiasm when her people stood up in spontaneous readiness to walk the weary way throughout the continent, eastward, where the land of the Saviour dawned its pure light; and at the same time her poem of long, patient, admirable worship, when princes and feudal lords contributed their rich gifts, and the serfs and artisans contributed their labor and pains, to erect those eternal monuments of spiritual aspiration and trust that raise their majestic towers above the brows of cities.

Historians have searched the motives that actuated some of the kings and nobles to start on the crusades and found them mixed with ambitions and desires that were neither disinterested nor pious. Such is the way of men. But in spite of all that has been dis-

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covered the traditional aspect of the crusades still remains valid. They were animated with the purest, holiest, most truly ecstatic zeal—the crowds of simple people who thronged at Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne, when Peter the Hermit, from the hill where stands the cathedral, called on them to give up all earthly pursuits and forthwith follow him to the East, over the snow-clad Alps, down the Danube valley, across the Dardanelles and through unknown Asia Minor, to the City of God, where the Tomb of Christ was barred by Moslem guards from devout religious pilgrims yearning to kneel within its sacred precincts. Those ragged plowmen, half-starving craftsmen, poor menials who had been taught by the monks that by prayer, penance, and forbearance they would be rewarded in the other world for all their sufferings on this earth, longed to complete the cycle of mortification and pious obeisance by undertaking that supreme pilgrimage and get here below an earnest of divine bliss by entering the walls of Jerusalem—the Jerusalem of their dreams and of their

expectations. Mindless of what they left behind, regardless of the hardships that awaited them, they started, uttering with one voice the mystic cry, "*Dieu le veut!*"—"It is the will of God!" Rightly were the crusades named by the chroniclers of the Middle Ages, *gesta Dei per Francos*.

He was animated with the purest and holiest zeal—the virtuous king, Louis IX, who, although many expeditions to the Holy Land had come to grief or only half filled their object, and although a long line of white bones marked the roads followed by the crusaders for one hundred years, undertook the seventh, and then the eighth and last crusade. He had prepared himself for his holy undertaking by showing the most devoted care of his subjects in his kingdom of France and by putting into practice a high conception of kingly duty that had never been seen before on any royal throne. He was a chivalrous king. In the wars he was compelled to wage against rebellious barons, and especially against the most powerful and ambitious of them all, Henry III of England (the owner of the finest

dukedom on the western coast of France from Normandy to Aquitaine), he showed himself generous in battle, magnanimous in victory, and scrupulous in treaty-making. As one vanquished vassal would not swear allegiance to King Louis unless he got permission from his liege lord, Henry of England, Louis approved of this spirit of loyalty and rewarded him by leaving him in possession of his castle. To those who had linked their fortunes with one of his defeated rivals (and who, according to the custom of the times, ought to have paid for this with the loss of their estates) he gave leave to come to him of their own accord or remain with their former suzerain, lest he should compel them to commit perjury.

For the common people—so often ruthlessly oppressed or, at least, ignored by his predecessors—he showed attentive concern. His behavior was that of a sincere Christian who had not been blinded by power and high station to the commands of justice and charity. We know through his biographer Joinville, who was his seneschal and companion in arms, that he would sit under an oak in

the forest of Vincennes, near his castle, on appointed days, to hear the suit of whoever had a complaint to lodge, nobleman or commoner. He had developed such a nice sense of justice, out of religious scruple, that he actually returned some estates or provinces to some of his opponents, as his titles to them did not appear to his mind absolutely beyond question. The kingly state with which he was surrounded did not prevent him from fulfilling all his obligations as Christian, out of human tenderness as well as in obedience to the prescriptions of the church. He founded hospitals for the sick, and, among other such benefactions, showed special concern for the blind, three hundred of whom were sheltered and attended to by his care at the hospital of the Quinze-Vingts, still extant to-day. During Lent he had old people, invalids, and needy children seated at his own table, and he waited upon them in person. On the eves of the great church festivals he himself washed with great humility the feet of the poor pilgrims and houseless mendicants.

A high-minded and cultivated monarch

withal, he encouraged letters and the arts. The Sainte Chapelle in Paris, considered as the gem of Gothic architecture, was built by his order as a shrine for the crown of thorns of the Saviour, which he had received as a present from the emperor of the East. He had the Holy Scriptures and many a Psalm Book written on parchment and beautifully illuminated by the monks of his oratory. He used to receive as a guest Robert de Sorbon, the illustrious professor of theology of the University of Paris, to which he had recently granted its charter, and which was henceforth to be called "Sorbonne," from the name of that first great luminary of the new seat of learning.

A lover of peace as well as of justice, he strengthened the institution of the "Truce of God," established by the church to allay the warlike passions of the feudal barons. He instituted, with the help of the bishops, the *asseurement*, or "surety," by which a lord who had taken the engagement of observing truce or peace toward another, could not break his promise under penalty of trial for high treason. His reform of the judi-

ciary gave rise to the "Parlements," or high courts of justice, that were to play a great part throughout the history of the Ancient Regime in France.

The portrait of this saintly king—well worth being canonized for his virtuous life as well as for his holy death on the land of the infidels—would not be complete if mention was not made of the will, or solemn instructions, he left to his son and successor. The advice he gave him in that supreme and most precious bequest is the confirmation of his own practice and constant endeavor throughout his life. "Dear son," he wrote, "have a gentle and pitiful heart for the poor and all those who are in disease of body or distress of mind; as far as you can, give them comfort and help them with alms. . . . Uphold the good customs of the kingdom and strike off the bad ones. Do not covet the property of your subjects nor load them with imposts unless you are in absolute need of them. . . . Mind your ministers and counselors be wise and truthful men, remembering the words of the Scripture: *'Elige viros timentes Deum in quibus sit justitia et*

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qui oderint avariciam.' If a poor man has a quarrel with a rich man, protect the poor man more than the rich man until the truth of the matter be brought forth; and when you know the truth decide according to right. . . . If you own, either of your own purchase or come down to you from your forbears, any property, however important, either land or moneys or anything else, which is of doubtful title, give it back; or, if the case be uncertain, have wise and just men make an inquiry without delay and diligently. . . . Dear son, I advise you to refrain from war against any Christian people unless they have flagrantly misbehaved toward you. If any have done you wrong, try various means in order to have that wrong redressed before you resort to war, and come to any acceptable understanding rather than fall into the sin of war. . . . And if it chance you are constrained to wage war, see to it that the poor people who have done no misdeed, deserved no punishment, should be spared any damage either by arson or in any other way. . . . Dear son, mind that the expenses of your estab-

lishment be reasonable and moderate, and that the money for it be justly gotten. I earnestly wish you may be averse to any foolish expenditure and any unjust levy, and that both your outlay and your income be according to right and to reason. Such wisdom and all other wise pursuits may it please our Lord to teach you."

The beautiful character of Louis IX, emphasized by his beatification by the church, is presented in its human aspect in the chronicle of Joinville, whose charming personality and naïve style add an element of gracefulness and sympathy to the greatness of the hero and saint it had been his privilege to converse with, serve, and admire in the daily walks of life. Joinville himself was a true "chevalier" and a pious believer, an officer of the king's army in the crusade, and one of the upright judges of Louis in the province of Champagne. His worship for the king, so touchingly expressed in his chronicle, is a proof of the great fame Louis acquired among his contemporaries throughout the whole realm of Christendom. He has remained to the present day the perfect

exemplar of chivalrous and Christian virtues, the living embodiment of the French idealism of faith and chivalry in the eyes of the world.

While Saint Louis had the Sainte Chapelle erected at the western end of the city the magnificent structure of Notre Dame was raising its bold front and lofty nave in the eastern part of the isle. The cathedral was the pious offering of the burgesses and craftsmen of Paris to God Almighty, as the chapel grew from the spontaneous oblation of the king's heart. The thirteenth century witnessed the wonderful efflorescence of Gothic churches all over France, among which were those unparalleled marvels of noble conception and devout workmanship—Chartres, Bourges, Amiens, Rheims, the last mentioned, the most perfect of all, with its forest of pillars and its host of statues, which had lived intact and resplendent through seven centuries, until it was battered and shattered by the modern barbarians wreaking on its unsullied robe of stone the spite of their defeat at the Marne.

All has been said on the Gothic cathedrals of France, masterpieces of the architectural genius of a country so rich in artistic achievements, imperishable monuments of the faith of France in the Middle Ages, and, despite the changes wrought by science and philosophy in the attitude of men toward the mystery of the unknown, ever-living symbols, piously revered, of the undying fervor of the French people. Everyone has read about the devotion of the whole people giving their labor free to build the cathedrals. Everyone knows about the daring technique which raised the fragile frame of grooved and carved shafts and vaults higher and higher above our groveling life here below and opened in the walls those wondrous windows with their gracile trefoils and pillarets or their flamboyant tracery, to let in the sunlight filtered through glass of subdued stains and hues, forming a glorious symphony of paradisaical glow. Instead of rehearsing in plodding terms the beauties of Gothic architecture using art for the most immaterial and impersonal purpose, I prefer letting two of your great writers speak on the sub-

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ject and express the wonder and amazement of the New World in the presence of those unparalleled marvels.

Thus wrote James Russell Lowell after he spent a day at Chartres:

“The gray spire, molten now in driving mist,
Now lulled with the incommunicable blue; . . .
Still climbing, luring fancy still to climb,
As full of morals half divined as life; . . .
Far up the great bells wallowed in delight,
Tossing their clangors o’er the heedless town.
Solemn the lift of high-embowered roof,
The cluttered stems that spread in boughs dis-
leaved,
Through which the organ blew a dream of
storm. . . .
I gaze round on the windows, pride of France,
Each the bright gift of some mechanic guild
Who loved their city and thought gold well spent
To make her beautiful with piety;
I pause transfigured by some stripe of bloom,
And my mind throngs with shining auguries,
Circle on circle, bright with seraphim,
With golden trumpets, silent, that await
The signal to blow news of good to men.”

Hawthorne, your poet in prose, was particularly sensitive to the pervading beauty of

the stained-glass windows, mellowed by time and delicately interweaving the sensuous appeal of their variegated tints with the edifying lesson of the biblical scenes or saintly legends painted on their transparent surface:

“It is the special excellence of pictured glass that the light, which falls merely on the outside of other pictures, is here interfused throughout the work. It illuminates the design and invests it with a living radiance; and in requital the unfading colors transmute the common daylight into a miracle of richness and glory in its passage through the heavenly substance of the blessed and angelic shapes which throng the high-arched windows. . . . It would be a woeful thing that any Christian soul should pass from earth without once seeing an antique painted window with the bright sunshine glowing through it. There is no other such true symbol of the glories of the better world, when a celestial radiance will be inherent in all things and persons, and render each continually transparent to the sight of all” (*Transformation*, Chapter XXXIII).

For a moving utterance of what the French of to-day feel toward those precious heirlooms of the spirituality of their race and nation I refer you to *Notre Dame de Paris*, by Victor Hugo. What our great imaginative writer understood and expressed with more penetrating insight than any other is the close communion of the soul of the cathedral with the soul of the people. His character of Quasimodo is one of the most suggestive and significant symbolical figures ever created by philosophical fiction. The stunted, deformed creature, whose physiognomy was a perpetual grin and whose ears were deaf to all sounds except that of the bells he rang in the towers of Notre Dame, is a powerful impersonation of the "people" in the Middle Ages, debased, cramped, ignorant, but finding in the Christian religion, when they knelt in the diffused light of the rose windows struck by the declining rays of the sun, or heard the chime of the deep-toned bells showered as it were from the very threshold of heaven, the only support and ray of hope which remained to them in this world.

This spiritual truth, that Victor Hugo with his poetical gift of sympathy divined and embodied in the immortal episodes of his novel, a French scholar of to-day, M. Emile Male, professor at the University of Paris, has proved through an accurate and thorough study and interpretation of all the mediæval sources, producing a monumental work of erudition instinct with the deep emotion that such a great subject can hardly fail to arouse.

The cathedral in the Middle Ages was the solemn "book of stone," out of which the people, ignorant of the written Word, could read the teaching of religion and take in the spiritual inspiration that it contained. All that forest of carved figures and subjects, in high- or bas-relief, that decorated in triple or quintuple rows the vaults of the porches, the tympana of the gates and the capitals of the pillars, that fill the niches, squat on the buttresses, nestle in the wooden stalls of the chancel, and hide even in the gloomy crypts where sleep the relics of the saints; all that efflorescence of painted scenes, with much dainty and minute details in the dresses, the

appurtenances, the aspect of the rooms and buildings, the apparitions of supernatural persons, are not mere representations of the facts of the Scriptures; they are loaded with symbolism, and in that symbolism the higher life of the Spirit, as it was understood in those days, is enshrined.

It is well known that Dante intended for the chief fictions and leading scenes of his *Divina Commedia* a triple meaning: one *literal*, as it appeared at first sight from the reading, another *moral*, illustrative of some precept or rule of conduct through the punishment or reward, eternal torture or bliss recorded in the episodes, and a third, *theological*—or, as the schoolmen said, *anagogical*—a suggestion of some mystical truth referring to the higher destinies of the soul. It is not so well known that the same triple interpretation applies to the sculptures and painted windows of the cathedrals. Both Dante and the pious “masters of the works” who designed the Gothic churches received this doctrine from the scholastic doctors of the University of Paris (where Dante was a student). The doctrine was expressed in

the Latin distich (which even set a quadruple key to the religious sculptures) :

“*Litera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria,
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogica.*”

On solemn occasions the people were taught by the deacons how to understand the meaning of the mysteries, miracles, lives of the saints, manifestations of the power of the Lord through unusual occurrences or wonderful deeds expressed in the symbolical figures that looked down upon them from the walls and pillars or shone in the painted windows. A strange flora and fauna had thus developed, with hidden meanings attached to every plant or animal, which were also found in the *Bestiarii*, or marvelous stories of beasts that spoke or worked wonders at the instigation of supernatural influences. The miracles were told in the famous *Golden Legend*, by Jacques de Voragine, out of which a little later Dante and Chaucer borrowed materials for their poems. The people could not read those books, but besides the sermons that alluded to their contents there were readings from

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the books to rings of eager listeners by clerics, born from the people and familiarly conversing with them in the long and wearisome winter evenings or on the eves of fête days.

The same edifying legends in the thirteenth century were staged on improvised theaters, first by the clergy and then by the city guilds, presenting to wondering or shuddering audiences, in the famous "Miracle Plays," the Passion of our Lord, the saving interventions of Notre Dame, or the frightful enterprises of Satan and his demons. In all these manifestations of piety through art-forms France was supreme. Such towering geniuses as Dante and Chaucer were indebted to her for their motives and themes and derived both encouragement and inspiration from her spirit. In those early times it was already the characteristic of France to show her supremacy in collective movements of thought and feeling, where the whole people was interested, which strikingly expressed the best of her national soul with an indescribable touch of geniality and infectious enthusiasm, so that

the language of her mind and heart became the very language of humanity.

The Miracles of Our Lady, that engrossed the minds of the people of the thirteenth century, are a proof of the growing influence of woman in society. Woman had hardly any place in the "Song of Roland" and played very small part in the whole cycle of the *Chansons de Geste*. But, as religious change then inclined the hearts of the people toward the gentleness, pitifulness, and purity of the Virgin to intercede for them and assuage the stern justice of the Lord and its awful decrees, so the eternal feminine was henceforth to receive due recognition in worldly concerns and be granted its rightful share of influence.

While the heroic poetry of war, warlike adventures, warfare in defense or in furtherance of true faith developed in the North, a courtly poetry of gentle manners, delicate feelings, and lyrical strains, inspired by love of woman, developed in the South with the *troubadours*. In those tender songs of idealized love we find a transposition in a new key

of the great motives developed by chivalry. Loyalty to the suzerain lord became loyalty to the lady-love and mystical adoration of the Virgin lent its ecstasy to the passionate regard for the beloved. All that the knight used to do in obedience to the call of chivalrous honor he did now at the behest of the fair one. As marriages in those days were nothing but alliances between families with a view to aggrandizing an estate or rounding out a kingdom, there grew a sort of tacit obligation for the young knight to pledge his faith to a fair mistress who represented in his eyes the ideal moral values so often obscured in real life by grossness of appetite or fierceness of rivalry. From the queen of his soul, throned in beauty and dreamlike radiance, the knight received a ring or bracelet that he ought not to suffer being wrenched from him in fight or in tournament. He had to accomplish, at the bidding of his lady, a number of feats of strength, valor, and sacrifice, which he credited to her in token of devotion and humble obedience.

Those ideal and mystical *liaisons* (which

actually took place in life and may be considered as efficacious forces of civilization in those days) assumed a marvelous glow in the literature of the period. When the itinerant bards from Britain and Brittany had brought to France the love stories connected with King Arthur and the Round Table, a whole cycle of courtly poems arose in which the sweetness of the *troubadours* mixed with the adventurous and masculine spirit of the *trouvères*, the mystical vein coming in, now in relation with idealistic love, as in "Tristram and Yseult," now averse to love and its dangerous allurements, as in "Percival." Chrestien de Troyes was the most famous writer of such romances, the true ancestor of "romantic" literature throughout the world, so widely was he read, translated, and imitated.

The idealism that pervaded those poems was of such an immaterial quality that it very easily passed to the realm of pure abstraction and gave rise to the symbolism of the *Romance of the Rose*. Personified ideas, such as Courtesy, Loyalty, Jealousy, Falseness, became the characters of a dra-

matic tale, the aim of which was the conquest by Youth of the Rose typifying Love. Thus grew a poetry of pure idealism, where the humanizing influence of pure love, reverence for woman, and victory over self in a glowing flow of passionate enthusiasm were the chief motives. Chaucer and, much later, Spenser drew some of their themes and much of their spirit from that thirteenth-century symbolic poem of Guillaume de Lorris. By her poets France disseminated through the mediæval world and handed down to ages to come the elements of the chivalrous respect for woman, which, passing over to this continent, is now one of the most winning characteristics of American civilization.

There was something of that respect for female gentleness and purity in the worshipful affection that two centuries later—when the minds were still swayed by the same ideals—France bore to Jeanne d'Arc. How can we best conclude this presentation of the temper of mediæval France but by calling up the beautiful figure of her whose *oriflamme* has been symbolically floating over

all great causes where noble patriotism blended with devotion to humanity? Jeanne d'Arc is universally revered as the very incarnation of sacrifice to country and the ideal. Her radiant figure is worshiped and loved, in spite of racial diversity, historical differences, and religious oppositions, wherever the forces of the spirit prevail over low, selfish cares or mean local interests. Jeanne raised love of country so high above all that may belittle or disfigure it that it established itself on a level with the ideals of faith and chivalry which were the honor and glory of that phase of French civilization.

She was an ignorant girl from the ranks of the tillers of the soil, but she was born with that distinction of mind which is not seldom to be found among the common people in a noble nation. Religious idealism she had imbibed at home and at the village church and the convent chapel. Chivalrous idealism—loyalty to the suzerain lord, eagerness of sacrifice, devotion to the common welfare—she had received from the heroic poems and courtly lays recited by rhapsodists at popular festivals or passed down

through oral tradition in the form of popular ballads. Such ideal characters as Saint Louis (whom to deliver from the hands of the infidels the shepherds of France, the *pastoureaux*, as they were called, had started on a march down the Mediterranean) and such as du Guesclin (to pay whose ransom every housewife in France offered to spin her distaff) had remained in her mind as models and objects of emulation. Especially was she moved to the desire of heroic sacrifice by the pitiful plight of her fellow countrymen, assailed by numberless evils in the course of that interminable war waged by the English kings with the connivance of a few ambitious French barons to seize the crown of France. She saw the angels of God revealing their presence to her and bidding her to go and compel the English to raise the siege of Orleans and lead the French king to be anointed in Rheims Cathedral. This was mystic revelation—no vulgar superstition. Jeanne was too noble and too sincere to have anything to do with magics or sorcery (although this was the pretext resorted to later by her enemies to

pass against her the iniquitous and cruel sentence). When misled peasant women, after her first victories, came to her and asked her to touch their strings of beads to impart to them supernatural virtues, she answered, "Touch them yourselves; it will be just as good!"

War in her mind was a dire necessity, in which she herself took no individual part, riding to battle and marching to the assault of the English bastilles unarmed, with her white standard unfurled, her eyes fixed on the visionary figure of Saint Michel pointing to the heavenly promise of spiritual peace beyond the conflicts of this life. Maddened rage, fierce hatred, and galled despoite caused the English and the Burgundians to disregard the greatness of the character of Joan and to inflict on her the cruel martyrdom in the market place at Rouen. To harden their hearts they had to persuade themselves she had acted, not as a saint, but as a sorceress, and that the strength she had wielded was not from God but from the power of darkness which appalled men then as much as the divine light exalted them.

What a proof of the universality of French idealism in the Middle Ages that the saintly figure of the Maid of Orleans has kept hold to this day not only of the minds of the French but of the Americans as well! How touching that revival of idealistic worship for Joan of Arc which took place on this side of the ocean when America decided to enter the crusade for human right and Christian charity, provoked in her distant continent by the distracted nation that had battered down Rheims, the symbol of Christian faith, and was trying to lay prostrate France, the home of chivalrous honor! I was here in 1917 and heard—with what emotion!—crowds singing with one voice a hymn to Joan of Arc, naïve of tone and simple of tune, so sincere in its plainness and so significant in its direct appeal. It is but yesterday that a committee of Americans sailed over to France taking a statue of the Maid to the city of Blois, whence she first started on the short campaign which was to rid France of the foe and also to deliver the heroic girl into the hands of the foe.

The Americans have understood that to

her fervent faith and chivalrous nobleness Joan added a new spirit which had already manifested itself in the short-lived movement of communal emancipation and had been voiced by the poet Jehan de Meung: the spirit of democracy. That daughter of the people typifies democracy in its most winning aspects: human brotherhood, national freedom, devotion to moral idealism, and self-sacrifice for the common good. She showed as early as the first half of the fifteenth century, when feudalism was beginning to wane, that it was possible to combine the higher motives of the past with the noblest motives of the future, sympathy for the humble, hatred of tyranny, allegiance to the community, and catholic love of humanity.

It is this faithful union of the older idealism with the progressive force of the newer aspirations which we are going to trace in our next lecture.

III

THE IDEAL OF REASON

WITH the Renaissance we enter a world in which the forces of the past gradually make room for the forces of the future. There had been an imperceptible change from the older times to the new. In spite of war, famine, and pestilence, so often recurring, in spite of the limitless sway of the political power and the absolute authority of the spiritual power, which drove men to mystical aspirations in order to escape the stifling atmosphere of their prison life, there had been a gradual stealing in of the forces of the intellect, a slow continuous widening of the horizon.

There seemed to be an impassable gulf between the high station of the feudal lord and the low condition of the villein; and yet the villein's son, when he entered clerical life, acquired a social status in which intellectual gifts and personal merit were recognized and

sometimes gave him precedence over the temporal masters. The crusades, which, after the first tumultuous rush to the Holy Land, had assumed the shape of regular expeditions, prepared with care and method, stimulated commerce and the arts. They put the West into contact with the East, superior in many lines of action, and, among other things, initiated Europe to the science and mechanical craftsmanship of the Arabs. Aristotle in Latin versions became known to the schools, and, although often misunderstood and misused, to some extent trained the minds to receive later the learning of the ancients in a more accurate form. In cities, the burgesses had gained wealth, resourcefulness and social importance, to the point that they thought of conquering their independence through the movement of the "communes"—premature and quickly repressed, but the forces of the spirit could not be smothered. Middle-class literature had made its appearance with the continuation of the *Romance of the Rose* by Jehan de Meung. Within the precincts of the church Abeilard had dared question the reality of

the "universals," those abstract creations of the minds of the schoolmen, which blocked thought on all sides. Among the people, the Vaudois (Waldenses) had started a heresy that emancipated the Christian religion from narrow dogmatism, placed man directly in presence of God, and declared that above the Scripture there was in the mind of man an irrepressible individual yearning for spiritual perfection, which they called the "eternal Evangel." They had been cruelly persecuted and massacred, but they survived, heralding the Reformation.

The discovery of the New World, the discovery of printing, the discovery of the new astronomy, the recovery of Greek literature after the fall of Constantinople precipitated the evolution which had been slowly maturing and abruptly ushered in the modern era.

It was in Italy that the Renaissance began, whence it passed on to France and then to England. In that vast and deeply significant movement France played a distinct and characteristic part. Italy had seized upon the new element of beauty, handed on to her by the Greek masterpieces. Ariosto and

Tasso attained at once a roundness of composition, a fullness of sensuous and emotional inspiration, a wealth of ornamental splendor, a delicate sense of harmony, which gave them uncontested prominence in the art of verse and set them masters of poets in all countries.

There was also in Italy a displacement of the center of intellectual and moral gravity. From the austerity of Dante and the mystical self-effacement of Saint Francis the country rushed into pagan riot and individual self-assertion. The Ego, so long compelled to submit to authority and rule, or, at any rate, cunningly to compromise with them, claimed its right to liberty with fierce eagerness. Art and finance, luxury and revelry, scholarship and culture, political shrewdness and imperial ambitions, lust and crime, all was good to bring about the fulfillment of personal desires and the enlargement of life through possession of the outward world. It was an amazing enterprise of expansion of the Self, but rather in the realm of passion than in the realm of thought; and its characteristic was to be

almost wholly regardless of morals. This welling up of untamed and unscrupulous energy, this proud aristocratic contempt of the restraints that bound vulgar souls, that glaring asseveration of nature in its splendid and savage nakedness was summed up in the word *virtù*. *Virtù* in a sense announced the world to come (although discipline had not yet brought in its tempering influence), but mostly partook of the unrestrained paganism which prevailed in decadent antiquity and of the vein of barbarous buoyancy which ran as an undercurrent in feudal times. It was not so much constructive individualism that established itself in Italy, as a form of aristocratic outlawry, typified in the Borgias and the Medicis and chronicled in the work of Machiavelli.

Very different was the spirit of the Renaissance in France, both in life and in literature. In life, in spite of the dark shadow of the religious wars, this period saw the ascent of the middle class, favored the development of the arts and crafts, and spread abroad a humane form of civilization, vying with the ancients in thought activity, moral earnest-

ness, and creative vigor. It produced such beautiful characters as the humanist Budé, the judge and statesman Michel de l'Hôpital, the artist and sage Bernard Palissy, the scholar Henri Estienne, the printer and martyr of the new learning Etienne Dolet.

Budé prevailed upon King Francis I, in the early years of his reign, to protect the new learning against the fury and hate of the clerical Doctors of the Sorbonne, who, scenting in science and philosophy terrible enemies, wanted to smother them before they could gather strength. Through the earnest endeavors of the humanists, the Collège de France was founded, which, to this day, has been the home of the pathfinders in the field of observation and interpretation of all things offered to the curiosity of man.

Michel de l'Hôpital showed such nobleness of soul that the scheming and cynical Marie de Medici bowed to his incorruptibleness and felt bound to appoint him Chancellor of France. Religious and political factions were pitted against each other in hateful and bloody rivalry. Michel de l'Hôpital worked for peace and union and

was one of the first broad-minded statesmen of Europe who conceived the ideal of toleration. At the session of the States General at Orleans, in 1560, he pronounced these admirable, most Christian words: "Those who try to further the Christian religion by means of swords and pistols gainsay their profession, which is to suffer, not to perpetrate, violence. Worthless is the argument by which they try to justify their doings, namely, that they take up arms in behalf of our Lord. Our Lord will not be defended by arms: *Mitte gladium tuum in vaginam.*" The Chancellor could not be accused of siding with those who were called heretics; he did not think either that heresy was to be let alone; but he believed in gentle admonition and peaceful efforts of persuasion. "Softness," he said, "will profit better than harsh measures. Let us discard those diabolical names of parties, factions and seditions—Lutherans, Huguenots, papists: let us by all means preserve the name of Christians!" At a time when the Inquisition in Spain was covering the country with *auto da fes* and when special tribunals were contemplated in

France and in England violently to suppress differences of opinion, Michel de l'Hôpital gave the judges of Rouen this solemn warning: "You are judges of the field and the mead, not of the manners, behavior, or religion of people. You deem you are right when you decide a case in favor of a man you think more moral or a better Christian—as if it were a question which is the better poet, or orator, or craftsman. If you don't feel sure enough of your conscience to overcome your passion and love your enemies, as God commands, then you had better keep away from the judge's office!" Such a man could not remain long in power when France was drawing near Saint Bartholomew's Day. He barely escaped being murdered by the infuriated fanatics on that day, and exclaimed, measuring the shame that fell upon his country: "*Excidat illa dies aevo!*" He did not live to see his humane policy triumph at last, when King Henry IV issued the Edict of Nantes in the spirit of his broad doctrine of toleration.

All Europe then was desolated by the intestine wars that arose from the conflict of

the traditional with the reformed religion. France had her share, more than her share of troubles. The wonder is that, in the midst of constant affrays and too frequent massacres, thought could soar high above the fearful realities of the time and outline intellectual and moral progress so luminously that not only France but all countries in the succeeding ages have profited by the achievements of the French genius, represented by Calvin, leader of the Reformation, and by Rabelais and Montaigne, leaders of humanism. Let us first give our attention to the two daring and wise thinkers who broke away from the stifling grasp of a dead tradition, renewed the founts of thought at a time when problems had to be faced with renovated methods, installed reason on her throne and heralded the mighty developments that our own days were to witness.

True humanists Rabelais and Montaigne were, who, inspired by the great example of the ancients, for the first time in the modern era set man on his feet and told him to look at nature around him and scan his own thoughts in himself. Strong with growing

knowledge of the outward and the inward world, they shaped man's course, calling on him to become his own tutor and the purveyor of his own material and moral needs, with the leave of God, sponsor of the order of the universe, but interfering not in the working of its laws.

In the Middle Ages, under the spiritual impulse of faith and the intuitive guidance of chivalrous honor, the French had reached out toward the great truths of individual and national ethics, illuminated by the vision of Roland dying, of Jeanne d'Arc receiving her behest from above. Through the hard trials of their uncertain existence they had sought relief from the sufferings of this vale of tears by gazing ecstatically on the bright guerdon of eternal reward. They lived for the other world. Ideally, they went here below on a pilgrimage, like Dante's, in the hope of making themselves worthy of beatitude in the world beyond. Life was but a preliminary stage to a Christian death.

The man of the Renaissance, as interpreted by Rabelais and Montaigne, took a firm and definite grasp of the actual prizes

of life on the earth. Stimulated by the great achievements of human reason at the time of Greek and Roman splendor, and feeling in himself something of the same mental strength, he trusted his natural faculties and meant to exercise them for his own benefit and the benefit of his fellow beings. Trust in self is the keynote of the age, backed and complemented by trust in nature. Man is eager to know—know this wide universe, whose laws he is beginning to discover and whose limitlessness he dimly perceives with awe; know himself, with the will to train his intellect for truth and the hope to conquer fatality by mastery of self and of the forces of nature. Rabelais and Montaigne, by different roads, with the variations which their individual tempers, the quality of their genius and an interval of fifty years introduced into their work, served the same end, furthered the same movement, stood both on the threshold of the modern world pointing to the way generations after them were to follow.

The modern reader has to overcome an unpleasant feeling when approaching Rabe-

lais, on account of his complete unconcern for propriety and even decency. Rabelais cannot be placed in all hands: for him, more than for Shakespeare, expurgated editions are necessary. That nudity of his, on the other hand, is so frank, so exempt from any innuendo, so plainly the bare copy of nature in its very indiscrimination, that, in spite of grossness, there is undeniable sanity about it. It is to be explained by the naïve acceptance of the entirety of the human body and the nearness to primitive necessities, which characterized throughout Europe the civilization of the sixteenth century otherwise refined, thoughtful, rich in intellectual and artistic values. It is to be accounted for also by the deliberate purpose of Rabelais, to set up a screen of coarse jollity behind which he might retire and plead not guilty, if he were too hard pressed by the censors of the church. For, in those days, it was not crudities that frightened the church, but ideas smacking of heresy or of philosophical independence. What Rabelais had to say might have thrown him into terrible straits and even taken him, as he said, "as far as the

stake, inclusively," had he not guarded himself against such an emergency. He had no vocation for an end like that of Berquin and Dolet, burned in Paris, or of Caturce, burned at Toulouse, or of Servet, burned at Geneva, all upright men guilty only of philosophical "novelty." Prudence then was a timely consideration that induced the author of *Gargantua and Pantagruel* to put on a mask of buffoonery. Moreover, there is no denying his bent for rollicking fun or his huge comic genius, by which he belonged to the ranks of the people and was connected with the popular vein of French gayety. However uncouth, unseemly and unreserved he may be, he produced one of the most precious, sanest, and greatest works at that time of transition when the modern mind was groping its way to light.

The giants *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel*, in their unwieldy mammoth-sized shapes, that give innumerable occasions for fantastic adventures, racy nonsense, extravagant gabble and boisterous fun, stand, when seen in their esoteric philosophical significance, for *man* himself, the renovated man of the Renais-

sance, shaking off the shackles in which the schools, the church, all sorts of oppression had gyved him, seeing through the opaque deleterious mist of ignorance and prejudice, daring to open his eyes and unseal his mind to the dawn of science and humanistic wisdom.

Gargantua is a king, who, instead of living in a court surrounded with guards and supercilious attendants, mixes familiarly with his subjects, shares their life, inquires about their affairs, and, entering one inn, will exclaim, "Keep seated, good people; give me wine to drink, and go on with your talk."

To remind kings and rulers that they are not above the common fate of men and ought, therefore, to be more conscious of their obligations toward mankind at large, Rabelais opens to one of his characters the gate of Tartarus. He comes back from the nether regions with a startling description of a world upside-down, with all the customary relations and stations of society reversed. "In this manner," he relates, "those who had been great lords in this world had to earn

their miserable paltry living over there. On the contrary, philosophers and those who had been ill-provided here on the earth, yonder were great lords in their turn. I saw Diogenes strutting in magnificence, with a long purple gown on and a scepter in his right hand; and he rebuked Alexander the Great because the latter had badly mended his breeches, and paid him with cudgel-blows. I saw Epictetus to whom Cyrus came and asked for a copper in the name of Mercury, that he might buy a few onions for his supper. 'Nothing,' bawled Epictetus; 'I never give coppers. Here, sirrah, take this silver coin, and be gone.' Cyrus was very pleased to have secured such booty. But the other rascally monarchs who were there, Alexander, Darius, and the like, robbed him of it during the night."

King Grangousier is averse to war—although ready to play his part valiantly as commander of his armies, in a defensive campaign, to protect his country and his people from aggression. He calls back his son Gargantua from college by a noble letter, in which he sets forth in lofty terms the

duty of action, when national danger commands to risk one's life for hearth and home, but expresses his moral indignation at the conduct of his ambitious and criminal enemy. His ambassador to the invading king delivers an oration full of the pressing appeals of humanity and reason. In an age when war was the chief occupation of rulers, and peoples suffered in silence to be led to the slaughter or trampled under foot, Rabelais issued his high-minded protest against the degrading savagery of battle. "Time is no more, the envoy said, when men can be proud of conquering kingdoms with dire damage to their Christian brothers. That imitation of the ancients, Hercules, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Cæsar and such like is contrary to the teaching of the gospel, by which kings are enjoined to preserve, guard, rule, and administer each his land and country, not hostilely to invade others, and what the Saracens and Barbarians of old called prowess, now we call brigandage and rascality. Better had it been for you to stay in your country governing it royally, than come and insult me in mine, laying it waste;

for, by governing well, you would have prospered, whereas by attacking us, you will be ruined." War must be waged; but the operations are carried on solely with a view to destroying the opponent's strength without any harsh treatment to the guiltless populations or any cruelty to the combatants themselves. "The deed shall be done with the least effusion of blood, and, if possible, by skillful maneuvering and ruses of war, we shall save all the souls, and send all the soldiers back merry to their homes."

The fate of the insolent, irate, insatiable Pichrocole, after his defeat, reminds us of the discomfiture of another conqueror of later times, fallen from the dizzy height of his criminal ambition, and left for his punishment to the pangs of disappointment and remorse. Fleeing from the battlefield, the beaten king saw a donkey tied to a pole near a windmill and wanted to take it. But the miller thrashed him soundly and took away his clothes, giving him as garment a sorry smock. Then the poor choleric monarch went his way and was told by an old woman that he would come again into possession of

his kingdom "when the traveling cranes returned." "He is at present a poor laborer at Lyons, as choleric as before. And all the time he anxiously questions strangers about the return of the traveling cranes, hoping as the old woman prophesied, that this will be the sign of his coming again into his own."

It was a risky thing to touch the problem of religion in those days. Rabelais intimated pretty clearly for those who wished to understand that he placed sincere worship of God—not the God of the theologians, but the benevolent, beneficent God of the simple people—above outward demonstrations of piety and mere conformity to the ordinances of the church. He put it in half-jocular words in the passage, for instance, where he speaks of "that great, good, pitiful God, the which never created Lent, but, on the contrary, salad, haddock, herrings, carps, pikes, bass, cod, etc., item, good wines." He briskly carped at the monks for their idle lives, useless—not indeed to themselves, for they enjoyed cosy fat benefices—but to the community. To the usual type of monk he opposed his Friar John, who could eat,

drink, and swear like a carter, but worked like ten men and thought he prayed best when he exerted himself most strenuously for the advantage of all. During the war of which we have spoken, as the invading army reached the convent, the monks with the abbot at their head flocked to the chapel and began to sing psalms and recite litanies. Friar John alone seized a wooden cross, rushed to the vineyard, where the soldiers had already spread, and, laying out right and left with his improvised club, knocked down so many that the others fled.

In his Fourth Book, published years after he had acquired uncontested fame as teller of wonderful tales and could rely on his character of a hilarious writer to shield him from unpleasant interference, he made bold to aim his thrust at what he considered a derision of true religion, and a state of mind little short of idolatry. He led Pantagruel on a sea-expedition which after a tempest stranded him on the Isle of the Papimaniacs. The people thronged about him and his friends. "Have you seen him, strangers? Him have you seen?—Whom? asked Pan-

tagruel.—The One, answered they.—Who is the One? asked Friar John. Odd's Blood, I will knock him down at once (thinking they inquired after some thief, murderer, or sacrilegious misdoer).—What! they exclaimed, you pilgrims don't know the Unique?—My Lords, said Epistemon, we do not understand. Do explain to us whom you mean and indeed we will tell you the truth without any dissimulation.—It is, they said, He who is. Have you seen Him?—He who is, answered Pantagruel, according to our theological doctrine is God. In such terms did he declare himself to Moses. Never indeed have we seen Him, for He is not visible to bodily eyes.—We don't mean, they said, God on high who reigns in Heaven. We speak of the God on earth. Have you seen Him?—Upon my honor, said Carpalin, they mean the Pope.—Oh, is that so, said Panurge. Yes, yes, sirs, I have seen three of them, and little did it profit me!" Rabelais was not antagonistic to the Pope more than to any other religious leader or spiritual guide of men. What he was after was the clearing away of any corrupt form

of religious belief or practice that smacked of superstition; he wished to effect the coordination of religion with reason.

Reason was the great force that then needed to be upheld, for it had not had its apostles, although its reign was sure to come. Under the superficial coloring of rowdy mirth, what makes the permanent value of *Pantagruel* is the advocacy of personal thinking, on the solid foundation of science, with firm trust in nature, as the preordained field for human observation, research and experience, with the help of the best intellectual and moral traditions handed down by the ancients. In the plan of education for Gargantua and the letter of Gargantua to his son *Pantagruel*, we find a lyrical eulogy of the new learning and a complete program of voracious study, including anatomy, botany, the application of the knowledge of medicine to diet and hygiene, as well as the best methods of training the mind through books, reflection, observation, classification and elaboration of the data of experience. Rabelais wanted the body to be as carefully attended to, nourished and devel-

oped as the intellect. His motto read: *Mens sana in corpore sano*, to which he added, to remain true to his assumed character: *sed non in corpore sicco*. His morals were one-sided, no doubt, laying the emphasis on the natural goodness of man and complacently comprising the sum of all wisdom in gentle obedience to the dictates of nature. But what could be done in the way of strict precepts and rigid law had exhausted its strength and, for the time being, resulted in a standstill. Future progress lay in the direction of an appeal to the better instincts, to the social sense and to rational adherence to natural and experiential wisdom. The famous formula carved on the frontispiece of his Abbey of Theleme: *Fay ce que voudras*, can be misinterpreted. For him it meant: Do away with harsh prescriptions, loose the mind from narrow and unnatural bonds, give up asceticism and obscurantism, bestow due care on cleanliness, health, and physical expansion, seek culture, regard decorous manners, prize the refinement that comes from dignified intercourse between men and women, love all things beautiful, re-

spect truth, practice candor, sympathy, and toleration—in brief, worship life—and you may trust the moral instinct inborn in man to profit by education and example and lead the rising generation to a saner, richer, and wider outlook. How many of the truths cultivated people cherish to-day we find expressed in the doctrine of Rabelais! Indeed, America was foremost in modern times to put into practice some of the precepts of the new wisdom as formulated in the hornbook of humanism written by Rabelais. Equal regard for the body and for the mind, scientific knowledge applied to the needs of life, free and unreserved intercourse between the sexes, religion viewed from the angle of moral and social activity in an atmosphere of spiritual idealism, aversion to war unless for the necessity of defense, eagerness for learning and devotion to the institutions of learning, public interests placed above private concerns, facts valued more than shibboleths—all points where American pragmatism meets French common sense, intellectual alacrity and reason, as Rabelais set the example.

What Rabelais had begun, Montaigne took up and carried one step further. With Rabelais the wisdom of the new age assumed a character of youthful exuberance and spontaneous cheerfulness. There was a fleshly healthiness in its enjoyment of life, which, when allowance is made for its willful boisterousness, yet contained an element of somewhat immature optimism. Montaigne represents humanism grown conscious of itself, of its indebtedness to the past of Greece and Rome and of its relations to the present. His trained and agile mind could no longer be satisfied with gushing imagination, brawny sensuousness, naïve delight in knowledge, and good natured laugh at the besotted sticklers to the world's nonage. With Montaigne the spirit of inquiry grows to adult stature, critical thought takes pleasure in exercising itself, the meditative mood settles in the field of intellectual activity. He had a varied and extensive knowledge of the ancients, and carefully sifted and weighed the lore he received at the hands of his favorite authors, the historians, the philosophers, the moralists—chiefly among them, his be-

loved Plutarch. He opened his eyes on the multitudinous aspects of the world around him, on the thoughts, feelings, and doings of men, appraised them in the light of the wisdom of the ancients, and put them to the test of his own experience. Especially he scrutinized his own soul, analyzed in himself both his individual peculiarities and the fund of universal humanity they merged in, and rested upon that foundation of composite motives and reactions his views of man, of life, and of morals.

The shrewdness of Montaigne's observation, his absolute frankness with regard to himself, as well as to the problems which men often shrink from agitating with themselves, his colorful choice of details, his originality in telling facts, incidents, and stories, the novelty and flavor of his metaphors, the piquancy of his style, and lastly and above all the charm of his personality, have made his *Essays* one of the best-loved and best-read books of world-literature. They were translated into many foreign languages. Shakespeare owned a copy of Florio's translation, whence, besides the well-known pas-

sage in *The Tempest*, he may have drawn many a precious suggestion of psychological or moral truth. Ben Jonson felt attracted toward Montaigne for the qualities in his work that herald the classical era. Bacon opened the series of imitations of the *Essays*, that was to prolong itself in many languages down to the present day. I need not remind you what important part the study of Montaigne played in the intellectual formation of Emerson.

Emerson saw in Montaigne the skeptic, and in this he was not mistaken. Montaigne, freed from the bugbear of dogmatism, starting on the quest of truth with purely human methods, found himself first in presence of the contradictions, inconsistencies, and follies of mankind and was too candid not to record them in their glaring confusion. Turning his searching look toward himself and culling from his own consciousness an egregious collection of self-conflicting moods and tendencies and a no less striking array of clashing judgments and actions, he again truthfully stated the result of his personal experience. Never were the variations and

uncertainties of human thought—not only in minor and inconsequential matters, but in domains where men most earnestly strive to reach permanent and stable decisions—more uncompromisingly exposed. “Here is,” Emerson wrote, “an impatience and fastidiousness at color or pretense of any kind.” Montaigne yields complacently to the flow and flux of things, considering that, whatever disappointments he may come across there, it is the common lot of man, and that man had better bravely face what he cannot escape from. “Whatever you get here shall smack of the earth and of real life, sweet or smart or stinging.”

Montaigne has no taste or aptitude for metaphysics. All that eludes the grasp of observation applied to the past and the present, to France and foreign countries (where he traveled extensively), to himself and to his fellow men; all that lies beyond the reach of the classifying, comparing, weighing and appraising powers of the human reason, seems to him useless conjecture or empty dream. To get a secure footing on experience, to keep clear of extremes, to ward off

surprise by foresight, to draw from reflection and moderation the best advantages they can yield, such was the aim of Montaigne. "Why should I vapor and play the philosopher," writes Emerson, "interpreting Montaigne's thought, instead of ballasting, the best I can, this dancing balloon? So, at least, I live within compass, keep myself ready for action and can shoot the gulf at last with decency."

Man is a fallible, feeble, fickle creature, that ought not to attempt more than his nature permits. It is only by spurning man's estate and straining man's power beyond its scope that some strive for knowledge of what they call being, substance, and absolute truth. If this soaring into the empyrean engaged but themselves, it would be tolerable and might even be deemed beautiful. But doctrine meets doctrine, vision clashes with vision, belief falls out with belief. From arguing in the realm of ideas, creed-mongers and zealots come to actual fighting with weapons, wielding decrees of proscription and excommunication, hurling mobs at the heels of gentle nonbelievers, and

dragging conscientious objectors to the stake. "Can men," said Montaigne, "lay so much store by their surmises as to cut each other's throats for them?" Is not the wisest course to possess oneself of the tangible goods in this world, to make sure of a few tried precepts that stood the ancients in good stead and about which reasonable men all agree, and, for the rest, take refuge in doubt? "He took and kept his position of equilibrium. Over his name he drew an emblematic pair of scales and wrote: *Que scais-je?* under it."

This Emerson saw in Montaigne, and was grateful to him for suggesting so ably and so winningly the reasons for the attitude of suspense with regard to the universe and the relations of man with the universe and the changing conditions of society, that is, the whole domain of the perishable, the unstable, the relative. He found in his own transcendental belief wherewith to rise above the plane which Montaigne considered as the proper ground of man, and to reach the ineffable regions where he felt the certain presence of the Over-Soul.

Yet Emerson did not do full justice to Montaigne, because, in his time, text criticism, as it has been of late practiced by French scholars with regard to Montaigne, had not yet revealed the great fact about the *Essays*, namely, that they were touched up again and again by the author, and that every remodeling (in the way, not of corrections, but of additions) corresponded to a new phase in the thought of Montaigne. So that the very changes of opinion of the author of the *Essays*—which he was too candid and sometimes too careless to conciliate with his former positions—accumulate contrasts and contradictions which emphasize the wavering character of Montaigne's thought.

It is a fact that Montaigne went through a phase of skepticism, under the influence of the *Hypotyposes* of Sextus Empiricus, but he never adopted radical skepticism; and even that mitigated form of doubt gave way later to a more constructive doctrine that secures him a rank among the founders, in France and in the world, of the reign of reason. Montaigne, like Rabelais, stood as a de-

votee of nature, but setting foremost in his preoccupations and in the hierarchy of subjects the moral nature of man. Nature, "our good guide," our "foster-mother," includes, in the thinking creature "man," reason, without which (not being endowed with the more limited but surer instincts of beasts) we should be left helpless, the victims of outside forces, the play-things of our own inward inclinations.

Reason, in Montaigne's mind, is essentially the faculty capable of learning, of judging, and by judging of fitting us for life. Nature is good and life is good, if we know how to interpret the former and to understand the latter. No need of going beyond nature or beyond Life to discover the true rules of conduct and find happiness. Montaigne is truly French by his ready sense of moderation and his firm grasp of the real. Too much imagination, as he thinks, is harmful; too much strenuousness leads to disappointment. Let us court genuine human dignity which consists in playing our part decorously among our fellow men, without attempting, Icarus-like, to take our

flight to unreachable heights: our own nature, fully realized, is the sum total of human perfection, absolute and quasi-divine. "Some there are who will start out of themselves and discard the man; but this is folly. Instead of transforming themselves into angels they turn into beasts; instead of lifting, they lower themselves."

Seeking temperate pleasures is commendable. Wisdom does not consist in frowning at the joys of life, but in keeping our desires under control. Inner harmony can be reached by giving equal play to the forces of impulsion and to the forces of inhibition. Just poise can be secured by what he called "diversion," that is, when we are threatened to be carried away by any excess, by purposely throwing the weight of our imagination, our desires, our will, on the opposite side. Properly trained habit is the paramount resource to keep within the bounds of discretion. This is why Montaigne, like Rabelais, attached so much importance to education. The care which the French humanists gave to the proper methods of rearing children is the decisive proof of their de-

votion to reason—the power by which man, when he becomes fully possessed of it, can raise himself to increasing mastery of self and of the outward world. Both Rabelais and Montaigne wanted education to rest upon the self-exertion of the child as well as on intelligent and gentle guidance. Rabelais insisted on learning acquired from books chosen and commented upon by the teacher. Montaigne was struck by the danger which might arise from too much memorizing, and assigned to the teacher as his essential task the forming of the child's judgment, setting in contrast to a "full head" the higher achievement of a "well-fashioned head." Life was the great book from which he directed the pupil to draw the most fruitful lessons, by observing facts and extracting the substance from them.

Trust in nature, then, did not mean for Montaigne any more than for Rabelais the mere following of instinct. It meant, indeed, the belief that instincts, kept free from corruption, are legitimate; but it also called upon reason and the will to tutor and guide natural inclinations according to the

best precepts confirmed by the consensus of mankind. It welcomed the wisdom of the ancients touched to vitality by Christian ethics, and Christian ethics cured of superstition, intolerance, the prejudices of ignorance, and the abuses of absolute authority, by an infusion of new wisdom. It hailed in man the power of conscience, the noblest attribute of the kingly race in animal creation, admirable by its intuitive discrimination between good and evil (in spite of egregious mistakes committed in various times and countries), subtly and surely efficacious by the gall or bliss it distills. "Vice leaves repentance in the soul, like an ulcer in the flesh which ever bleeds and festers; for reason brushes away all other griefs and pains, but intensifies that of repentance, the more grievous as it grows inward. . . . Reversely, there is, certes, I know not what congratulation for righteous doing, which joys us in our souls and a generous pride which accompanies a good conscience."

By dint of meditating on death—at first with a certain strained concentration of thought, then later with rare self-possession

—Montaigne came to assume toward the necessary end and dissolution of our perishable being the attitude of tranquil reason, measuring the place of our species in the natural order of things and addressing itself to accepting it in a spirit of cheerful obedience. "Why should nature imprint in us hatred and horror of death, seeing that she turns death to great use to nourish the succession and vicissitude of her works; and that death, in the universal process, furthers birth and growth more than loss and ruin? *Sic rerum summa novatur.*"

Thus the great egotist, who wrote three large folio tomes to leave to posterity a record of himself, rose superior to egotism there where it is wont to assert itself more loudly or to steal in unawares. The modern epicurean (in the philosophical sense of the word), who all his life deprecated stoic rigorousness and ascetic self-denial, found in the plain survey of nature's course, in fruitful reflection on universal laws, in the comforting thought of the value of the legacy he bequeathed to the world, equanimity and peace in face of the supreme trial. This true dig-

nity, as well as the deep significance of his work (the constructive doctrine which runs under the froth of superficial skepticism), he owed to his cult of reason.

Thoroughly modern he showed himself in his horror of fanaticism, of murderous partisan zeal, and of civil strife, in his advocacy of tolerance, in his protest against torture, in his disbelief in witchcraft, in his denunciation of Spain's cruel treatment of the natives in South America. Distinctly French he was in his dislike for metaphysics and his earnest endeavor to outline rules of conduct according to the innate and acquired dictates of reason. Morals was for him the natural product of experience weighed by considerate judgment, interpreted by the enlightened intellect, under the guidance of conscience: relativity dwells there as in everything human, but it rests on us to tighten our hold of truth by our own efforts and to bring up our children to greater wisdom and saner conduct by ever improved methods of education. The position of Montaigne is already that which will be taken in the nineteenth century by the positivist school. It

was too early in his day to foresee, even to conceive, the scientific and social developments of the philosophy of self-reliant reason, but on the moral side the doctrine was full-fledged. On the other hand, his conversational familiarity, desultory skipping gait, lightsomeness of spirit, and winsomeness of phrase stamp him as the keenest-sighted and nimblest-witted of moralists.

Montaigne's *Essays*, however, so replete with mellow wisdom, are somewhat lacking in intensity of purpose and earnestness of appeal—which alone can move great masses of men and prepare immediate changes in the thoughts and ways of life. His discursive scrutiny and nonchalant philosophizing diverge radically from the enthusiasm that had rushed the Middle Ages into mystical adventures of the soul or stupendous undertakings in fulfillment of visionary behests. But other great figures of the Renaissance, also touched by the wing of reason, had not lost the earnestness of aspiration or the yearning for action which are a no less distinctive feature of the French spirit than cool disquisition and considerate behavior. Faith

allied with reason was the force that actuated Calvin. He belonged to the age of reason by his reliance on the individual conscience and his trust in logic. On the other hand, all that makes for the preeminence of the individual he referred to God, the absolute and arbitrary dispenser of spiritual gifts. His rationalism and his moralism moved in an atmosphere of faith, yet were deeply colored with the thought of the Renaissance. In his own manner he returned to nature, for he raised a protest against the celibacy of priests, denied poverty to be a form of piety, and waived maceration and mortification as offerings to God. For him man was not to curtail or distort his being, as he had received it at the hands of the Creator; but he had the strict obligation to maintain its wholesomeness. This could not be done without strenuous and constant effort. Nature was not essentially good, but tainted with original sin. Evil was an actual and frightful reality. The doctrine of predestination imposed upon the individual to humble himself at the foot of the Redeemer, to watch his own thoughts and weigh his own actions, to live

in awe and trembling, never sure to obtain the supreme favor of "grace." In the eyes of Calvin man is both exalted in eminent dignity and crushed under a terrible burden. As endowed with reason and the natural craving for spiritual illumination, man so fully deserves respect that Calvin declared no king or absolute master had a right to usurp authority over him, and thus laid down the principles of republican government. As a fallible creature, exposed to temptation, error and misdoing, man needs sincere and ardent faith to uphold him and stern theological and moral guidance to keep him in the right path. Hence that mixture in Calvin and his followers of intellectual pride, containing the germ of revolt against political misrule, and spiritual humility, seeking support in prayer and striving to secure justification by faith.

In the next century, Pascal was to show, as a devout Jansenist, the same intense fervor and to give the same example of a life of ardent faith. Calvin and Pascal remind us, at the very time of the triumph of reason, and when the French more and more prized

the intellect as the instrument of truth-seeking and thought-building, that spirited movements of the soul were still to be looked upon as permanent and powerful elements of the French temper.

Earnest self-dedication and hopeful endeavor, in the new field of methodical thinking, for the great novel task of constructing modern philosophy and science, were likewise to be the inspiring forces of the master-builder of rationalism in the seventeenth century, Descartes.

The seventeenth century, the age of reason properly so called in France, could not have done its momentous work, whose reverberation was to be felt throughout Europe, in neighboring England as well as in distant Prussia and half barbarous Russia, had not the great minds of the sixteenth century, whom we have just studied, opened the path to its stately and irresistible advance. The sixteenth century had broken down the barriers that thwarted the free expansion of the human mind. Descartes undertook the noble task of providing mankind with the method best fitted to lead the intellect, in

search for truth, to the desired goal: he drew up the chart and covered the first most arduous stages, leaving to generations to come the stimulus of his example and the illumination of his doctrine. He achieved two great things: establishing final trust in reason and laying down the foundations of universal science.

He was a great physicist and mathematician. His confidence in the power of man's intellect arose from the two invaluable scientific discoveries that he made in his early career, the creation of analytical geometry and the application of mathematics to physics. The results he obtained, confirmed by inner and outer evidence and by the concordance of calculations with experiments, bore proof that the procedure of the human mind, starting from ascertained data and conducted according to strict laws of deductive logic, corresponded to the very order of nature. He found himself in presence of the stupendous fact that there was one and the same law presiding over the necessary sequence of events in nature and over the concatenation of exact thoughts in the process

of reasoning. For him this was the permanent everyday miracle which revealed the august presence of the Creator, and the demonstration of the spark of divine essence bestowed on man by special dispensation. Henceforth he approached his philosophical and scientific studies with a feeling of awful reverence, and at the same time with a wonderful sense of certainty and a powerful encouragement of hope. What if his findings were deemed dangerous to orthodoxy and his books condemned to destruction by ecclesiastical councils! He knew the verdict of posterity would be in his favor, acquit him of any sacrilegious intent, nay, proclaim that his was the true religion, conformable to the most imperative intuitions of the human mind and heart.

He saw and dared publish that the material universe was a huge mechanism, in which, given space and motion, all phenomena had a place in a definite succession of causes and effects. There was no causeless phenomenon; reversely, let one cause be made active, the effect was bound to follow. The human

mind was so constituted that it could sift the apparently confused mass of the data of experience, analyze, abstract, clarify the obscure, disentangle the complex and trace to one comprehensive cause an intricate mass of loose facts. The criterion of truth was the satisfaction given to our intellectual need by what is called logical evidence. There was the greatest probability for a notion, a demonstration, a conclusion to be true, when they answered to two essential requirements—simplicity and clearness. The proper method to reach truth consisted in laying hold of simple propositions, linked one with the other by logical bonds, and to extract from them all the consequents, to the remotest term of the series.

This was the theory of deductive reasoning and the method of exact sciences. For the first time, the paramount importance of mathematics in the making of science was demonstrated. Descartes ventured the startling hypothesis that the material world, in all its aspects, was the product of motion, and that all phenomena were but modes and transformations of motion. Although he

could back this wonderful guess only by the facts within his reach, the all-embracing scope of his discovery has been shown since by every new forward step of science, down to the most recent interpretation of matter in the light of the properties and activities of radium.

The Cartesian method ousted authority from the domain of thought and drove theological explanations out of the order of the universe. There was no room left for "virtues," "qualities," "efficient causes," behind which loomed the credulous belief in possible supernal intervention. Descartes cleared his mind of all superannuated notions, starting from a *tabula rasa* of self-sufficient reason, building the structure of philosophy, science and theoretical ethics on the single formula: *Cogito, ergo sum*. Reason, analyzing itself, discovered the law of "evidence" as its very essence. Taking its stand on "clear ideas," extracted from experience by a process of generalization or hypothesis, it could figure out the ideal schemes of inter-related groups of phenomena or correlated trains of notions, and thus create sciences

and systems. Man, projecting the searchlight of the intellect into the welter of the physical world, could dominate nature and compel it to subserve his needs. Science grasped truth and wielded power.

In the realm of moral facts there was occasion for a similar exercise of the rational faculty, although here Descartes did not feel free to express his whole thought, lest he should trespass on burning ground. He could not but remember that, a few years before, Galileo had become the victim of the theologians for daring to venture in a direction where the search of truth collided with the pronouncements of the church. But in his letters are to be found indications that he was fully aware of the important developments his doctrine might beget in the field of ethics. It was left for the following century to carry rationalism to its extreme consequences: with Voltaire, Rousseau and the Encyclopædists post-Cartesian philosophy, stung to revolt by the abuses of the time, was to attempt the remodeling of individual and social schemes of conduct and the overhauling of the political order. Descartes him-

self in the seventeenth century professed absolute respect for the monarchy, the church and the tenets of Roman Catholicism, as if to redeem by his practice the boldness of his theory.

Rationalism reigned supreme in the literature of the "classical" period, penetrated with the thought of Descartes and influenced by the decorous stateliness of the court of Louis XIV. Thought took precedence over passion with Corneille, whose dramatic motives set off the conflict of love with duty, love being made to submit to the idealism of moral truth and strict virtue or to fall a victim to its own distraction. The tender heart of gentle Racine opened itself to the subtle, insinuating sway of passion, but passion presented in its general, universally true aspects, described with temperateness and reserve, and so sternly submitted to the ascendancy of the moral law that it becomes rationalized and conforms to the prevalent intellectual type. Psychology and ethics thus turned to be the proper field of the dramatists, who investigated them with a view to culling human truths common to all

times and places, as well as to gather motives of pathetic emotion. In other terms, emotion had to make itself accepted, as it were, by conforming to the rules and methods of reason. Violent movements of the soul were banned or could be tolerated only if they put on the sober garb of restrained and guarded expression. Personality was allowed to appear only in the reaction of the author to general truth and in the quality of his style, but not in a display of individual motives, subjective views or egocentric feelings. Pascal pronounced the anathema, "The Ego is hateful." Boileau, the legislator of Parnassus, declared that beauty can consist only in the presentation of truth—by which he meant the aspects of nature or of humanity most capable of immediate and world-wide acceptance. In fact, mere concrete or picturesque nature was neglected; man became almost the sole object of literary treatment—not any particular man belonging to a definite time or nation, but man, the representative of civilized and polite society in its general features.

Within these limits, French literature in

the reign of Louis XIV produced masterpieces of keen analysis, balanced judgment, restrained pathos, chastened phrasing, stately shapeliness, truly classical in conception, form and spirit, which became the models of the literature of Europe for one century.

Great as was the influence of French rationalism in the literary field, it is on its importance as a new departure in the domain of thought and on the broad human significance of its tendencies, tenets, and method, that I have insisted and will ask you to ponder. With Rabelais and Montaigne, the superannuated dogmatism of theology fell into the yellow leaf, the dry formalism of scholastic philosophy broke down and emptied itself of its content; superstitious respect for authority and submission to prejudice and precedent were discarded. The precious lore of the ancients was conned in a spirit both of reverence and inquiry, paying due homage to the continuous effort of mankind to understand itself and lay down the principles of conduct, diminishing not the part that Christian belief was called on

to play, inserting it where it was to stand, between the harvest of ancient wisdom and the expectation of new scientific and philosophical knowledge. Nature was studied and human nature scanned with an openness of mind which determined the true relation of one to the other, situated man at his rank among living creatures under the laws of the universe, and at the same time proclaimed his power of self-mastery and mastery over the forces of nature by the exertion of his intellect and his will. Prayer preserved its value in the spiritual plane, which was conceived as towering above life and the world, without casting upon it any ominous shadow: yet thought and action were the proper field of human endeavor. Rabelais sounded the clarion call of this creed amid peals of boisterous laughter. Montaigne distilled his gentle wisdom to his readers in a delightful tête-à-tête interspersed with candid confessions, sly remarks, half-cynical sallies, playing with lissome versatility now the artist, now the philosopher. Both were, each in his way, intellectual pioneers, the sharpshooters of humanism, scouting the

path of the great revolution in thought, heralding the momentous advance of reason, yet too individual, too spasmodic, too hard pressed by the necessity of prudent reticence, to become the final interpreters of the new movement.

With Descartes and his followers—who numbered all that counted in the seventeenth century—reason was duly enthroned. The Cartesian method not only built the robust buttress of exact science, but raised the bold and lofty cathedral-vault of modern philosophy. Reason took definite trust in itself, mustered its powers, surveyed its virtualities. Science had got its compass and its glass: philosophy its schedule and its chart. The encouragement reason found in the actual correspondence of its hypotheses and conclusions to the order of nature was to become a wonderful incentive to a parallel ideal construction in the order of things moral, political, social—wherever an overhauling of notions or statutes could open a new vista of truth or happiness. It might happen that the basis of experience, upon which the intellectual fabric rested, was too

slender or too hastily laid. It might happen that an error of reasoning impaired some conclusions and a generation or two had to pay for too much boldness in rationalizing. Such disappointments are the common lot of men. Men had to learn that, in the sphere of the ideal, as in other fields, there is no absolute truth. But rational idealism was born—born of the French mind, to go through the process of growth and change, to be confronted with vicissitude and correction, but to stay. A great force was at large: strange powers fraught with inevitable danger and wonderful promises were rising in France, soon to be backed by new feelings, destined to invade the world by mysterious infection.

These gigantic developments will be the work of the following era.

IV

THE IDEAL OF PROGRESS

WE know to-day from familiarity with the laws and the facts of evolution that any forward steps affecting the species in the line of social as well as physical development originates first with an individual or a small group whence it spreads through the mass. History proves the decisive importance of new ideas, feelings, or acquisitions conceived by men of genius or set afloat by a sect, a school, or a class, in determining a move ahead of a nation, a continent, or a whole system of civilization. The environment where the "hero" (to use a phrase popular once with poets and moralists) or the "élite" were born and nurtured, must indeed contain in solution, as it were, the elements out of which the representative man or class will draw the substance of the innovation. Without a favorable *milieu*, the exceptional individual cannot develop, any more than the

rare plant without a favorable ground. But it is in the exceptional individual or in the select group that the mass first takes consciousness of its latent energies; it is with the guidance of these leaders that it brings to act, after many tentative efforts and experiments, its virtualities.

In the light of this historical law the part played by Rabelais, Montaigne, and Descartes, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as heralds of the humanistic and rationalistic movement, assumes its full significance. They were the founders without whom independence or boldness of thought in the following age would have been impossible. Rabelais and Montaigne, living at a time of absolute authority and ruthless persecution, when any divergence from political or religious authority was cruelly repressed, could not openly treat questions upon which church or king had thrown an interdict. Under Louis XIII the situation was not much changed, nor did Descartes, a pupil of the Jesuits, a friend of the Oratorians, a gentleman of birth and fortune, incline to dissent from the acceptance of the

established regime and the prevalent form of religion. He declared his attachment to "the religion of his nurse"; the king for him personified the country and all ideas of order, security, and lawful government. His doctrine was purely scientific and philosophical. The times were not ripe yet for any extension of the spirit and method of rationalism to things pertaining to political institutions and the organization of society. But the seed had been sown; it was soon to germinate and to grow to startling vigor and fullness.

The eighteenth century in France is a strangely mixed and puzzling period—in some aspects an epoch of decadence, in other aspects an epoch of wonderful creation and construction of a new order. That very coincidence was probably the reason of its audacity and fruitfulness. Mincing pettiness in art and literature, effete mannerisms in social life, sentimentality often coupled with licentiousness were but the deciduous tegument under which the stalk showed its fresh sappiness and buxom strength. Not only did science move at

long strides, but thought took the boldest flight it had yet ventured on, now soaring aloft above the regions of experience, now grazing the ground and dropping into its furrow the dew of the summits. The data of history, the rules of conduct, the principles of society, the reasons to believe were revised with searching eagerness and an impassioned desire for truth. From the sunlit spaces of speculation there floated down a warmth of hope, and soon a will to reform the actual conditions of life in the humble path of man's everyday traveling. As science stimulated philosophy, philosophy poured vital energy into the veins and sinews of practice. The eighteenth century, which had begun with grafting on Descartes' doctrine of reason a new system of ethics, a new science of political economy, a new philosophy of history, ended in the French Revolution.

By degrees which historians have traced, Cartesian rationalism at the beginning of the eighteenth century grew sure enough of itself to apply deliberately to psychical and moral facts the method successfully tried in

mechanics and physics. A new impetus had been given to speculation by the discovery of Newton, who, building a deductive reasoning on experiential data, had startled the world by the theory of gravitation. It was then expected that a similar mechanism of causes and effects could be found by careful observation in all orders of phenomena, even those which men had heretofore abstained from scrutinizing out of self-diffidence or religious awe. If a causal chain was to be discovered in history, if ethics was to be explained by a series of actions and reactions, if political and social institutions were not God-given realities but results of conditions that could be studied, would it not be possible to extract from the entanglement of historical, moral, political, and social facts systems of laws which would constitute the sciences of man and of society, and, like the sciences of nature, give power to alter the facts by intelligent intervention?

Descartes had imparted to his age a wonderful trust in reason, proclaiming the miraculous correspondence between the concepts of reason (elaborated by the double

process of induction and deduction) and the higher, ideal order of nature. Was it not a legitimate extension of this method, a natural issue of man's trust in his own intellect, to seek the ideal constituents of the moral, political, and social order? The notion spread that the marvelous economy which had been revealed by physics and celestial mechanics could be discovered in things pertaining to life, conduct, government, and the mutual relations between men on which society rested. There was a "natural law" referring to government and society, to individual and collective behavior, which reason could attain through a proper interpretation of history or, some said, through direct intuition subsequently confirmed by a critical appraisal of existing reality. Philosophers agreed that the "natural law" was the true test to be applied to the evils and abuses of the present form of society, and ultimately might provide the means to reform them. They spoke of "principles" ideal, absolute, as scientists spoke of axioms and ideal relations. Christian idealism, which, consciously or unconsciously, per-

vaded the minds and offered its hallowed spiritual solutions for problems now stated in terms of reason and science, exerted its powerful sway even in those who claimed freedom from Christian belief, and, more or less, inspired the formulas that then took rise to be handed down to following generations.

The philosophers had a negative work to do, which was to expose the corruption of the government under which they lived, the intolerance and bigoted narrowness of the church, the injustice of the advantages granted to the privileged classes, and all the arbitrary decisions of a power which knew no limitation to its will and practiced patronage or persecution as regular means of securing its own stability. Against despotic and absolute authority roundabout ways had to be resorted to. The ingenuity of the means the writers devised to throw discredit on royal tyranny and clerical omnipotence is one of the most interesting features of eighteenth-century literature. As the readers were on the lookout for whatever allusion to the present state of things might be

foisted into a book or literary production, they eagerly took the hint when Montesquieu introduced to them two Persian visitors to Paris and made them remark on what they saw, or when Voltaire let loose a Huron through the polite society of France and gave him an experience of what the clergy, the judges, the officers of the king, and the jailers of the Bastille could do to suppress personal liberty and all manifestations of independence.

There was hardly an important book which escaped the penalty of being burned by the hangman on the public square, and could reach the public but by smuggling or by the special protection of some great favorite, more interested in the wit of Monsieur de Voltaire or the dashing brilliancy of Diderot than in the safety of the kingdom, or, maybe, touched with paradoxical sympathy for the ideas of the philosophers. When an age is tottering to its fall there appear such contradictory states of mind: the pampered minions of the decaying regime become, out of levity, the unconscious agents of the forces of dissolution and of reconstruction.

By extending her favor to Voltaire and the Encyclopædists Madame de Pompadour unwillingly helped them to drag to the abyss the throne of France, to whose occupant she had many reasons to be grateful. Voltaire, who had already been twice imprisoned in the Bastille by arbitrary decree, finally sought a further guarantee by settling at Ferney, near the Swiss frontier, which he could cross on the shortest notice and thus find shelter against any possible return of a fit of suspicion.

The current of the new ideas was too strong for any dyke, however strongly built and buttressed by all the forces of absolutism, to prevail against it. How different the history of France might have been if, instead of attempting to choke the stream of progress, the crown, the judiciary, the University, the clergy had understood what power of renovation floated in its waves, and had managed to capture it, and, through it, rejuvenate the senescent monarchy! On the contrary, blind opposition was to reduce philosophy to accumulate its energies under pressure and force them into the social mass

until it reached the third estate and broke into irresistible revolution.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, however, when the doctrine had gathered all its strength and shot out a dozen epoch-making books with vigorous vitality, it did not yet contain any virulent ferment of revolution. It set down the universal principles of pure reason with no intention of having them applied forthwith or of hurling the country into any sudden effervescence. It expressed itself with liveliness, wit, charm, often with passionate earnestness, but without any sting of bitterness, any dangerous movement of impatience, any perverse impulse to mischief. The characteristic of the thought of France in those days was an intense intellectual fervor, shifting faith from dried-up dogma to rational enthusiasm and human charity. The philosophers felt deeply. How else could they have accomplished the huge task of surveying, plowing, and fertilizing anew the whole field of human knowledge? They were earnest in their zeal to instruct but aimed directly at no destruction. Voltaire, the enemy of supersti-

tion, intolerance, and persecution, believed in God and wrote many a page in the spirit of true piety. He concluded his poem on "Natural Law" with this prayer: "O God, disowned by some, proclaimed by the universe, listen to the last words uttered by my mouth. I cannot think Thou, who didst give me my being, who on my days didst pour so many blessings, when my time is done wilt inflict on me eternal torments. If I have erred, it is when seeking Thy law. My heart may have gone astray, but it is full of Thee. I see without alarm eternity draw near."

With regard to politics, far from advocating the overthrow of the monarchy, Voltaire only asked of the king to be mindful of the public good. His immediate desire for reform went no further than having on the throne "an enlightened monarch"—such as (with strange aberration) he thought he had found in Frederick of Prussia. Montesquieu, who so admirably analyzed the essence of the republican form of government, when it came to practical propositions, expressed his preference for the English constitutional monarchy.

The Encyclopædists, d'Alembert, Diderot, Marmontel, and others (who had obtained from the royal authority through Madame de Pompadour a sort of tacit, non-committal printing license), were careful, when laying down the rational bases of the moral sciences, not to affront religious or political orthodoxy. They appealed only to considerate, cultivated readers, refraining from any incitement to revolution.

Thus the constructive work of the philosophers prepared the future development of the doctrine of reason without incurring the reproach of sapping the existing institutions. They were gentlemen and scholars, no iconoclasts. It was not their fault if the blind and besotted obstinacy of the monarchy and the church gathered the tempest, which, after brewing half a century in the thoughts and hearts of a suffering nation, finally burst out and swept away a decayed government. They legislated not for France only but for all the world. Montesquieu drew from the interpretative analysis of the English Constitution the rationale of government by checks and balances,

which was to become, fifty years later, the inspiring idea of the American Constitution and the model of other republican governments established since. Voltaire became for a time the adviser of Frederick of Prussia and of Catherine of Russia, who played the game of liberal and enlightened monarchs, soon to relapse, however, into the ways of despotism. Rousseau devised a Constitution for Poland and for Corsica. The "Social Contract" aimed at redressing abuses that were not peculiar to France, but clashed with reason and the rational organization of society under any clime. So universal was the political and social doctrine of the philosophers that they had to imagine a "state of nature" to situate the broadest principles lying at the bottom of their speculation. Hence the wide range of their influence and the unparalleled power of contagion of their principles. Popular government, as it had developed in some countries of Europe and in the New World, was indebted to them either for precept or impetus. The force of impact of eighteenth-century French thought is not spent yet, and al-

though it ought not to be made responsible for the follies of blind fanatics, it can be credited for part at least of the success of the ideas of individual and national freedom which have prevailed after the Great War.

Let us approach the doctrine of the French philosophers in its permanence and universality, and take as guiding thread the chief idea which led those makers of modern thought, bore up their hope, and inspired them with vigorous faith in the future of France and of mankind: the idea of progress.

The idea of progress was not unknown to antiquity. Æschylus embodied it in the myth of Prometheus, and Plato gave it expression in the ideal structure of his Republic. Yet the ancients, discouraged by so many vicissitudes of nations and empires, had finally settled in the stern fatalism of the Stoics, whose thought was best expressed in the words of Marcus Aurelius: "All that suits thee suits me, O Cosmos! Nothing seems to me premature or belated which comes in time for thee. . . ." Christianity brought to the world its message of

hope, to man the affirmation of his worth (if he won divine grace by his deserts), to nations the promise of prosperity (if they were true to the Covenant tacitly struck with the Supreme Legislator). Yet ages were to elapse before men understood that they themselves had to be the authors of their own fate, that they had to interpret their aspirations in terms of the moral law, and that the applications of the moral law, as modes of the working of the universe, fell within the domain of reason and creative action.

As reason gathered strength and self-confidence, it realized that it was possible for man to struggle against the worst evils, physical, moral, or social, which cramped his life, by a better knowledge of himself, of the true relationship of the human species to outside forces, of the just laws that ought to regulate the social order. In so doing he did not insolently rebel against the eternal behests but actually advanced toward the fulfillment of the prophecies. The aspiration for justice, the hope of happiness were no longer postponed to the life to come but became actual forces of immediate action.

The belief prevailed that working for an earnest of truth and bliss in this world, within the pale of morals and reason, was conformable to the preordained mission of men.

Thus the Christian ideal lay at the root of the new philosophical thought and fed its eager desire to meliorate the human creature and the human condition. Reason became the agent of thought, moved with the strange fire that used to animate religion in ages of faith, endowed with visionary power, urged on by intense feeling. Creative and impassioned reason was the gift of the leaders of thought. They appealed to the more widespread form of reason, in the masses, that, under the name of common sense, Descartes had declared to be the essential attribute of man. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, as disciples of Descartes and propagandists of the new rationalism of reform and progress, wrote for the whole people; not only for the cultured nobility and gentry, but (without sacrificing elegance or finesse of thought or expression) for the middle class and the more intelligent wage-

earners. They found among the French commoners, no less than in the public of the *salons*, clever readers prompt to seize the pith of the doctrine and respond to the suggestion of the feelings. They did not expect to be immediately and fully understood, but the intellectual and emotional stir they created, gradually widening like the undulations produced by the fall of a stone in a lake, was in itself an education. What they aimed at was the education of their generation. Education was the great watchword of the philosophical school. Education, they firmly believed, could fashion out the intellects of men, even in the lower ranks of society, so that they would be able to grasp the most essential truths and judge of the rightfulness of the reforms proposed.

Education, to be valid, ought to be given in favorable conditions; that is, to men freed from the most crushing abuses of oppression, political or spiritual, and rescued from the blighting evil of sordid poverty. The way being thus cleared, reason could step in and achieve the work of progress. There

were variations and divergencies of programs and methods among the philosophers; nor were their motives, personal temper, or modes of feeling alike or in perfect correspondence with one another. But all, moderates or radicals, Christians or atheists, logicians or sentimentalists, professed the belief that man is the master of his destiny, that the part of the thinking, feeling, and volitional being in the scheme of the universe is no longer obedience, acceptance, or resignation, but *action*—strenuous endeavor to seek truth, to enforce the findings of reason, to improve society by the insertion of thought into facts.

Some of them—the sensualists and determinists—attributed to matter the faculty of thinking and submitted thought to immutable laws similar to those that rule the stars and swell the tide. According to their doctrine of “necessity” man was bound to follow truth, when truth plainly dawned on his mind, as inevitably as a stone falls from the top of a rock to the ground below. But they posited that only “voluntary” actions assumed this inevitable character (however

hard it seems to conciliate the contradiction), so that it was the same as to say that will enlightened by reason, or reason backed by will, was supreme. The same union in reason and will was to be found in those who placed conscience foremost and declared it the great motive power of human action—God-inspired conscience, whose awful intuition, however, had to be interpreted by reason and conducted by reason to the solution of everyday problems concerning the conduct of individuals or the reform of society. The union of reason and will, of the head and the heart—with nominal prominence given to one or the other—was the great achievement of the age. There lay the very spring of progress.

A gradual development of the belief in progress took place in the course of the eighteenth century from Montesquieu, the forerunner, to Condorcet and the Ideologists, contemporary with the Revolution. Progress, reasoned out, striven for, consciously and methodically furthered by constant intervention of man's thought and will, progress in doctrines, progress in facts,

was the creed of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. It sustained the energies of those men who had to contend with such crushing difficulties. It gave them courage to affirm the universal truth of their doctrine, meant for all times and countries; it left them brimming with hope even in the face of death, when (as happened to some) they fell victims of the blind fury of the populace, for whose enlightenment and liberation they had worked to their last breath.

Voltaire has often been represented as the arch scoffer, for whom nothing was venerable or sacred, who never refrained from criticism on any consideration, nor ever spared anyone when occasion offered to wield sarcasm or ridicule. His fame has been assaulted and his memory begrimed by two powerful sets of enemies in his lifetime and after: the clerical set, who felt their privileges and omnipotence in the state threatened by his scathing denunciations, and the romantic set, who scented in his advocacy of reason, in his respect for facts and for clear logic, the great obstacle to their attempt at establishing the hegemony of

feeling. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, when, in spite of malice and misrepresentation, his doctrine was more and more coming to the fore, it stood in danger of being robbed of its legitimate influence by the vulgarity of some of his followers, *petits bourgeois*, upstarts, would-be intellectuals, who clapped the word, "Voltaireanism," on their own shallowness, bickering aggressiveness, and partisan spirit. But now that those petty quarrels are forgotten, it is time to restore the ideas of the great man to their rightful position in the history of French thought.

Voltaire conquered an eminent place among the philosophers, in the *salons*, with the people, for the nobleness and vigor of his doctrine and his unmatched talent as a writer. He was properly the popularizer of the new moral and social philosophy among the classes and the masses, now inditing scholarly treatises for the learned, now scratching out light leaflets full of liveliness and wit, interesting, colorful, embodying abstract thought in characters that became the favorites of the day, passing judgment

on men or events in innumerable stories, dialogues, and poems, that struck the fancy and lived in the memory of the readers.

Voltaire did not deal in metaphysics. At the outset of the philosophical age he set the tone that French moral philosophy in the eighteenth century was to keep (the note that had already been sounded by Rabelais and Montaigne). He started it on the path of observation of life and meditation on the conduct of life in the light of reason and conscience. His nearest approach to metaphysics was his affirmation of the existence of God, based on admiration for the marvelous order of the universe. What intelligent being could contemplate this perfect contrivance we call nature, and not recognize in it the work of a supremely intelligent Mind? This fundamental truth sufficed, he contended (after Descartes), to justify the power of human intelligence—a reflex of divine wisdom—and give man strength and confidence to seek the true laws of his own nature in relation to the myriad phenomena, physical and moral. Man, developing his latent faculties through the ages, had

reached the stage where he could measure the full scope of his intelligence and feel the full force of his will, conditioned but not enslaved by the necessary chain of causes and effects. Thinking, now, ought no longer to be an idle exercise of the reasoning faculty, but a stage leading to action. Knowledge meant power. "Man," exclaimed Voltaire, "was born to act, just as fire tends upward and water flows downward." To have no occupation or aim is the same as not to exist. The idea of evolution—in its early form of an intuition or a feeling—lay at the bottom of Voltaire's doctrine. For as soon as reason is believed capable of altering for the better pliant reality, transformation takes the ascendancy over fixity; gradual change intervenes at every moment of the course of events, with possible halts, recoils, or returns, but, on the whole, furthering truth, justice, and universal happiness.

This state of mind, in the heyday of the new creed, might take an exaggerated form, which, carrying the conclusion far beyond the premises, would set the notion of "divine purpose" over and above the notion of

“voluntary and rational human action.” This was the case with the German philosopher Leibnitz, who, in his mystic vision of a world ordained by God for the greatest felicity of man, ran to the extreme of absolute “optimism,” and, overlooking pain, evil, vice, and crime, declared that “all was for the best in the best of worlds.” Voltaire, with his keen common sense and firm belief in the power of reason, ruined the metaphysical thesis of his too sanguine predecessor in his famous philosophical tale of *Candide*. The barbed arrows of his satire punctured the wind-bag of metaphysical optimism, raising mixed laughter and reflection by its irresistible burlesque shot through with rays of clear thought and suggestive common sense. Superficial readers of this tale and of his poem on the “Earthquake of Lisboa” falsely interpreted Voltaire’s position as that of dispiriting pessimism. Nothing could be further from the writer’s intentions. What he wanted was to crush in the germ a doctrine manifestly contrary to sound judgment drawn from experience, and, what was more, adverse to strenuous

action for reform. *Candide*, read in the light of Voltaire's whole work and lifelong personal endeavor to enlighten his age and firmly lay the foundation of progress, tends to encourage service in behalf of one's fellow men and earnest striving to increase one's own and others' happiness. Goethe remembered the conclusion of *Candide* when he wrote the last chapter of the *Second Faust*, just as, in the same way, he kept in mind Voltaire's philosophy of history when he stated his doctrine of "culture," or the joint contribution of all peoples, in all times and countries, to the building up of civilization.

Voltaire's most important contribution to the thought of his and later times was his historical work. It is in direct correlation with the doctrine of progress. Up to his day history had been mostly a collection of anecdotes, in which battles, conquests, kingly deeds, royal marriages, episodes of the lives of noblemen and successful captains were uncritically related; or it had been used, as in the case of Bossuet's *Universal History*, to exemplify the intervention of Providence in human affairs. Voltaire, in his turn,

wrote a universal history whose title is significant: *An Essay on Manners*. What arrests his attention is that which, to his mind, ought to be first in the consideration of both rulers and subjects, namely, opinions and institutions—opinions, which show what degree of enlightenment men had reached at the various stages of history; institutions, which show how men had succeeded or failed in establishing the forms of government best fitted to secure prosperity and happiness for the greatest number. In other words, it is the first history of civilization ever written. Voltaire was so sensible of the wide import of his undertaking that he worked at it twenty years before publishing the first edition and touched it up again and again. He had long meditated on the leading principles he was to follow and the best methods to carry them out, as may be seen from his correspondence: some of his letters to learned friends show how fully aware he was of the repercussion of a work of this kind on the whole movement of reform by confirming men in their will to work out their own destiny and in the hope that his endeavor, so

full of risk and danger, would not be vain. Such a momentous new departure, even if it fell short of its objects in some parts, was enough to secure fame for the writer and make him a towering figure in the history of thought. Voltaire, indeed, was too much of an intellectualist and too devoid of spiritual sensibility to extricate himself from the engrossing struggle he had undertaken against the Catholic Church and do justice to the influence of the Christian religion in the Middle Ages. This is the great shortcoming of his book. But in other respects, through his wide scholarship, through his critical insight, through his unique talent of composition and style, and especially through his philosophical view of history, attributing to reason its full rights in the management of human affairs, he stands as a great precursor gathering the first extensive mass of evidence, judiciously sifted, upon which later thinkers were to build their rational constructions.

Voltaire's historical work was continued along new lines by Montesquieu. The author of *L'Esprit des Lois* was more than an an-

nalist of opinions and institutions. He undertook to trace the causes of manners and laws, to analyze the essence of the various forms of governments, and to judge of their relative value. Although he carried out his purpose in a rambling fashion, as a man of the world writing for his own satisfaction or wishing to instruct the polite society of the *salons* without imposing upon them too hard an intellectual task, there are so firm guiding principles, such solidity of thought, such depth and coherency of doctrine—if no very methodical order—in the work, that Montesquieu is entitled to be called the founder of political science. For the first time the whole range of governmental institutions—the republic as practiced by the ancients, absolute monarchy as it prevailed in France, constitutional monarchy as it had developed in England—were scrutinized, compared, explained in their origin and in their relations to the climate, the nature of the country, the character of the people, the laws and manners produced by historic circumstances, and judgment was passed on them by applying to them the general principles of reason

drawn from the permanent moral aspirations of man confronted with the possibilities of practice. The scope of the work is universal, and, in spite of the rapid advance in later times of the science born of Montesquieu's creative genius, to-day called "sociology," its results have remained valid, its developments are illuminating, and the reading of it an education. Its most striking triumph was the hint it gave to the founders of the American Constitution. When the fathers of the American republic wished, in 1787, to give a permanent Constitution to the United States, they did not choose to adopt a mere replica of the English system of government, but remembered the rational improvement on the English precedent formulated by Montesquieu in his doctrine of the "three powers."

How did Montesquieu proceed to dig underneath the particularities of time and place, local interpretations and historical residues, to strike at the very root, at the fundamental and ideal law of government by checks and balances? He followed the typically French and Cartesian method,

adapted to the requirements of a science that dealt with the flexible facts of political and social life; that is, he gradually passed from observations of reality to the normalizing process of forming general ideas and deducting universal laws. He had given proof of his respect for facts when, in the *Lettres Persanes*, among much light matter, he had treated seriously of the political and social state of Europe, and, still more, in the *Considerations on the Greatness and Decadence of the Romans*, he had shown himself a learned and thoughtful historian of antiquity. Now his aim was to make use of the enormous knowledge previously stored, to confront, compare, oppose or harmonize, reject or assimilate the data of history, and bring out the types of the main forms of government with their characteristic laws, motive forces, and immediate and distant effects. His work in a way was tentative, as it cleared the ground and built an entirely new structure with still imperfect materials, moreover shaping out the ideal figure of a changing reality destined to undergo considerable transformations as men grew more

self-determining, self-acting, and self-controlled. Yet it has been universally hailed ever since as the fountain-head of political and social science and the classic treatise, where all must refer for the most general principles and the laws of widest application.

I do not need to insist on the theory of the three powers which America has made hers, and which, in the hands of your people, gifted with the genius of government, has grown to possibilities never thought of by its originator. You have proved by the successes of your political history one of the laws that Montesquieu set forth—perhaps the most impressive truth his keen observation and penetrating insight had discovered—namely, that forms of government, however carefully devised and rationally thought out, are worth only as much as the nations that adopt them make them worth. Laws can do nothing unless manners uphold and support them and unless the people apply them in the right spirit. Montesquieu stated that the form of government based upon the independence and balance of the

three powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—partook both of monarchy and democracy, the more valuable in his eyes for the very reason that it realized a compromise, a middle way, which has always given the best results in this diversified, divided, relative world of ours, where we breathe conflict and struggle with the very breath of life. Montesquieu had seen as much. You, after framing your three-power Constitution with the intention of placing power in the hands of a governing, aristocratic class under the guidance of a sort of elected monarch, have developed the democratic side of your form of government to the point that you enjoy to-day the most liberal and most truly popular government in the world. Montesquieu would have been surprised with the result, but not displeased, for he was an admirer—although a prudent one—of democracy.

It is he who, analyzing the moral forces that actuate each form of government, attributed *virtue* to democracy as its mainspring and guardian spirit. He meant “political virtue”; that is, “self-renunciation, devotion

to law and country, and continual preference for the public good, instead of seeking one's own interests." He was too positive in his views and too temperate in his expectations to believe that ideal republican virtue could be altogether attained, although no superhuman gift of foresight could make him anticipate the "machine"; but he saw, and justly saw, that a republic could persevere and prosper, and steer clear of the two dangers of despotism or anarchy, only if it approximated in some measure the ideal of virtue. In fact, we see in America the machine kept in check and shorn of its worst power for mischief by the conscience of the citizens and their spasmodic outbursts of indignation. Montesquieu, living at a time when the only known republican forms of government were those of Athens and Sparta in antiquity and of Switzerland in modern times, could not form the notion of the huge and complex democracies which were to develop later. His conception of the republic was that of a small community administering its affairs by the direct action of the citizens met in general assembly, all

united in devotion to the commonwealth and in love of equality, simplicity, and frugality. He could not (any more than Rousseau, the ardent apostle of democracy) picture such late developments as representative government, the balance of parties, electoral campaigns, the intervention of minorities, financial influences, moral offensives, and so many features now familiar to the citizens of modern democracies. But his analysis of the democratic government at a time when despotism and oligarchy were rampant, his advocacy of "virtue" at a time when ambition, cunning, cynical self-seeking, sly intrigue, and secret diplomacy were the most common means of exercising power, his moral leaning for equality and simplicity, mark a significant stage on the path of progress.

Montesquieu was not one of the theoretical exponents of the doctrine of progress. But he did more than build up a theory: he established the fact of man's power to *create* government according to the data of experience and the normalizing intervention of reason. His strength lies in his moderation, in his sense of the real as well as his attach-

ment to the ideal. Thus, when he had made allowance for the determinism of the laws of nature, he devoted the best of his talent to show how man could deflect the course of nature's laws by throwing the weight of his wisdom and of his will on the side of rational aims. "I may say," he remarked, "that my *Esprit des Lois* secures a perpetual triumph of morals over climate and physical necessities. . . . The purpose of the whole work is to uphold moral causes. The bad legislators are those who favor instead of resisting the vices caused by the climate." Montesquieu's work, like that of Voltaire and of the contemporary philosophers, indirectly battered down the principle of "divine right," upon which the absolute power of the French monarchy was founded. Montesquieu, it is true, always deprecated sudden changes and violent means of transformation. But he was the resolute opponent of every measure that stood in the way of freedom of thought and of the gradual move toward personal and political liberty. He was especially categorical at a time when the Protestants had not yet been given the

right of public worship, and, now and then, some Protestant minister was made to swing at a gibbet in order to instruct others, against accusations and indictments concerning what was called heresy. He was one of those who, in an era of persecution, without even the excuse of sincere religious belief on the part of the persecutors, upheld the cause of toleration.

Toleration is the first step toward the conquest of liberty. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century well understood the importance of this principle which, were it to prevail, would do away with one of the worst errors handed down by the Middle Ages—uncompromising religious dogmatism—and brush aside one of the most dangerous passions of the populace, skillfully exploited by unscrupulous supporters of absolute power-blind fanaticism. He who most courageously and relentlessly defended toleration at the cost of imperiling his safety and liberty was Voltaire.

There are various ways of being tolerant. Frederick of Prussia preached toleration because of mere indifference and cynicism, not

out of any respect for conscience or any love of liberty. Voltaire roused the cultivated audiences who attended the performances of his tragedies—prepared to understand him *à demi mot*, in half-concealed terms—by bold lines such as that in “Alzire”: “And the true God, son, is a forgiving God.” In his poems, in his tales, in his history, in his philosophical treatises, again and again he harped on the same string, appealing to his followers, all equally crushed under the burden of human misery, to fly to each other’s help instead of assailing each other in the name of heinous bigoted feelings certainly not approved by an intelligent, just, and benevolent God. At the end of his *Treatise on Toleration* he wrote the following admirable prayer:

“I no longer address men but Thee, O God, Lord of all creatures, of all worlds, of all times. If feeble creatures lost in immensity, invisible to the rest of the universe, may be permitted to implore Thee, O bountiful Giver, who dispensest all, and whose decrees are immutable as well as eternal, deign to have mercy on errors attached to our very nature, and see to it that those errors be not

our calamity. Thou hast not given us hearts to hate one another or hands to throttle one another. Be it Thy will we may mutually help one another to bear the burden of this hard, fleeting life. Let not petty differences in the garments that cover our puny bodies, in our languages all insufficient, in our customs all ridiculous, in our laws all imperfect, in our opinions all foolish, in our conditions, so unequal to our minds, all equal in Thy eyes—let not those slight shades that distinguish the atoms called men become signals of hatred and persecution. Let those who kindle tapers in full midday to honor Thee bear up with those who are satisfied with Thy sunlight; let not those who put a white linen fabric over their gowns to celebrate Thy love devour those who do the same thing under a cloak of black woolen; let it be equally legitimate to worship Thee in an ancient tongue or in a newer language; let those whose garments are dyed red or purple, who rule over a little portion of a little heap of this world's clay and own a few round fragments of polished metal, enjoy meekly what they call riches and greatness,

but let others look upon them without envy: for Thou knowest that, in their vanity, there is nothing to be jealous or proud of. May all men remember they are brothers! May they have in horror tyranny exerted on the souls as they execrate brigandage that takes away by force the fruit of peaceful work and industry! If wars are inevitable, let us not hate or tear off one another in time of peace. Let us make use of our existence to bless equally in a thousand different tongues Thy goodness that hast bestowed on us our short lifetime."

The glory of his career as a great citizen and benefactor of mankind, in which capacity he stood as high as in that of a great man of letters, culminated in the courageous part he played to obtain redressment of the iniquitous and cruel sentence passed and executed on the Protestant Calas at Toulouse. Jean Calas was a prosperous and well-behaved merchant who had resisted pressure of all sorts for his conversion to Catholicism, but practiced his faith quietly within the precincts of his family without any public scandal. He had even shown his

good nature and conciliating spirit by keeping an old Catholic servant who had been the nurse of his children. One day his son Marc Anthony (who had previously given signs of an unbalanced mind) was found dead in the house: he had hanged himself. This mournful event occurred a few days after the people of Toulouse had indulged in a riot of fanaticism on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the massacre of four thousand Protestants in the city, thus commemorating one of the most horrible events of the religious wars of the sixteenth century. A party of Cordelier monks and White Penitents invaded the house of Jean Calas pretending he had murdered his son in revenge of the latter's offering to convert himself to Catholicism. They got up a great show for the funeral of the young "martyr," and having thus wrought the multitude to an indescribable degree of fanatical excitement, they had Jean Calas and his older son Pierre arrested. Pierre was handed over to the Jacobin monks, who were to bring him to abjure Protestantism. The two daughters were wrenched from their mother and shut

up in a convent. As to the father, after a trial which was a parody of justice, and after being put to the "grand question"—that is, the most exquisite form of agony and torture—he was sentenced to have his limbs broken on the rack and finally be quartered on the public square. He was two hours dying without one word of confession escaping his lips. This was the sort of thing fanaticism could achieve in the year of grace 1761.

Voltaire met Mrs. Calas in Switzerland, where she had taken refuge, and understood from her relation that the trial of her husband had been the most shameful challenge to justice and humanity since the days of the Spanish Inquisition. He undertook to have the judgment revised. Gathering around him an active group of liberal-minded men, he obtained (at a formidable price) the privilege to take cognizance of the minutes of the trial, and built on the evidence therein gathered a defense of Calas which for years he never tired repeating, daring to undertake from his safe residence at Ferney what would have sent him to the Bastille had he

remained within reach of the king's police in Paris. At length he obtained the rehabilitation of Calas by a decision of the Parliament of Toulouse, although it was forbidden to have the deed posted publicly. About the same time he took in hand similar cases in behalf of Sirven and of the Chevalier de la Barre, and was equally successful. The full account of his interventions was later introduced in his *Treatise on Toleration*, one of his works that best deserves to be known. In the conclusion, which rises to lofty nobleness, he upheld "natural law" as the justification of the rights of individuals and recommended to all, orthodox believers or members of the reformed religion, the doctrine of Jesus: true Christian fraternity.

Voltaire's generous plea for freedom of conscience and toleration was taken up again by Turgot (as admirable a statesman and philosopher as Michel de l'Hospital in the sixteenth century), who tried, during the short time he was secretary of state under Louis XVI, to force into practice those of the new moral principles that were capable of immediate realization. His entrance into

office was hailed by Voltaire as the luckiest and most promising event in the history of France in the eighteenth century. Turgot addressed to the king a *Memoir on Toleration*—a very bold initiative in those days—in which he denounced fanaticism “that now places a dagger in the hands of kings to throttle the subjects, and now in the hands of the subjects to throttle kings.” This “citizen minister,” as Voltaire called him, hated and harried by the clergy, might have led the monarchy to gradual reformation if he had been allowed to carry out his plans. Agreeably to the doctrine of the philosophers, he considered that politics was not an art of shifts and expedients which king, favorites, and state- and church-beneficiaries could use for their own advantage, but the exercise of high and strict duties, a school of responsibility and sacrifice, with the public good ever in sight. He wrote: “Morals has equal regard for all. It recognizes in all an equal right to happiness”—memorable words, written a few years before Jefferson introduced the very same principles: equality, right to happiness, into the American

Declaration of Independence, perhaps influenced by Turgot, certainly with a general knowledge of the doctrine of the French philosophers, whom he had studied and learned to admire. Thus the "rights of man" proclaimed by all the French thinkers of the eighteenth century were to be grafted on the sound and solid experience of liberty acquired by the American colonists from familiarity with English institutions.

As Washington and Hamilton were influenced by Montesquieu, as Jefferson was influenced by Voltaire and Turgot, so Thomas Paine derived his inspiration, of decisive importance in its day for the success of the American Revolution, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Rousseau, like the other philosophers, was the heir of the double current of thought which had been running down from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century made up of two streams—humanism and naturalism. Both bore forces of renovation and liberation. Humanism led to emancipation by means of reason; naturalism enlisted nature—that is, instinct—in the struggle against

all smothering and deadening influences. For Rousseau the nature of men was essentially *feeling*. Let feeling lend its force of impact to the ideal and moral principles formulated by reason, and the human being would be transformed, deeds would be accomplished never heard of before, and heroic times would be born again.

The work of reason needed a motive power. It depended on the intellect, which was methodical, sedate, cold. At most could it rouse a sort of brain enthusiasm in men of learning and study. What was wanted was an irrepressible ground-swell of passion in the mass of the nation that would give thunderous expression to the will of reform. Rousseau could not be—and, indeed, was not—an open advocate of revolution, but the spirit of revolution is seething and sizzling in all his work. The philosophers had gathered together the inflammable brushwood of principles and systems: Rousseau struck the spark that was to set it aflame.

Rousseau was a plebeian. He belonged to the artisan class, intelligent, industrious,

clear-sighted, that, in spite of political and social oppression, had become alive to its importance in the state and to its rights. It was no longer passive and resigned but was eager to emerge. Rousseau represented that plebeian aspiration with all the emotional impetus that accompanied it. The ideal of freedom, justice, and personal rights had penetrated the now enlightened middle class and had bred in it a state of mind which did not partake so much of intellectual as of sentimental life. They did not cherish the new truth as a beautiful piece of speculative workmanship, but yearned for its realization with the onrush of imperious desire. Rousseau was a child of instinct. His plebeian *élan* was strengthened and uplifted by his Christian fervor.

It may seem paradoxical to speak of Christian feelings in the case of a man who as a "littérateur" was the creator of the sex novel, and as a citizen raised the scandal of putting his children to the waif asylum. But however objectionable Rousseau's personal conduct may have been, there remains the fact that in an age of ratiocination and wide-

spread skepticism he gave expression to the religious longings of the soul with such contagious force that the effect of it is still felt to-day. His was not orthodox Christianity; indeed, orthodox Christianity was then all but lost to faith and to any generous impulse. But, while reviving love of God, admiration of the work of God in nature and in the moral life of man, worship of God in the presence of infinitude and mystery, he effected, if I may say, the secularization of Christian belief; that is, he brought spiritual aspiration, thus far exclusively connected with the hope of eternal life, from heaven to earth, and revealed to his contemporaries the beauty of the human-divine in man and in man's work. Why should not justice be realized here below? Why should not equality be recognized as a law on earth (were it a relative law) until it be found an absolute law in heaven? Why should not conscience—that inner light granted from above to all men—secure for all the right to personal respect, the most precious attribute of the spiritual person?

Rousseau's brain- and heart-energy was

powerfully operative in awakening in his contemporaries a new "moral consciousness" applied to things political and social. His flaming appeal aroused in those who suffered of oppression, unmerited slight and neglect, lack of education and opportunity, an eager desire for justice. They felt that they had not been given a chance to develop their possibilities: the individual no longer accepted meekly to submit to usurped privileges, to misused authority, to cynical self-indulgence and self-seeking, to the haughty aloofness of those who called themselves his betters. Individualism was unloosed—with its immeasurable force for good and evil.

There was danger in the liberation of the pent-up energies and repressed instincts that had so long been denied expression. But it is those liberated energies and freed instincts that have built the modern world. Any great gain, as human affairs go, is bought at some price. There are constant alternatings of ebb and flow, each flow carrying up the line of progress a little higher on the slope of destiny. Rousseau was instrumental in bringing up the flow, at one

time, to such a point that, whatever temporary retrogression might take place, every onward return would bear forward the future of democracy.

The power of Rousseau lay in his combined appeal to reason and to the feelings. He proposed to the intellect an ideal "social contract" which solved the difficult problem of securing the liberty of individual citizens while organizing government and society under the protection of law, discipline, and devotion to the public good. He proposed to the sensibility the greatest satisfaction it can receive in matters concerning the arrangement of the collective order, namely, as much equality as just laws, open opportunity, and respect for the person can secure to all. He created both a rational and an emotional enthusiasm, setting in motion the two great forces which actuate free men, intuition and intellect. His work, it is true, was abstract. He dealt with principles and theory. There remained to find the practical means of carrying out his ideal schemes, to which, in the process, many corrections were to be applied. But what greater eulogy for

a thinker than the recognition by the world, a century and a half after his death, of the truth and beauty of the ideal of political justice and social equity he set up, with a clear vision of the future and a buoyant faith in the law of progress?

With all the fervor of his soul Rousseau cherished above all two great loves: love of country, which he did not separate from devotion to justice and to virtue, and love of mankind, which he did not separate from the ideal of peace and fraternity.

The men of the French Revolution proved themselves his true disciples, carrying patriotism to the highest degree of sacrifice when they resisted the coalition of European despots banded against nascent liberty. When they drafted their Constitution they were mindful of men (strangers though they be) pining under despotism, and declared themselves the friends of all peoples revolted against tyrants.

One hundred and fifty years have elapsed. France again in 1914 rose unanimous against terrible odds, in defense of country and the ideals that are the very essence and

substance of civilization. When finally she had won victory, with the help of the great democracies of the world, she showed by her moderation that she had due regard for the ultimate issues of universal peace and justice, seeking not revenge, demanding only equitable compensation, working to build a permanent world-understanding by the League of Nations. Both by her *élan* in the hour of danger and her conscious disinterestedness after the superhuman trial, she was true to her great thinkers of the eighteenth century, to the example of the heroes of the French Revolution, and to her imperishable trust in the force of moral and democratic progress, which she cherishes, like yourself, you American friends of France and of democracy, for herself and for all mankind.

V

THE IDEALS OF EQUALITY AND SOLIDARITY

WE have seen the French philosophers of the eighteenth century become the propagandists of the doctrine of progress in the world by the universality of their principles and the effectiveness of their appeal. They were indebted to the precedent of English liberty. But it is they who, beyond the English type of local and national liberty, grown out of historical circumstances, based on charters and Parliamentary bills, carefully limited and deftly conciliated with institutions of the past, conceived liberty as a rational idea, an attribute of man as man, a requisite of government according to natural law, an inalienable right of the citizen which ought to prevail against the tyranny of kings, the absolutism of church, the arbitrariness of judges, all the conspiracies of prerogative, privilege, and social iniquity. The complementary notions of government

of the people, by the people, for the people, of just laws, of an equitable distribution among all of public imposts, of toleration and peace were posited by the philosophers as logical consequences of the premises whose truth plainly appeared in the light of evidence. They expressed those truths in a clear, lively, colorful style which made them immediately intelligible and acceptable to all peoples and nations. It was a new humanism bearing on morals and politics which rapidly spread in the Old and New World, and was to grow, expand, and fructify in the nineteenth century.

As the French philosophers rationalized *political* science and established it as a branch of morals, so they enlisted the feelings of men on the side of *social* problems. Political and social problems they approached with the earnestness of religion. They strove, by clearness of thought and warmth of appeal, to make their solutions valid for all mankind. Whereas the English commentators on representative government laid down empirical rules applying to England alone (however valuable), the

French philosophers poured into their work a passionate heat which accorded with the vastness of their design and the hopes they cherished for the universality of the human species. Their blood pulsed and their brain beat at the glory of the vision in the enthusiasm of prophetic rapture.

Voltaire, the most sedate and self-possessed of them all, wrote to the Marquess of Chauvelin fourteen years before the American Revolution (which he did not live to see), twenty-five years before the French Revolution (which he felt coming): "All I see sows the seed of a revolution which cannot but break out, although I shall not have the satisfaction to witness it. Enlightenment has spread so widely by gradual stages, that there must be a general uprising some day, and then it will be a fine affray. The young are happy: they are to see great things."

Condorcet, hunted up by the police agents of the Revolutionary Tribunal for the crime of "moderatism," wrote his *Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind* in the six months he lived hidden in a garret, Rue Ser-

vandoni, before being found out and reduced to taking poison in order to avoid the guillotine. This last work of his, scribbled off in the shadow of the scaffold, breathes the purest and most ardent faith in the future and the emancipation of mankind. He excused beforehand the blind rage of his judges: "In all emancipated countries the influence of the populace is no doubt to be feared; but give to all equal rights and there will no longer be a populace."

Men of action, nourished with the doctrine of the philosophers, professed the same belief and were upheld by the same hope even in the jaws of death. The Girondist Buzot, from the cave where he had run for shelter in his native province, wrote, the day before he was discovered: "Man is naturally good. It is at the moment when I am suffering most for men that I want to proclaim this great truth. It is society that distorts and degrades human nature."

In these ultimate utterances of men of powerful intellect, Fathers of the Revolution, that fell its victims, we hear more than the note of liberty. Their passionate fervor

was fanned by their faith in man, the rational and sentient creature, man universal, whose spiritual essence lives irrespective of rank, class, education, or condition. They foresaw with a throb of the heart the moment when this truth, anchored in their reason, would prevail over political tyranny, social privilege, moral blindness, racial differences, and warped and distorted feelings. Those who lived long enough to see the French Revolution hailed it as the greatest event in history and supported its stormy onslaught on intolerable abuses, until the fury of the mob outreached them.

The chief characteristic of the French Revolution, in contradistinction to the English and the American Revolutions, is that it assumed a social no less than a political aspect. This is why it incurred the scathing denunciation of Burke, the great Whig, who shuddered and paled when he discovered that not only the crown was humiliated but that the aristocracy was ousted from place and privilege, the church dispossessed of its prebends and power, and its property rudely transferred from the great lords and clerical

beneficiaries to the tillers of the soil even before the phase of systematic violence had set in, in answer to the provocation of the European despots bent upon drowning the Revolution in blood. Burke in England, and in America Washington and Hamilton took alarm at the subversive and (to them) truly appalling new principle formulated by the French, claiming the support of reason and universal truth and calling upon all the world to share in their faith: the principle of equality.

The then governing class of the United States shrank from the example of the French, because the equality which the latter proclaimed was not that which the American Constitution recognized. The French Revolution was not only the daughter of the considerate thought of Voltaire and of Montesquieu but also of the impassioned revolt of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau called himself "the friend of Equality." For him the task of government consisted essentially in making up by reparative measures for the injustices of society. Society as he saw it had smothered the natural man and all na-

tive goodness and had unloosed everywhere selfishness, greed, luxury, and lust of domination. He flaunted such formulas as, "The first man, who, having inclosed a patch of ground, took it upon himself to say, 'This is mine,' was responsible for the crimes, murders, wars, and all the misery and horror that mankind has suffered. . . . The fruits of the earth belong to all; the earth belongs to none!"

Rousseau did not care for the vested interests. The state of things that prevailed in France in his day seemed to preclude any gradual and prudent reform, so hopelessly steeped in error were the king and the governing class. His was the cry of revolt, not incoherent or blindly mad, but suggested by straightforward reason and impassioned logic. This is why, warding off all contingencies, discarding established fact, compromise, or precedent, he raised his voice for man in the abstract, contended for absolute liberty and equality as reason conceived them or Christ had promised them to the righteous. Religious fervor combined with plebeian aspiration urged him on as the

prophet of the new dispensation upon earth. The spirit of the age, irresistibly carrying him along in its whirl, led him to lay the emphasis on the redressment of material wrongs, the suppression of actual injustice and suffering, and the satisfaction of crying needs and desires. He exclaimed, "Justice is of God!" by which he meant, "Kings who favor the powerful and rich, privileged and mighty men who oppress and starve the people, are criminals in the eyes of God." Therefore the people had a right to strive for the reign of equality in the name of reason and conscience as well as because of their pressing wants and unbearable misery.

After flinging to the world his flaming call in behalf of the downtrodden, Rousseau proceeded to build up a theoretical plan of government in agreement with his rational principles and the longings of his insurgent soul. What he mostly was concerned with was to realize the ideal of equality. When we bear this in mind the trend of his famous book *Le Contrat Social* becomes clearer, although in seeming contradiction, on many a point, with the uncompromising tone of in-

dividualism which predominates throughout the rest of his work. He starts from individualistic premises. Every citizen as a free man must enjoy the sacred right of liberty. But social liberty cannot be the same as natural liberty. In order to live in peace with his fellow citizens each man must make the sacrifice of part of his liberty. In theory he is asked to surrender only as much of his individual liberty as is necessary to effect harmony between the actions of all. Practically, the "sovereign," that is, the people, alone has power to judge how far this voluntary surrender must go. Rousseau devises a subtle piece of sophistry to assert that, whatever obligations the citizens submit to, they preserve their full autonomy, for, being members of the "sovereign," any constraint imposed upon them actually proceeds from their own will. "Whoever," he writes, "shall refuse to obey the general will shall be constrained by the whole body—signifying nothing more than that he will be forced to be free."

When it comes to definite provisions, Rousseau's democratic constitution turns

out to be most strictly exacting. His pre-occupations are those of a moralist who is less concerned with securing to the citizens freedom of movement and favorable conditions to develop their individuality than to forestall any encroachment of the more enterprising and less scrupulous on the rights of all. There must be such severe laws regulating the material and spiritual behavior of the members of the commonwealth that none can become rich enough or careless enough of the obligations of collective morality to take precedence over the others, and thus plant the germs of inequality and possible tyranny in the Republic.

There will be laws to empower the state to levy compensating taxes on fortunes grown out of proportion with what was considered by the moralizing school as "virtuous mediocrity": thus it will be impossible for any to monopolize wealth, that is, the means of enslaving his fellow citizens by commanding the very sources of life. Frugality will reign. It will be taught to the children in the public schools and required of all as a civic obligation. No commerce with foreign

countries shall be allowed unless carried on by the Republic to meet urgent needs, so as to cast off beforehand the very roots of luxury and insolent wealth. With a view to keeping the will of the people in the right path there must be a religion of the state, "with a few simple dogmas," writes Rousseau, "expressed with precision, without any explanations or commentary. Those principles will be less a dogma of religion than sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be either a good citizen or a faithful subject. Without being able to compel anyone to believe them, the sovereign can banish from the state unbelievers. . . . The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foreseeing, and provident Divinity, the life to come, happiness of the upright, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and of the laws—these are the positive dogmas. . . . If anyone, after publicly recognizing these dogmas, contradicts himself as if he did not believe them, let him be punished by death. . . ."

This indeed is equality with a vengeance.

Rousseau, living in an age when intolerance and cruel repression were the rule, himself brought up in Calvinistic Geneva, then under a strict theocratic government, did not conceive any other means of maintaining purity of spirit in the commonwealth. Individualism was the motive power of his thought; but self-independence as he understood it was to be used primarily for the sake of self-submission to the dictates of rational idealism and republican virtue. As in the Puritan theocracies of the seventeenth century in America, moral discipline was to be the foremost duty of citizens. Rousseau's failure to form a true notion of liberal democracy originated from his fear of class distinctions and of intestine discrepancies which, as he had too many reasons to apprehend, would soon trample equality and public morality under foot, ruin the republican spirit, and destroy the commonwealth. Those fears in his day were perhaps not unfounded or exaggerated.

The oppressed classes that listened to Rousseau as the prophet of the time to come did not care for what seemed negligible de-

tails of political organization. They were roused to enthusiasm and hope by his passionate and glowing advocacy of a reform destined to bring about political justice, as called for by their human reason, and a possibility of happiness in the world, as called for by the earnest inner yearnings of their souls. There was in Rousseau's doctrine a ferment of what was later called "socialism." Socialism ought not to be a bugbear. Understood in the right constructive sense, it has invaded all forms of political activity to-day. Social aspirations could not but be revolutionary at a time when there existed in France (and in England as well, in spite of her institutions of liberty) such a wide gap between the propertied and the unpropertied classes, when there were no equal laws, and when the welfare—nay, the lives—of the poor did not count for anything. Whereas in England the rabble, more or less brutalized by their sordid existence and by gin, bowed their necks under social inequality, with here and there such sporadic and ephemeral upheavals as the Gordon or the Wilkes riots, the French *petit peuple*,

endowed with some natural refinement and intellectual liveliness, drank in the doctrine of Rousseau and were ready to listen to rational reforms for the betterment of their condition. This is what drove Burke to a panic in 1791 when he heard that the political clubs of the French Revolution, the Cordeliers and the Jacobins, composed of middle-class professional men, of craftsmen and manual laborers mixing fraternally, rehearsed political and social systems, formulated by the philosophers, and fashioned out bold, practical applications, for the need of France and of all nations.

Thus the French Revolution, breaking out in a world still for the most part under the sway of a quasi-feudal regime, roused the people of Europe to consciousness and laid down the principles that were thereafter to change the political and social aspect of society in almost all civilized countries. The French Revolution was not purposely violent. To realize how respectful it was of existing institutions, of legitimate superiorities, of national traditions and of the monarchical regime itself, as far as they

could be conciliated with just improvements, one has only to read the petitions of the people entered in the *Cahiers*, or Reports presented to the States General in 1789. Nothing there but moderate grievances and reasonable demands. The king, if he had been well advised, would have taken the lead of the movement, and might have kept his crown and been hailed as liberator of the country. Instead, he surreptitiously mustered his foreign mercenaries to shoot down the patriots and secretly called on the despots of Europe to lend him assistance. It was only when France had been invaded by the armies of Prussia and Austria that, while the volunteers fought at the frontier, the revolutionary government raised the guillotine as a means of defense against the plotting aristocrats at home. We have the testimony of your great statesman Jefferson and of the English poet Wordsworth to vouch for the nobleness of the principles of the Revolution and the high character of the men who assumed the terrible responsibilities of the time. Neither Jefferson nor Wordsworth was frightened by the *sans-*

culottes, who appeared much more human when met with in the flesh than when imagined through the reports of the agents of the counter-revolution.

How can we explain that the French Revolution when in progress excited suspicion or aversion in England and in America (at least with the conservative classes), whereas its influence was later to act powerfully and urge these two countries and many others to fulfill the promise of democracy? No doubt because the Revolution failed at first to accomplish the superhuman task it had undertaken, checked by outward attack and inward troubles, carried away to extremes by the fanatics of the new faith, crushed under the burden of its very idealism. Another reason was that it aimed at social as well as political reform; that is, it strove not only to free men from arbitrary and despotic government, but to establish greater uniformity in the conditions of men, so that all might aspire (if they were not unworthy) to what measure of happiness pertains to life here below. For the French foresaw that liberty alone would be inefficacious to secure

equal chances for all, to enable all to develop their full powers and reach the reward they might lay claim to. There are economic advantages or hindrances which favor or handicap men and place them ahead of or behind their fellows, sometimes without their having done anything to deserve the advancement or the rebuff. Rousseau and the leaders of the French Revolution were all aglow with moral fervor and the passion of justice. For the first time in the history of the world an attempt was made to place the citizens of the Republic in fair economic relations with each other at the start, and maintaining the social environment in conditions favorable to the working of the law of merit or demerit. For the first time the general happiness of the masses was taken into consideration by the legislators, not in Utopia, but in this very world, in pursuance of the higher claims of reason and the feelings of universal sympathy and respect for the essential humanity of man.

The French Revolution opened with the voluntary surrender on the famous night of August 4, 1789, of feudal privileges by

the nobility in a splendid movement of enthusiasm started by those of the aristocratic class, like La Fayette, who had been pervaded by the spirit of the new age. Then the nation ordered the estates of the emigrated noblemen and nonjuring clergy to be sold out to those who could best make them productive for the benefit of the community as well as their own. This was the origin of the dissemination of rural property among small landowners—a fact which explains that to this day there are fewer discrepancies of fortune in France than anywhere else in Europe. The ideal of equality, with such qualifications as are necessary to make it tally with the actual conditions of human nature and the requirements of the moral law, lay at the base of the legislation of the Revolution—equality not only in its political but in its social aspect, implying that those who reached a high position or gathered a fortune were to be mindful of their indebtedness to the community which had provided them with the means of their ascension. Mirabeau, in one of his speeches in the Constituent Assembly, said: “It is time to ab-

jure the prejudices of proud ignorance that cause the words wages and wage-earners to be despised. I know only three possible conditions of existence in society: whoever is not a beggar or a robber must be a wage-earner. The landowner himself is the first of wage-earners. What is vulgarly called his property is nothing but the price society pays him for the distribution he is called upon to deal out to others in remuneration for work or in expenses for his needs. The landowners are the agents and the bursars of the community."

In the rehandling of the taxes the Constituent and the Legislative Assembly introduced the principle of *progressive* taxation, which exempted from any fiscal burden the indispensable minimum for a man and his family to live on, and levied a gradually increasing contribution on the incomes that allowed a margin of superfluity beyond the bare means of subsistence. Such a discrimination seems natural to our generation because the principles of the French Revolution have finally prevailed. In spite of extensive resistance at first, almost all govern-

ments and nations have come to adopt this social point of view after a century of contention *pro* and *con* the doctrine. All civilized countries have taken the habit of viewing progressive taxation on property or income as just, because they hold it a social compensation for the natural inequality between individuals, and admit that the law of justice is bound to redress the hardships of the law of nature. Almost every one of us to-day takes socialism (in the broadest sense) and socialistic measures as a matter of course, because we look on the society of men from the point of view of their interdependence and mutual indebtedness. We are moved to this by the same moral faith, applied to matters political and social, as Rousseau professed, with the same humanistic and Christian background as he himself envisaged. It can hardly be contested that it was the French Revolution (especially when we consider its influence on the Jeffersonian democracy in America and the Chartist and radical movement in England and on the European revolutions of 1830 and 1848) that brought about this great step forward.

The principles of the French Revolution, including the ideal of equality, as first conceived by the French, had a theoretical, sweeping character which left in the shade the slow efforts of men—by means often contrary to the end, or vice versa—to build up civilization and make society a workable institution. The men of the French Revolution disregarded the difficulties of application and overlooked (because not yet enlightened by experience) the instinctive impulses or passions of human nature. They took it for granted, as Rousseau had affirmed, that man was essentially good and amenable to reason, and that it would be sufficient to annul usurped authority, divest malfeasant magistrates of their power, and amend corrupt institutions, to secure justice and happiness for all. Yet, in spite of their abstract character and all-embracing universality, the principles of the French Revolution as spiritual forces have been the inspiration of many peoples long kept prostrate by tyrannical governments, as well as the stimulus of nations following a slow process of evolution, where precedent, traditions, and

the resistance of the governing classes made it difficult for the commoners to come into their rightful heritage as men and citizens.

That the French have not neglected some of the most important conditions fit to effect the actual advance of men toward equality appears in the emphasis which they have laid on education. There is hardly a French philosopher of the eighteenth century but did insist on the capacity of the ignorant to rise to higher levels of intelligence and knowledge through appropriate teaching. The Revolution (whose civil reforms are often left in the dark by historians unduly attracted by the dramatic aspect of the struggle and the individual or national vicissitudes) gave its most careful attention to the organization of schools for the people, both primary and secondary, which had been neglected by the monarchical regime. The educational work of the Revolution (that the reactionary governments issued from the ruins of the first Republic often repudiated as dangerous) had simply to be taken up again by the third Republic to form a perfect system of schools and higher institutes

of learning for the French democracy—with one exception (where the example of America pointed out the way), namely, provisions for the secondary and higher education of women on an equal footing with that of men.

In the nineteenth century, through many political vicissitudes, there set in a struggle, in France, between the principle of collective discipline, necessary to order, and the principle of individualism, necessary to progress. Liberty and equality were considered no longer in their purely theoretical or rational aspect, but approached as concrete and practical problems. In the course of this evolution America stood in the eyes of France as the living proof of the possibility of realizing enduring democracy. Popular government was hailed by de Tocqueville with almost religious reverence as the supreme manifestation of human wisdom in the sphere of political activity. De Tocqueville's testimony concerning the greatness and vitality of American democracy became a constant encouragement for the French. It created enthusiasm for America with such

thinkers and men of action as Michelet and Quinet.

France experienced oscillations from sanguine idealism to despondency. But after the fire-ordeal of 1870-71 the Republic settled never to be shaken or shattered again by any attempt to restore the past. A final union was then seen to take place between rationalism and the practical understanding of facts, idealism and the acceptance of political and social necessities. A sober notion of equality established itself which neither swerved from the goal of universal truth nor disregarded the humble task of reconciling ideal principles with the contingencies of reality.

It appears to-day, to minds that approach the problem without illusion or skepticism and with a breadth of view developed by the modern practice of analytical thought and accurate observation, that real equality does not mean equal treatment, equal rights, and equal conditions for all—that is, a sort of uniformity in mediocrity—but equal application to all of the supreme law of justice, full justice, civil and political, economic and

social, according to the diverse human values that diverse individuals represent. Rousseau and the men of the Revolution had laid the emphasis on the "quality of man," common to all. We to-day primarily consider the individual value of the person. It does not follow that we neglect the figure only to retain the index. Humanity in man—in all men—is the bed rock of political equality. No other means has been found to protect the masses against the possible encroachments of the classes than universal suffrage, in spite of its manifest drawbacks and the abuses it draws in its wake. But after this fundamental guarantee has been given to democracy, let every man count in the competition for places or success, in the intellectual or social scale where merit is weighed, for what he is worth. "Does not this amount," some will ask, "to opening a free fight for the goods of the earth, with no protection for the weak, the poor, the handicapped, the disinherited?" Not so. I intend to point out presently the part played by solidarity, and to show how it comes in to temper the evil results of unlimited liberty.

The problem that I am facing now is that of equality dissociated for one moment from that of social interdependence, which has as much, if not more, importance at the present day. What I want to insist upon, first, is the particular position and practice of the French at present with regard to equality.

Laws and manners have combined their effects for over a century to make France the country of Europe where the middle class—the people of moderate means, as far removed from large affluence as from extreme poverty—really constitute the body of the nation. The law of inheritance requires an equal division of the father's property among all the children; strict legal supervision prevents preferential treatment in favor of trusts and precludes monopolies. The thrifty habits of all classes have made petty tradesmen, professional men, farmers, and workers the owners of an income, or of a house, or of a piece of land. From this widely spread distribution of wealth have ensued true democratic good feeling, general contentment, and tranquillity, and (what is still more precious) extensive culture and

refinement. Foreigners are often struck by the intellectual equipment of the common people and the taste or artistic sense they evince in dress or home decorations. If the German *Beuteamt* (booty-office) during the Great War organized the looting of French furniture, wood-carvings, tapestries, works of art, etc., with such exhaustive meticulousness, one of the reasons for it was that they knew the high artistic value of those personal possessions of the French bourgeois and had long premeditated a general raiding of the treasures of the French homes.

The English writer Matthew Arnold, who devoted the best of his talent to raising the British Philistine to a higher intellectual life, was an admirer of French equality, to which he attributed some of the most significant qualities of the French. "We find in France," he said, "a general equality in a humane kind of life. This is the secret of the passionate attachment with which France inspires all Frenchmen. There is so much of the goodness and agreeableness of life there and for so many. It is the secret of her having been able to attach so ardently

to her the Germans and Protestant people of Alsace, while we have been so little able to attach the Celtic and Catholic people of Ireland. France brings the Alsatians into a social system so full of the goodness and agreeableness of life. It is the secret, finally, of the prevalence which we have remarked in some other continental countries (Sweden, Norway, Switzerland) of legislation tending, like that of France, to social equality. The social system which equality creates in France is, in the eyes of others, such a giver of goodness and agreeableness of life that they seek to get the goodness by getting the equality. . . .”

It would have been worth Matthew Arnold's attention to point out another method the French employ to maintain equality—with due consideration for individual merit—namely, to reserve every position under the government to the ablest and most deserving candidates. In a country where extensive—perhaps excessive—administrative centralization opens so many state offices to the ambition of all, strict regulations establish the qualifications required

for each post however humble. The usual way to a situation in public administration from assistant tax collector, arsenal workman, or telephone girl, to high commissioner, inspector-general, or director of a government office, is through a competitive examination whose millstones grind mighty fine. Very little room is left for patronage, the plague of democracy. Public offices are open to all, not through intrigue or political pull, but by a careful weighing of the knowledge, competence, training, and intellectual powers of the candidates. No more striking demonstration can be given of the modern conception of equality in France: careers open to talents, with elaborate provisions to ascertain where talents lie and what degree of talent is found in each—such is the method applied to reward effort, personal distinction, and individual merit.

In the same spirit democratic France is mindful of forming an *élite* and seeing that the best gifts, whatever their origin, may be shunted toward positions of responsibility. Education is the best means of selecting and training the elect. The process of selection

begins with the secondary school. Our secondary schools are not free. We believe it is detrimental to the qualities of studies to admit to the classroom pupils indifferent to the best intellectual foundation, either because of the vagueness of their aim, or, on the contrary, because of the narrowness of their immediate and practical purpose. We keep the vocational school and the culture school separate; the former alone is free. In the latter the obligation of paying a fee is a guarantee of the seriousness of the effort made to raise oneself to the ranks of the intellectual *élite*. A number of scholarships are offered to the children of the lower middle class or the working class, enabling them to take the whole course of studies through the secondary school and the University if they successfully pass the competitive examination that tests their ability. Thus a true aristocracy of merit is recruited by a just encouragement to and measurement of intellectual capacity and will power—an aristocracy with no exclusiveness, no caste spirit, no assuming airs, no supercilious attitude toward the common people, from whose

ranks they originate, if not directly, at least at one or two generations' distance.

Thus, while the philosophers of the eighteenth century, absorbed in the struggle against despotism and privilege, proclaimed a universal, unqualified law of equality meant to rouse men to a sense of their rights, the thinkers of the nineteenth century conceived equality in the organic form of just relations between the various types and natural categories of citizens. As French democracy passed from the combative and theoretical to the constructive and practical stage, the idea of the interrelations and interdependence of men came to the fore. Progress has been moving toward a more and more distinct notion of society conceived as an organism. The French founders of this idea—before Spencer and the English evolutionists expressed it in their own way—started from the point where the philosophers of the eighteenth century had left the problem: from the faith in man's power, through his rational activity and his imagination, guided by experience, to remodel the political and social world; and they went

further, taking a wider survey of the psychological resources of the human mind, making a stronger appeal to realistic common sense (although still relying on the force of moral sentiment), taking within their ken a vaster array of facts. As their aim was to weld together the various elements of society into a more coherent whole and bring about more happiness for all, they may be called "socialists" in the broader acceptance of the term. But their socialism was not the international revolutionary creed which has acquired ominous notoriety in connection with Karl Marx. It had nothing to do with the "materialistic" conception of history; nor did it distract the minds of simple men with the lurid glow of a "catastrophe." It may have been Utopian in some of its tenets, but it was marked, on the whole, with a spirit of sanity; it was generous and noble. It had handed down to us precious and fruitful suggestions. The right name which ought to be applied to the doctrine is not properly socialism but *solidarity*. The word is French, and French thought at large rallies to the ideal.

Solidarity is constructive, not destructive. It aims at a beneficent advance for all, without any spoliation, any violence or ransacking of the consolidated advantages of civilization. The idea of solidarity may be said to have haunted the thoughts and dreams of many a French thinker in the nineteenth century, until it came to be well-nigh universally adopted as the leading principle of social reform. The conception, if not the word, originated about 1820 with Saint-Simon.

Saint-Simon left to his successor, Pierre Leroux, the task of coining the term. He was the creator of the thought. What gave his work its right significance was the social point of view which he made the leading motive of it, in opposition to the uncompromising attitude assumed by the industrial bourgeoisie in the twenties and thirties of the last century. Whether we look at him as savant, social aristocrat, theorist of the development of industry, or founder of a new religion, the author of the *Catholicism of Industrialists* and of the *New Christianity* appears absorbed in the thought of amalgamating society into a whole by close legal

and humane interrelations. In reaction against the unsettled and disconnected conditions that prevailed at the time of the Revolution he felt the need of a strong organization of society under the guidance of a leading class. This class was to be an aristocracy of thought and conscience, open to all those who qualified themselves for it by their exceptional gifts and devotedness to the public good. They were to form a body politic intrusted with the task of government and with the management of the resources of the country—an *élite* of moral and efficient leaders whose creed should be science and faith, their duty toward their fellow men. The novelty was not only to substitute personal merit for hereditary rights but to place magnates of industry side by side with savants, philosophers, and professional men among those who were to guide the destinies of the country. He foresaw (what appears more plainly to us every day) that the industrialists were not to engross themselves in the mere production of wealth, but had moral and social responsibility toward the working class and toward the

country. As all great ideas, this conception of an aristocracy of men of intelligence and men of action taking in hand the political, economic, and moral leadership of the country was to mature before it could become practically feasible. To-day we see it realized by the activity of the associations, corporations, conferences, syndicates, with an important admixture of the democratic element and with a parallel activity of purely democratic groups, workmen's unions and federations, in a spirit, as Saint-Simon wished, of cooperation and solidarity.

The aristocratic leaning of Saint-Simon bears the mark of his time. On the other hand he was a true forerunner and prophet when he pointed out long before it had become a plain fact in the eyes of his contemporaries the paramount importance of economic activities, forces, and values in the modern world. He and his friends—the Saint-Simonians, as they are called, most of them engineers, technicians, and great administrators—drew up a program of industrial development and economic expansion for France which provided her with her sys-

tem of railroads and steamship lines at a time when the rapid and efficient conception of such a scheme was a question of life or death for the country. They did much for the building of new factories and the establishment of new great banks. One of them, Ferdinand de Lesseps, conceived and executed the opening of the Suez Canal.

Yet the most precious legacy of Saint-Simon was his social philosophy, which, even when modified by later experience, remains a valuable expression of the modern spirit. He himself would have gladly concurred in the adaptation of his ideas to the needs of the later times as the founder of "evolutionary morals"; that is, a system of ethics which sets constant progress, ceaseless creation of new values, and frequent readjustment of former tenets as the law of human conduct. His chief contribution lay in his views regarding liberty, labor, and property.

Saint-Simon believed that too much emphasis had been laid on liberty. The time had come, he thought, for the upper classes to recognize their indebtedness to the laboring classes, and to impose limits on the im-

pulse which had thus far too exclusively urged them to acquire wealth and power. Any class, he argued, was dependent on the other classes; any individual, whatever his rank and importance, was dependent on a thousand others, themselves indissolubly related to the whole. This close union of all, too often darkened by pride, exclusiveness, or greed, was to be sealed by a new feeling, proclaimed by the men of the Revolution as a bond in the struggle against abuses, now to become a bond for common idealism and common action, mutual forbearance and sympathy, eager desire to find self-satisfaction in service to others: the feeling of fraternity. The motto of the new *élite* was to be: Do all in your power to meliorate the physical and moral condition of the more numerous class. Are not the members of the more numerous class endowed with the sacred character of persons? Do they not deserve respect as the soldiers of the great army of labor, without which the world would not get the necessities of life?

In our time of industrial development, if the spirit of industry were rightly under-

stood, Saint-Simon maintained, machinery and organization ought to set into relief the close connection between men as plainly as the necessary connection between shafts and gears or between the various divisions of business, with this difference: that the relations between men were of a moral as well as a physical nature.

Although of aristocratic origin and tendencies, Saint-Simon was the first to feel, to understand in its beauty, and to realize in its universal force of appeal, the great democratic Gospel of Labor. Labor, in his eyes, was to be an object of reverence for all. He instituted the worship of labor as complementary to the worship of fraternity. Any transgression of the quasi-religious commandment to work was subject to reprobation and was presented as contrary both to the moral and social law. Saint-Simon pronounced idlers to be bad men and bad citizens. "Such a disposition," he wrote, "must be severely repressed wherever it is to be found."

This led him to his own considerations on property. How can a man lead an idle life?

Only if he is in possession of that form of accumulated labor which we call wealth. There is a distinction to be made between a capital which is the direct product of a man's activity and an unearned capital. Even in the former case, Saint-Simon hesitated to declare property a full individual right. His mind, it is true, was equally struck by the force of the individualistic and the socialistic point of view: in this, as in so many other human things, he felt the necessity of reconciling contraries. As a clear-sighted observer of psychological facts, he felt that property was the very support and stay of individuality. Without the stimulus of rightful gain individual effort was curtailed or smothered. But for the ownership of land, a house, or money, a man had no security against the surprises of fate. But for the reserves of private wealth, society lacked the means to provide for the great public services on which rest the prosperity and welfare of all; life was stunted and dis-crowned. On the other hand, from the very nature of Saint-Simon's philosophy—essentially social in spirit—there followed that

society alone could have full right of possession. Only a part of any property, rent, or profit, belonged to the individual. What was the share society was entitled to claim? Saint-Simon thought that this share, or limitation imposed on property owners by the state, should vary according to time, place, and national circumstances, and also the nature of the property. He did not formulate any precise rule of application, but he made the principle clear. This principle, in some form, although in various degrees, is almost universally accepted to-day; it received during the Great War striking extensions.

The French Revolution had established progressive taxation. All similar forms of taxation on capital, on the unearned increment, on exceptional profits, on incomes beyond a minimum, are, in fact, interventions of society limiting the right of property, as Saint-Simon pleaded. Other social interventions, such as a partnership of the state in the private working out of mines, railroads or hydraulic forces, state taxes on capital and profits for social insurance

against sickness, old age or other vicissitudes of life, correspond to the point of view expressed by Saint-Simon as early as 1820, and are becoming more and more—with the same prudent reservation he has made concerning the necessity of keeping alive the motive springs of individualistic action—the universal doctrine of political and social science, as an application of the principle of solidarity.

Saint-Simon had as a disciple for some time a man who imbibed from him the spirit of the social missionary—destined soon to strike a path of his own, where science was to be his searchlight and social idealism his beacon—one of the greatest figures of French philosophy and of world-thought in the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte. The philosophical system he founded—positivism—is no longer the moral bugbear it seemed to some, since the modern mind has found the way to conciliate Christian belief with philosophical reverence for the laws of nature. It is a remarkable fact that when that great French savant and thinker, in his fervor of nature-worship and his faith in the unity of

the universe, undertook to show the identity, as he saw it, of moral and physical sciences and the uniformity of methods in the survey of things and the study of man, he did it with a view to establishing more firmly social idealism as the term of human evolution. His complex and masterly work, the *Course of Positive Philosophy*, is pervaded as its life-blood by the thought and the hope that a just and humane organization of society will crown the age-old effort of mankind to become conscious of itself, of its inner forces, of its possibilities, and, through knowledge of itself, attain an ever higher and fuller stage of development.

His doctrine of the three epochs of human thought in the course of history—theological, metaphysical, scientific—may not represent historical truth in its bewildering variety of facts, conflict of tendencies, and overlapping of doctrines, but it remains a striking analysis of the three chief modes of activity of the human reason in its attempt to solve the riddle of the universe. Auguste Comte's description of the third or present epoch, the scientific or positive, offers the most pene-

trating interpretation of social ethics in the purely scientific view of the universe. Bringing into comparison the human and the animal mind, and seeking in animal societies (birds', ants', bees') a primitive, elementary form of our own elaborate social structure, he finds in the *social instinct* the motive power of the higher moral activity. In man the social instinct has become conscious: with the help of the intellect, owing to our faculty of observing facts, linking causes and effects, conceiving general ideas and laws, foreseeing consequences and directing our acts accordingly—thanks to our gift of memory, of speech, of reasoning, of craft- and art-building—we have been able to bring the possibilities of the social instinct to complete development and full fruition. Morality is instinct rationalized, conceived and accepted as the law of the group, respected as the essential element of order, that is, of collective adjustment and organic procedure, made sacred by example, precept, and habit, kept effective by the sanctions of public opinion and of legislation, cherished and enforced as the basic condition of prosperity and happi-

ness for each and all. Egoism remains the primary impulse of conduct, but, sublimated by the long process we call civilization and combined with the social impulse, it tends to aims radically opposed to its original bias. For out of the consciousness of our own joys and pains we derive a capacity to share in the pleasures and sufferings of others; sympathy comes into action, and, through the universal radiation and interplay of sympathy, altruism takes strength, unfolds its powers, takes precedence over self-seeking, and settles in the hearts of men as the main force which regulates, coordinates, and magnifies the collective actions of men.

Auguste Comte, like Saint-Simon, was still too much influenced by the reactions against the disorders of the French Revolution to welcome a regime of democratic government. His social idealism appealed to an aristocracy of intelligence and conscience, whom he charged, in the name of man's highest duty—devotion to the public good—to use their superiority for the benefit of the laboring classes. In so doing they would help those in need of material and moral as-

sistance, but they would also serve their own spiritual interests; for society cannot reach its highest level so long as it is dragged down by an ignorant, rude, degraded class, whose weight is a clog on its progress. As a true moralist, Comte appealed to the nobler feelings of his contemporaries, reminding them that man is never so great as when he conquers himself, rises superior to his sluggishness, greed, pride or self-indulgence, and dedicates himself to a disinterested social task. Auguste Comte's social philosophy effected the union of science with idealism, and, although outreached by the later developments of thought, did much to prepare the minds of the cultured class to adopt the doctrine of the interdependence of all the members of the social organism, the creed of solidarity.

The idea of organization—the most pressing need of modern society—imposed itself so urgently on the minds of the French in the primitive period of democracy that we see it appear in another form in the system of Fourier. Fourier was not of aristocratic origin and leanings, like Saint-Simon and

Auguste Comte, but a *petit bourgeois*, self-educated, with a comparatively small baggage of learning, especially consisting of the knowledge of Jean Jacques Rousseau. He was to become the Rousseau of the first half of the nineteenth century. His originality consisted in trying to conciliate individualistic aspirations, with all the energy, buoyancy, and even freakishness and vagabondage they imply, with smooth-working, machine-perfect cooperation. How was this to be realized? Fourier might have remembered the Draconian legislation imagined by Rousseau in his *Contrat Social*; but he was an individualist, with less of the moralist's longing for virtue and more of the artist's independence of temper than his master. He wanted to save the sum total of liberty that each man brings with him as his birth-right, and yet build as strongly knit a social structure as Rousseau's. With this in view he recalled another side of Rousseau's teaching, his plea for passion and for instinct, and, looking into his own heart, discovered those ardent passions and irrepressible instincts, the splendid gifts of bounteous na-

ture, which he felt to be the very spring and source of life and joy.

Fourier imagined the industrial society of the future as made up of workers' cooperative associations, whose members, having joined freely, would be under no constraint, giving their best effort for the sheer joy of "attractive work," kept together by natural affinities. His social conception rested on the keen and true psychological remark that when a man works of his own accord and with pleasure, he does more and better work in less time and with less fatigue than when he labors grudgingly under necessity. In his *phalansterium*, or brotherly community of industrial workers, there were to be occupations adapted to every age or sex; each one would have a choice of his vocation according to his aptitudes and preferences; work would be done in groups so constituted that similarity of tastes and temper would accompany physical and professional fitness. In order to avoid monotony or ennui there would be changes of occupations by duly arranged rotation. Work thus regulated, under the supervision of sympathetic bosses,

having only to guide spontaneous inclinations into their proper channels, would recover the character of joyous activity which it had in earlier stages of social life, when man sprang forth to satisfy his wants with the alacrity of health, strength, untired muscles, and unexhausted mental faculties.

There is much that sounds Utopian in Fourier's system; but, barring the naïve exuberance of his imagination, let us take stock of the actually precious novelties he has handed down to our later age. He is the father of cooperative societies, for the purchase of commodities and the manufacturing of products, founded in a spirit, not only of economy or profit, but of human brotherhood and mutual help. From him modern industry has also learned the importance of natural aptitudes and spontaneous inclination in the worker. America was prompt in appropriating the notion. Where more than in America does one see offices for vocational education in schools and cities, specialists appointed to select workers in industrial plants according to their physical and mental qualifications,

doing their task with tactful consideration of the workers' feelings? In America, more than anywhere else, special and attentive care is taken to put the right man in the right place, not only for the advantage of the firm, but for the contentment of the worker, and to give him a chance of the "joyous exertion" Fourier described. One sees in America factories where everything has been made pleasant, even artistic, about the shops, so that a ray of beauty may steal to the operative when he lifts his eyes from his machine. There are plants where a variety of jobs, akin in nature but bringing in welcome change, are distributed from week to week to the men, to forestall physical or mental weariness. Some progressive engineers or employment managers try, as Fourier taught, to enlist the fundamental instincts of man in the service of work: nothing is more striking than the appeals made to emulation or to the creative instinct, often with marked success. On the whole, much of what is now called "the human factor in industry," where America takes the lead to-day, may be traced to the original influence of Fourier,

and this factor is one of those which contribute most to develop in modern society the spirit of conciliation and cooperation, the direct outcome of the philosophy of solidarity.

Fourier's innovations are chiefly remembered to-day by humane and progressive employers that mean to do their full moral duty toward their employees. The workers themselves have learned the doctrine of what is called "the emancipation of the proletariat" in the work of the social reformer Proudhon. Although he has been dead fifty-six years, Proudhon is the recognized leader of the syndicalistic movement in France, parallel to that of the labor unions in America and likely to take more and more importance in the near future.

A man of the people and a manual worker in his youth, Proudhon knew the hard, upward struggle of the wage-earner who wants to get an education and liberate himself from the choking pressure of daily drudgery. He realized the proletariat could do nothing to ameliorate their condition unless they were united. He was always the tireless, power-

ful, vehement advocate of workingmen's associations.

With a penetrating insight into the true nature of democratic society, he saw clearly that individual liberty, if it was not to degenerate into ruthless struggle and legal anarchy, must coordinate itself with the liberties of groups, formed on the principle of common occupations, feelings, and wants. The nucleus-group would be the workman's union (having received at last legal recognition) which would ultimately enlarge so as to include all the elements that concur in one order of economic activity; that is, bring together labor, intelligence, and capital. Labor would get a share of profits truly corresponding to its contribution to the finished product and in keeping with the dignity of the human being; intelligence would be properly treated and encouraged; capital would be entitled to a just reward, yet not allowed to levy an enormous tithe on the joint product of the cooperative exertions of all.

Proudhon's early writings sounded the cry of social revolution. It is in one of them

that he flaunted the flaming formula, unjustly represented as containing his true doctrine, "Property is theft." When one follows up his thought, one discovers that he meant to condemn only the abuses of property, the monopoly of wealth concentrated in a few hands; but he firmly stuck to the French ideal of small rural homesteads in the possession of the farmers, and hoped to see in time the establishment of small industrial plants run by the workers themselves, pooling their savings or calling for the economies of people of moderate means through "people's banks." Large capital might still have occasion to employ itself, but not without some form of control through duly accredited representatives of intelligence and labor.

In contradistinction to German socialism, Proudhon made provision to keep the state, as far as possible, out of any domineering intervention in the economic activity of the nation. The groups, or syndicates, were to administer themselves by inner rule and to fuse the independent cooperative units into a large national cooperative system or eco-

conomic federalism, where private initiative was to assume responsibility under general laws set down by an economic Parliament.

Initiative and responsibility in his scheme reign at every degree of the social hierarchy; liberty and discipline rule jointly and counterbalance each other. Greater equality gradually spreads through the ever-increasing dissemination of property and capital. Above all—and here we reach the very heart and soul of the system—a powerful commonalty of feeling moves the whole, instilling life into its working; for without an ideal and a faith no social reform, however perfect, can work or come to any lasting result. This towering common feeling is the passion for *justice*. There Proudhon asserted the essentially individualistic character of his plan, for justice is the prime mover of individualism. It presupposes both a keen sense of self-dignity and a ready acceptance of reciprocal obligations. It is individualism in the modern sense, no longer one-sided, ambitious, haughty, and unscrupulous, but bilateral, respectful of the rights of others, considerate, finding in sacrifice of

self, above the line of just satisfaction, an inspiration and a joy. Proudhon insisted upon an exact exchange of services: labor balanced against managing ability, intelligence against capital, zeal against fair treatment, extra-exertion against extra-wage, time, effort, and skill against profits, loyalty and faithful duty against provision for sickness and old age. There was much in this that went beyond immediate possibility of realization. Experience has proved that the ideals of reformers never reach their goal easily or fully. Yet how much of Proudhon's social idealism has passed into practice! Unions and federations of labor recognized by the law; just remuneration by wage, premium, and bonus; profit-sharing, pensions, and insurance; cooperative associations of consumption or of production in the increase; lastly, shop committees admitted to discuss on an equal footing with employers grievances, work conditions, the fair wage or the comfort wage, shop regulations, and even questions of costs, dividends, constitution of reserves, and rates of profit-sharing.

In democratic America the new spirit has been furthered by the broad outlook and liberal attitude of progressive employers supported by powerful associations for the purpose of inquiry and mutual improvement, by a large element of enlightened public opinion, and by the onward movement of social justice in the churches. Workmen's unions are attentive and will see to it that the reform is not suppressed or stopped half way. It seems that, through scientific organization, employment management, recognition of the human factor in industry, and gradual growth of industrial democracy, social progress is on a fair way of development.

In France the workmen have great constructive schemes. Sobered by experience, instructed by the ruinous results of strikes and the damage done to production by soldiering and sabotage, having learned much from observation, more and more persuaded that the unions must be the guides and regulators of the proletarian movement, and taking their inspiration from the doctrine of Proudhon, the syndicalist leaders have en-

tered on the preparation of an organic plan of industrial reform under the name of "nationalization of industry" (a phrase not quite unknown in America). Let us not be frightened by words. If the movement is to succeed—nobody knows at what time in the remote future—it must be conducted by leaders who, like Proudhon, have fully qualified themselves by technical competence, organizing power, sense of responsibility, and ability to secure credit for the vast work anticipated by the great French socialist. The present leaders of the French *Confédération Générale du Travail*—although sometimes carried away by their troops to the brink of dangerous precipices—have worthily played their part in the Great War, and recently in the great international gatherings at Washington and at Geneva. They repudiate strikes, sabotage, and revolution. They have broken off with the left wing or communist faction of the labor movement. Their constructive efforts have materialized in the foundation of an "Economic Council," where they have called technical experts, economists, jurists, and state officials, and where

they reserve their place, on an equal footing, to the employers when the latter decide to enter into cooperation with them for effective attempts at reform. All this will probably remain far short of the results aimed at, but it is not without interest to see the *élite* of the working class, having reached the intellectual and moral development which entitles them to greater initiative and the ambition of being given a share in the management of industry, claim recognition of labor in the economic sphere of action, as they have already been granted their full rights as citizens. Proudhon had hailed the approach of the reign of the "producer": his disciples strive to bring it about.

Should the reform in France or in America be delayed till more favorable times, when it comes, it bids fair to be accomplished without any violent outbreak or any reactionary movement thrusting itself across its path. It is likely to be effected by gradual changes, with good will and intelligent comprehension of the benefits of cooperation on either side. France and America as the countries where de-

mocracy and equality are in full swing, and where the moral and social necessity of the interplay of all forces and the interaid of all classes are most fully recognized, are ripe for the practice of *solidarity* within the pale of *organic* individualism. Absolute authority, limitless, uncontrolled, and greedy desire for ever-growing dividends will fade away as anomalies of the past. As a representative in the French Chamber recently said, "The time of the employer by divine right is past." The spirit of "mutualism," according to Proudhon's phrase, the spirit of "service," as runs the American slogan, are sure to prevail: both are direct applications of the principle of *solidarity*.

It will be the end of an age and the opening of a new era fraught with momentous consequences, richer, we are entitled to hope, in social justice and in happiness for all.

VI

FRANCE AND PEACE

It is difficult for you, Americans, to realize the situation of European countries in their relations with one another. You have had your troubles. America lived hours of terrible anxiety when she felt the problem of union and the abolition of slavery could be solved only by recourse to the decisions of arms. The Civil War was a cruel inner trouble, yet how different from an outer conflict (like that France has had to cope with lately), in which a country, however peaceful and respectful of justice, is assaulted, not for any grievance or the solution of any problem, but in the name of ancient hatred and fierce ambition. Try to picture to yourselves the state of Europe for centuries past: a continent not larger than yours, four or five times more thickly populated, occupied by nations differing in race, language, institutions, manners, traditions, aspirations, and

separated by historical memories, where violence, theft, and bloodshed held more place than mutual benevolence, sympathy, and kind service. After all, it is a wonder that, in such adverse circumstances, a wish to overcome resentment, hatred, or revenge should have arisen in the hearts of men, and a steady movement in favor of peace should have set in and gradually grown until a new idealism took shape and means were sought to give it real and concrete existence.

The desire for peace is the outcome of democracy. "Virtue," as Montesquieu said—that is, as we say, equality and fraternity, justice and love for our fellow men—are the motive springs of the democratic spirit. Democracy abhors conquest and all forms of militaristic violence, which it had to crush and abolish in order to secure for itself freedom and the right to happiness within the limits of law and order. Democracy respects the rights of others, whether individuals or nations, and even shows a friendly disposition to help others, unless their attitude precludes any good feeling or benevolent attention. This is why America, who,

in the nineteenth century, gave the first example of a great country prospering under a full-grown democratic government, also took the lead in furthering measures to bring about better international relations and, if possible, do away with wars of aggression.

In Europe a significant proof of the close association between the democratic spirit and the desire for peace is the fact that the first philosophical movement in favor of arbitration and organized peace originated with French thinkers in the eighteenth century, at the very time when the political and social philosophy I have described in previous lectures was taking hold of the more enlightened and far-seeing men, the prophets of the times to come.

The eighteenth century in France, as well as in England, was the age of sensibility. Along with a general softening of manners, resulting from the progress of civilization, and a new fellow feeling for the suffering and misery of others, resulting from the moral and social prominence of the middle class, there grew indignation against despotism and war, the sources of so much

misery and suffering. Moral reprobation of war first arose from pity for the untold agonies war caused to mankind. The first pacifist was a man of note and distinction, who, born a nobleman, had become a secular member of the clergy, devoting his life to letters and the propaganda of ideas—a man known for his benevolent dispositions, his untiring endeavor in behalf of the public good, and his pertinacity, meek insistence, and obstinate courage in the defense of his generous schemes. Abbé de Saint-Pierre, having witnessed the last unhappy years of the brilliant reign of Louis XIV, dared write, after the death of the king, a criticism of his warlike policy and immoderate ambition. For this crime of *lèse-majesté* he was turned out of the French Academy and branded as a dangerous character. Nothing daunted, he went on publishing “projects” for the reformation of abuses and the bettering of the condition of the masses. In the second decade of the eighteenth century the philosophical movement, properly so called, had not been started yet. It was not in the name of universal principles that the kind-

hearted Abbé undertook to promote reform, but simply out of the geniality and goodness of his own nature. He created and launched abroad the word *bienfaisance*, designating a form of public activity later to take great importance under the name of "social work." He proposed a system of constitutional monarchy (which was to consist of several councils appointed to advise and control the king's power) under the queer title of "Polysynody."

Among the productions of his teeming mind came a *Project to Make Peace Perpetual*, published first in 1713, then remodeled and amended several times unto the sixth edition in three volumes in 1747. His design was to bring the five great monarchs of Europe to strike an indissoluble alliance to do away with quarrels among themselves and induce all the continent to resort to peaceful settlement for their disputes. His appeal was to the piety of the Christian sovereigns, who ought not to disregard the divine law, and also (which seems to us a particularly progressive thought) to the sense of immanent justice here below.

The violent, the remorseless might prosper for some time; but in the long run the conscience of mankind would rise against them and the day of reckoning would come. This hope in the force of morality to take hold of public opinion, suspend a threat over the heads of predatory rulers, and bind the peaceful nations together to resist aggression or oppression, was noble though premature. But how honorable for the Abbé thus to foresee, two centuries ahead, what the world was actually to witness! And how moving for us to read in the Abbé's work an anticipation of the coalition of the civilized world against the invaders of right and justice in 1914-18!

Peace, according to Abbé de Saint-Pierre, was to be secured by the establishment of a European Diet, to whose judgment (or, as we should say, arbitration) all contests were to be deferred, and whose decisions should be enforced by the combined military power of the allies. The detail of the alliance, the mode of appointment of the delegates, the procedure of the sittings, the financial contributions of each ally, the reduction of

armies and of armaments—all the chief problems raised by the new organization, including the general principles of the law of nations that ought to be devised for the circumstance, were faced and treated in a way which does not seem to us to-day inadequate or inapplicable.

The difficulty was to bring the minds of the contemporaries not to take the project as the mere whim of a dreamer or the extravaganza of a wild madman. Many were inclined to assume an ironical attitude, had not the dignity and the talent of the Abbé prevented their giving vent to their jocular humor too openly. Frederic II of Prussia, who, after writing the *Anti-Machiavelli* as a young prince and disciple of the French philosophers, was preparing to gainsay his early liberal professions and cynically to challenge right and the law of international relations, by violently laying hold of Silesia, did not conceal his contemptuous merriment. "The project is very acceptable. . . . Only a few things are lacking: the consent of Europe and other such trifles." The philosopher Leibnitz was struck by the

nobleness of the thought, yet could not refrain from the quizzical remark, "*Pax perpetua*, a motto only fit for a cemetery." Voltaire, the most realistic of philosophers, first opposed to the dream of the gentle Utopian the hard facts of life and of politics: "It is as difficult to prevent men from waging war as to prevent wolves from tearing sheep to pieces. . . ." Yet he reflected about the Abbé's proposal and finally came to a different conclusion: "What is absurd in the project of perpetual peace is not the thought itself but the manner of its presentation. . . ." He then proceeded to demonstrate that the way to impart some feasibility to the scheme would be to appeal to the interests of the rulers. Persuade them that by a league of peace they would gain a guarantee for the integrity of their possessions and an insurance against civil revolution, that commercial relations would be furthered and the wealth of every nation increased, that punishments would be always ready against any conqueror or disturber of the general tranquillity—do this and they might be tempted to join the European Diet and

contribute money and an armed force to police the continent.

In spite of raillery or ironical rebuff Abbé de Saint-Pierre succeeded at least in drawing the attention of his contemporaries to the physical horror and moral heinousness of war and in broaching discussions about an organization for peace. The weakness of his plea, in the eyes of the next generation, lay in the fact that he made his call to kings and did not give due consideration to the rights and feelings of the people. In the latter half of the century the great apostle of moral idealism and social reform, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was to take up the question again and give it true scope and importance. He who laid for his time and for all times the emotional and rational basis of democracy was not to overlook the problem which places itself, in reason, close to that of democracy, namely, the organization of nations in a world-league on the foundations of right, equal protection, and due respect.

We know from a note of his *Diary* that Rousseau intended to write a companion volume to the *Contrat Social* bearing on a

“contract” between nations to establish peace. He did not carry out his intentions. But there are, in various places of his printed works and unpublished manuscripts, explicit statements that enable us to reconstruct his doctrine regarding the mutual relations of nations. He did not disregard the opinions of his predecessors on the question, but it was to disapprove of or to confute them. His position was neither that of bare expediency, as in the case of Hobbes or Grotius, nor that of mere sensibility, as in the case of Abbé de Saint-Pierre. He disagreed with Hobbes, who posited the formula: “*Homo homini lupus*,” and saw no other way to prevent men from springing at one another’s throats than to establish a strong despotic government. He disagreed with Grotius, who, taking war as a fact, tried at least to humanize warfare by appealing to the Christian charity of generals and conquerors. Grotius considered land-grabbing and slavery as inevitable—and, therefore, justifiable—results of war: Rousseau would not surrender to the brutal practice of crowned murderers the claims of justice and

reason. He disagreed with Abbé de Saint-Pierre, not on the idea of perpetual peace, but on the grounds on which the plan rested. He published an *Abstract of Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace*, which was at the same time an examination and a criticism. Nothing could come out of a proposal which relied on kings for its fulfillment. Besides, Rousseau was enough of a realist to know that so vast a design could be carried out only by stages. Public opinion was still far from ready to back any philosophical device to suppress war. What he proposed, then, was to further a combination of the small nations of Europe who had no ambition for conquest and every reason to fear the covetousness of their powerful neighbors. In the small countries the citizens had greater influence on the governments (some of them were republics); their alliance would be a Confederation of Peoples devoted to peace, and, thanks to their close union, capable of doing something for the maintenance of peace by their joint action or by entering into an alliance with one of the great powers.

When approaching the general and theoretical questions of the world-peace Rousseau went straight to the central principle, the very one we consider essential to-day when we speak of the *self-determination* of nations. He, the theorist of political and social individualism, foreshadowed (although he did not fully develop the thought) what might be called the international individualism of peoples. A national community is not a mere grouping of provinces and townships, gathered together as chance willed it in the course of history. It is determined partly by the physical aspects of the country, the natural boundaries which constitute its protection and limit the scope of its economic growth, partly by the spiritual forces inherent or acquired, the memory of sufferings experienced in common or of heroic deeds accomplished for the common good—the sum total of desires, hopes, endeavors, deserved successes or undeserved trials which annals have related, poetry sung, and parents piously taught their children. A nation is a collective being with an identity and a personality of its own made

up of the individual sensibilities and consciences of the citizens and of something more—the larger soul of the whole, which vitalizes the feelings beyond the petty orbit of self-interest, gladdens the thoughts by its radiant light, and proudly floats in the folds of the flag.

This is what Rousseau felt with his sensibility turned to the noblest aspirations of the new era of democratic and national individualism, and what he understood with his reason trained to trace right and justice through all their manifestations. For the sake of right and justice, in the name of humanity, he claimed liberty and independence for small as well as large countries wherever a nationality had been fashioned by race, tongue, institutions, specific virtues, and a common will to live, endure, and strive for permanent aims. This is the principle the French were to adopt as theirs and uphold at the time of the Revolution and after, for which they were, more than once, to consent to great sacrifices in the course of the nineteenth century, until the Great War broke upon the world and their idealism

and fortitude were put to the severest test of all.

The French Revolution, the daughter of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, was attached to peace for reasons of self-respect and out of respect for other nations as "spiritual persons." Nothing was more impressive than the solemn sittings of the Constituent Assembly, when the statesmen of the Third Estate outlined the policy of the Revolution with regard to foreign affairs. A disciple of Rousseau, Volney, the author of *The Ruins*, had written in his book (which was twenty years later to exert a decisive influence on Shelley): "O nations, let us banish tyranny and discord. Let us form one and the same society, one and the same family, and, since mankind is constitutionally alike all over the world, let there be only one law, the law of nature; only one code, the code of reason; only one throne, the throne of justice; only one altar, the altar of the universe!" Having been elected a member of the Constituent Assembly, Volney repeated there: "Gentlemen, you are going to deliberate in the face of the universe for the uni-

verse. Yours it is, I dare advise you, to summon the Assembly of all nations." In the warmth of its idealism, which did not aim only at the liberation of France but at the political and social happiness of all men, the Constituent Assembly decreed, in 1791, to introduce into the Constitution this clause, referring to its relations with other countries: "The French nation gives up all wars of conquest. She will never make use of her power against the liberty of any people."

The realists in the Assembly, like Mirabeau, did not feel free to indulge in the glowing hope of concord and peace which fired the imaginations of their colleagues, in the first flush of democratic and humanitarian enthusiasm. "I wonder," he said, "whether because we suddenly change our political system, we shall carry the other nations along with us. Time will come, no doubt, when Europe shall be only one large family. But until this is realized perpetual peace remains a dream, and a dangerous dream, if it induces France to disarm in presence of an armed Europe." Of the two views, which thus confronted each other, the latter, in

spite of the generous dispositions of the country, was to impose itself inevitably when the coalition of monarchs, frightened by the progress of liberty and secretly called to the rescue by the French king, massed an army on the banks of the Rhine and invaded the northeastern provinces of France, sending before them a proclamation which threatened with immediate and pitiless massacre any village or town that should dare to resist.

Against the expectation of the despots, the ancient military virtues of the French, fired to desperate vigor by the spirit of liberty, overcame the invading armies. The *sans-culottes*, in the pursuit, crossed the frontier, bringing to the populations of the Rhine provinces the triple watchword, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." At that time bonds of sympathy and friendship were formed between France and the Rhineland that more than a century of Prussian rule has not quite effaced to-day.

The crusading spirit took hold of the volunteer army of the French Republic: it went its way, calling on the inhabitants of fortified cities to open their gates to the soldiers

of liberty. Instead of the usual cruel spectacle of warfare, what was seen in the Rhineland and the Lower Countries was the fraternization of the liberated citizens with the liberating troops. Thus grew in the minds of the French a notion that associated war with the progress of freedom and made it plausible to believe, as Sieyès said, that within a few years all the European nations would have established republican governments and would flock together to form the United States of Europe—a sanguine dream, quite in keeping with the mystic faith in the absolute truth of political justice and social equality and civic virtue that animated the men of that generation. A dangerous dream, too, for, in presence of resistance which, after some time, was opposed by foreign countries to the penetration of the French ideas, backed by the French army, and in the presence of the quarrels and struggles of irreconcilable parties at home, the citizen army became ripe for the *coup d'état* of the ambitious, unscrupulous adventurer of genius, Napoleon Bonaparte, who

was to monopolize for his own selfish aims the splendid *élan* of the Revolution. The twenty years' warfare of the Napoleonic era can be accounted for only by the strange illusion of the French, fostered by the mimicry of Roman institutions and the careful hiding of despotism under a republican cloak, that, under the guidance of a magnetic leader, they were true to the principles of the Revolution and worked for the emancipation of mankind.

In fact, Napoleon did something of the kind, shaking the "divine right of kings" to its foundation, shattering the old aristocracies of birth and replacing them by an aristocracy of merit and talent, and carrying out the revolutionary movement of collective individualism by giving his powerful aid to the promoters of nationalities. It is to him that Germany and Italy owed the first realization of their unity, which was to be finally effected half a century later by those countries acting for themselves on the very lines which he had laid down.

The principle of nationality, a product of the spiritual forces at work in the French

Revolution, was upheld by the French throughout the nineteenth century, even at the cost of money sacrifices and the sacrifice of human lives. We fought for Greece, and, in a joint effort with England, delivered her from the Turkish yoke. We fought for the unity of Italy and helped our Latin brothers to drive away the Tedeschi from the peninsula. In the overhauling of the Italian territory which took place then, we received the dukedom of Savoy (by its geographical situation within the natural boundaries of France) after the inhabitants had been consulted and had enthusiastically voted for their union with France. We thus closely connected the principles of nationality with that of the self-determination of peoples, under the ægis of the supreme law of liberty.

This French conception of liberty for others as well as for themselves, this French sympathy with other peoples' aspirations for independence, national unity, and individual personality, those French sacrifices, eagerly sought, and valiantly borne in the interest of others, to help others fulfill their just destinies, must be placed in contrast with

the principle of nationality as understood and as carried out by Germany. There, national unity, monopolized by Prussia, the nation of prey, was realized by the most ruthless and machiavellic of statesmen, Bismarck, by grouping the German principalities in a war against France, that is, by means of ambition and hatred, thus preparing the German people to welcome military despotism and cherish desires of aggrandizement by force. The original crime committed against the Danish dukedoms and the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine—which the indifference of Europe at the time suffered to remain unpunished—brought about the attempt of Austria, urged by Germany, in 1914, to swallow Serbia and open the way for the *Drang nach Osten*, that would have given the Teutonic nations hegemony over Europe and, after a short time, over the world. Against this monstrous undertaking, Europe roused herself. Saved by the dogged resistance of France at the Marne, Europe grouped herself around the armies of the French Republic, frustrating Germany from immediate victory and giv-

ing time to America to come in and deal the final blow. Thanks to the heroism of France and the admirable devotion and doughtiness of her allies and associates, democracy, liberty, the principles of national independence and of national self-determination—all the moral conquests of civilization, the fruit of the joint efforts of the liberal nations of the Old and the New World—were saved from the outrage of the most formidable conspiracy ever formed against them. After the huge conflict, will democracy triumph in the world? Will not the embers of aristocracy and militarism, still living in Germany under the ashes, leap suddenly into flame some day? The rest of the world must the more eagerly confirm themselves in the desire for peace and the more sedulously prepare the organization of peace.

We left our account of the contribution of French thinkers and the French people to the problem of peace at the end of the Napoleonic era. Let us revert to that period and resume our study.

Passing in review the systems proposed by the French thinkers of the nineteenth cen-

tury to put an end to war and further universal peace, we come across the names we have already met with when studying the modern French ideal of solidarity. What wonder, since solidarity, the organic form of democracy, cannot reach its full growth or give its most fruitful results unless it extends from national to international good will and mutual helpfulness?

While Napoleon was running his career of triumphant and outrageous conquest, Saint-Simon judged severely the Emperor's insatiable lust for power, and, in spite of the latter's liberal professions, deemed his epic parading throughout Europe a destructive blow to the modern hopes of peace. As soon as the fall of the military condottiere and the establishment of constitutional monarchy in France had let in expectations of more stable international relations, Saint-Simon published his long-delayed work on *The Reorganization of European Society*. He, the interpreter of a new conception of civilization, based on science, economic growth, and industrial development, averred himself the disciple and continuator of the philoso-

phers of the eighteenth century. It was they, he stated, who had first given men trust in their power, through knowledge, rational construction, and methodical action, to reform the moral, political, and social conditions of society. Voltaire and Montesquieu had emphasized the universal strength of Right and of Law, the articulated expression of Right. Rousseau had appealed to the universal conscience of mankind, and had set in motion the irrepressible will to personal independence, individual and national self-expression, and social justice in-born in all men. Condorcet had laid down the law of endless perfectibility and illimited progress. Volney (after Abbé de Saint-Pierre) had drawn from these premises his prophecy of universal peace and settlement of international disputes by a procedure of arbitration. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, it is true, had insisted more on the ideal beauty and rational irresistibility of the principles than on the practical means of application. The moment had come now to pass from theory to practice and to devise means of carrying out schemes

which, were they realized, would bring incalculable benefits for all Europe—nay (why not?), for all the world.

Saint-Simon put his trust in the form of constitutional polity which, in his day, seemed the more perfect organism of freedom, namely, parliamentary government. Two great countries, whose power pretty equally balanced each other, both possessed of parliamentary institutions, France and England, could, if united, take in hand the destinies of Europe. Instead of ceaselessly nagging at each other, let them frankly and sincerely make up their quarrels and start jointly on the great disinterested work of organizing peace for all Europe. The first step, he thought, would be to effect the unity of Germany under a regime of liberty. Saint-Simon, like almost every one of his contemporaries, knew Germany only through the noble idealism of Goethe and Kant's sublime serenity. He had not found out (as Edgar Quinet, alone among French thinkers, was to discover about that time) that under the growing military hegemony of Prussia a new Germany was getting con-

scious of itself, wiping off the notions of organic individualism, cosmopolitan cooperation, variety and spontaneity of aims in a commonalty of purpose, to make room for the monstrous doctrine of state absolutism, national self-seeking, predominance of the Teutonic race, and ruthless struggle and scramble for the possession of the world, without regard for right, law, previous justified titles, or any consideration of humanity. He had not felt the hot breath of fierce romanticism, all concentrated on national ambitions and limitless collective greed, which blew from over the Rhine. He had not measured the cold perversion of scientific ability and mechanical skill applied to material aggrandizement which had invaded the finest minds in universities, laboratories, academies, and institutes, and had met half way the cynical plots of the high-stationed immoralists for the control of the sources of wealth in the world by fair or foul means, and the absorption of neighboring nations, with or against their will. How can we reproach him for his lack of perspicacity since the whole world, including America, failed

to understand the German mind, until the Great War, in a glaring demonstration, revealed the inner abyss where the German soul had suffered itself to sink?

Saint-Simon believed that Germany, welded into one by national feelings of broad patriotism, might be brought over to the idealism of concord and harmony that France and England would spread among the European nations. It would then be possible to elect a *European Parliament*, with two Houses, one representing the governments, the other the peoples; an executive (whether an elected supreme magistrate or a supreme council) would carry out the decision of the assemblies.

A few years later, in the reign of the bourgeois King Louis Philippe, the first *rapprochement* between England and France took place, known as the first *entente cordiale*.

Unfortunately, the return to the French throne, following the *coup d'état* of 1851, of a Bonaparte, revived too bitter associations in the memory of England for her to entertain friendly feelings toward the new em-

peror and the country that seemed to revert to the invidious errors of the past. In fact, Napoleon the Third's dispositions were those of an idealist, devoted, as he thought, to progress, favorable to the advance of the laboring class at home, always ready to place the financial resources and military forces of France to the service of freedom in the world, as he did in the Crimean and the Italian War, but, on the other hand, enough of an impulsive adventurer to hesitate at times between a policy of international justice and vague ambitions of self-aggrandizement. Germany, now under the guidance of the unscrupulous, shrewd Bismarck, watched the events, eager to seize an opportunity of precipitating war with France, having resolved to seize the two provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, that would be a sign, in the eyes of her people, of her conquering strength and give her a favorable starting place for further aggression.

The formation of the German nationality, which ought to have made for the moral unity of Europe, turned to the ruin of all

progress toward the good understanding between nations. The German nation, instead of taking to democracy and peace, suffered itself to be fashioned mentally and morally by the school of Prussian civil and military officers who cherished the mediæval dream of building the greatness of their country on autocracy at home and conquest abroad. The Iron Chancellor had decided that France was to pay the first tribute to Germany on her path of domination. By means of the Ems forged dispatch, Bismarck fooled his weak adversary, Napoleon III, and brought France to declare war, thus saving appearances in the eyes of England, that might have interfered. The brutal appropriation of Alsace-Lorraine (after a short war conducted with systematic disregard of all laws of humanity) condemned France to irreconcilable estrangement, constant vigilance, and mute protest. All Europe came to be profoundly disturbed as a consequence of the one crime committed by a self-centered, infatuated nation, in defiance of all that the conscience of mankind now considers as binding commands on the

behavior of nations. A state of armed peace prevailed; systems of alliances were formed for the defensive on one side, with an aggressive spirit on the other, until Germany, after forty years' preparation, and relying on her superiority in numbers and in appalling new engines of war, thought she could only gain by a new war and unchained the huge conflict, which was, toward its close, to involve America.

In the course of the nineteenth century, while Germany, urged by passions and thoughts of another age, was devising historical, philosophical, and juridical theories that justified and advocated might, dominion, and conquest, was dreaming monstrous dreams of colossal expansion and organizing her army into a tremendous instrument of war, France (whatever mistakes she may have committed) was at least innocent of any dark design against her neighbors. She even viewed with friendly eyes at first (before the terrible awakening of 1870) the German movement toward unity. Napoleon III abstained from thwarting the policy of Prussia, regarding her as the pre-

destined agent of German growth and greatness, until Bismarck uncovered his batteries and willfully brought about the quarrel he had been long preparing.

Before the events of 1870 caused the scales to fall from French eyes, the French thinkers pursued their eager and ardent meditations on universal peace and the best means to make it a reality. The disciples of Saint-Simon, the strenuous and devoted men—engineers, lawyers, doctors—who carried on the work of the master, giving a powerful impetus to applied science and imparting to industry the consciousness of her moral obligations, deliberately strove for peace. They realized the importance of multiplied and rapid means of communication to establish closer relations and better mutual acquaintance among nations. It was mostly technical experts belonging to their school that built French railroads in the years from 1830 to 1860. Ferdinand de Lesseps, who conceived and executed the opening of the Suez Canal, was one of their group. They were no mere contractors of great public works, but philosophical industrialists, con-

scious of working for a new era of peace in the world by increasing moral and intellectual contacts as well as furthering mutual exchanges. The theorists of their creed—which was no less than a religion of fraternity and human fellowship—Enfantin, Allier, Halévy, d'Eichtal, declared that the time for military exploits was over, and that the great men of the future would be those who bettered the conditions of human life by inventions, creations, or undertakings profitable to all mankind. They considered that hostility between peoples could not survive in the more friendly atmosphere created by extensive economic intercourse. They had a true insight into all that actual contact, frequent traveling over frontiers and across oceans, common interests, the sharing of the same hopes and fears, could do to bring men together. They did not and, indeed, could not, foresee what greed and ambition, in a country bent on universal domination, were capable of doing to shift rivalry from the sphere of military struggle to that of economic competition, and, on economic success and desire for more and ever more profits,

build claims to military sway and absolute political hegemony.

Three years before the Franco-Prussian War (when Bismarck had so well concealed his intrigue that no sign of a storm appeared on the horizon) the Saint-Simonian Charles Lemonnier had founded the League for Peace and Liberty, which was joined by Garibaldi and Victor Hugo, and started a newspaper called *The United States of Europe*. He expressed the wish (which we find to some extent carried out in America to-day) that the army, still necessary in the present state of things as a guarantee and a protection, should be made an instrument of education for the youth of democratic countries. Instead of being trained to make and unmake trenches on the drill-ground, companies and regiments might be detailed to dig canals, build railroads, and erect bridges. Instead of loafing about garrison cities, soldiers might be taught to practice skilled trades and become useful members of the community.

Auguste Comte, in his early years a friend of Saint-Simon's, remained faithful

throughout his long, productive career to the ideal of international good understanding he had imbibed from his master in realistic idealism. He pointed out the great truth (which we are only beginning to grasp fully to-day) that, as local communities become richer in material and spiritual goods by division of labor and multiplication of individual abilities, so the world would be more amply provided with that wealth that makes life worth living if the individualities of peoples and nations were recognized, protected, and given full scope to develop under the shelter of liberty, equal rights, and peace.

However much Saint-Simon and his school may have done to bring the idea of a European organization for peace to ripeness, the most virile and fruitful reflections concerning the problem were presented by the thinker whom we have described as the staunch defender of individualistic motives of action combined with respect for social justice—the self-taught workman and sociologist Proudhon. What characterizes the doctrine of Proudhon is its frank realism as

well as its noble endeavor to reach the permanent rational values.

As a realist Proudhon recognized the fact of war. Before anything else he set to analyzing it, to make sure that none of its elements should escape his notice. In the first volume of his work *War and Peace*, he carried out his analysis with such thoroughness and fairness of interpretation that some pro-war advocates, failing to follow his discussion to the end, or willfully ignoring what he meant to be the body of his thesis, tried to enlist him among their party—an egregious blunder or a palpable injury! Proudhon was a most ardent lover of peace, which he considered as the necessary medium for justice. At the same time he thought struggle to be one of the inherent conditions of life and that the function of civilization consists in transforming the spirit of struggle from its destructive, heinous manifestation to a constructive, fruitful mode of action, fit to keep alive all the moral and social energies and to nourish progress, instead of bringing mankind periodically back to a detestable state of barbarity.

While admitting the natural and perennial character of war, Proudhon did not bow to violence as the supreme law of the world. Historically, force had predominated in the early stages of the evolution of mankind, but not always as a mere explosion of brutality: it had often counted among the factors favoring the advance of reason. At a nearer period of history, when the idea of right and the practice of contracts had prevailed in the inner working of society, force remained the ultimate way of settling contests among nations. Proudhon, as a realist, as a brawny thinker, a bold reformer who had suffered imprisonment and exile in fighting for his ideas, was no blatant pacifist. With a keen insight into collective psychology he discerned a radical difference between the attitude of individuals and the attitude of communities toward war. The personality of a nation, he justly remarked, was something more than the mere sum of the personalities of its citizens. A nation was an entity endowed with a collective reason marked by characteristics of its own. What individual reason shrank from, might be approved by

the collective reason, impelled by an instinctive hankering after mysterious aims. The national instinct might be right or wrong. It was mostly a question of time and place. There was no denying that in the past there had been wars of expansion, or crusading expeditions, which could be considered as conformable to the stern decrees of the inevitable law of progress. Included in force there had often worked an impulse obscurely making for right and reason, feeling out its way through armed struggle. It was not only ambitious, remorseless despots (as the philosophers of the eighteenth century had proclaimed) that had unloosed war, but often the peoples themselves, urged by an instinct where physical buoyancy met spiritual onrush—whether misguided and erratic or clear-sighted and prophetic, to be decided by the issue or by long-deferred consequences affecting generations at several removes.

Such was the course of the world in its blundering attempts at reaching the sane, economical, and humane methods of reason. Although Proudhon applied his searching analysis to the facts of history more coolly

and uncompromisingly than idealists are wont to do, it did not follow that he was a worshiper of fatality, an advocate of the determinism of strength and ruthlessness. Far from opening the way to the German doctrine of might, he distinctly stood in the line of the French philosophy of reason; only he was one of those who showed what hard battle reason had to wage with the blind forces of nature and instinct. Reason, as he understood it, was a late development of the human conscience—besides, apt to relapse into the dark regions of blind instinct unless constantly strengthened with remitless effort and persevering devotion.

He considered that the nations in their relations with one another had been gradually assuming a new character. In modern times it had become evident that a great change had taken place on account of the dissemination of knowledge among all classes of society, of the predominance of economic over political activities, and of the multiplied communications between the various countries of the world.

With the means of education which we

have at our disposal and considering the unity of manners and of spirit which we see spreading more and more every day in the world, war needs no longer to be the chosen vehicle of civilization. Although war favors to some extent the virtues of strenuousness, sacrifice, and heroism, human perversity has made it frightful. The inventions of science and technique have added to the sum of its atrocities, often detracting from it the part of valor, chivalry, or generosity it formerly implied. With the growth of industry and commerce war has become sordid, raised no longer for a conflict of principles, or even ambition of power, but to ruin a competitor nation or wrench land rich in natural resources. Proudhon saw disorder rampant, not only in the inner field of activity of many a nation, but in the haphazard jostling of interests and rivalries between nations in the vast world. Modern war, he declared (long before a recent conflict had made it known), was the result of economic world-anarchy.

The remedy for economic disharmony cannot be fighting. Industrial activity on a large scale and trade relations coextensive

with the surface of the globe suppose the interdependence of nations, one needing some raw material that another possesses or some product that another manufactures, each profiting by intellectual advance in other countries, or suffering from a temporary or permanent distemper in any part of the world. The prosperity which all covet and strive for is destroyed or seriously impaired by war. Not only the belligerents, victors as well as vanquished, are affected by the disastrous consequences of the struggle, but the neutrals themselves. The jealousies and rivalries that fomented the war grow more acute after the encounter, hatching a new outbreak of violence as soon as enough strength and resources are stored to provide the means for a fresh onrush.

Since the harnessing of the forces of nature for the benefit of man calls for intelligence and will, and especially for organization and cooperation, let the world take the hint from the new activities which engross men's minds and seek, at the cost of concessions (which, in the long run, will come to a reciprocity of services), to organize eco-

conomic life all over the world. Any botched system of contractual agreements (laying the foundations for further improvement) will be better and more dignified than the present attitude of petty jealousy, under-hand intrigue, or bullying intimidation. "Organization! organization!"—such is the watchword that Proudhon, like Saint-Simon, never tires repeating to his generation. The solution he proposes for this problem of world organization, differing from his predecessors by the whole distance that separates their minds and doctrines, is much more vital, much more in keeping with the aspirations of the modern world; it is almost dramatically arresting for us to-day in presence of the various projects of world leagues for peace between which the feelings of nations are hesitating.

Proudhon wished to see a federation of the states of Europe come into existence, but in a form that would leave to each state its full liberty and entire personality. He demurred from the idea of a common Parliament to which each member of the federation would delegate its powers. Better go on

with the present waste of efforts, wealth, and lives—with liberty—than gain an illusion of peace which would mean unbearable constraint, intervention, and regulation from a superimposed authority fit to smother initiative, originality, joyous creativeness—all that, in the long run, signifies more for progress and general happiness than exemption from temporary evil. A federation was not worth the trouble unless it grew spontaneously from parallel feelings and wishes on the part of all, so that, while keeping freedom of movement, all agreed to reasonable limitations of their ambitions in each specific case as it presented itself; that is, peaceful dispositions in the minds and hearts were better guarantees than decisions taken by an international Parliament that might be in constant conflict with national Parliaments. Moreover, it might be a good thing for the peoples to keep constantly on the alert, to have to measure difficulties as they arise and to decide either for energetic action or for surrender, according to circumstances. Life worth the name contained struggle among its constituents. It needed not to be the

struggle of fisticuffs or mutual slaughter; but, without antagonism—in the field of industry, commerce, science, art, economic activity or intellectual creation, quality or quantity of production—there was no stimulus, no effort, no progress. Liberty and individuality, with the powerful motive feelings which they breed, were to be carefully protected among nations as well as among private citizens. The problem was to rouse to the utmost non-inimical emulation among active and creative nations all over the world, while putting an end to the wasteful and repulsive destruction of human lives and useful resources effected by war. Work—energetic, creative, competitive—ought to remain the chief motive of the universal endeavors of mankind; for work, in peace, if nobly done, meant life strenuous and dangerous—what we call heroism.

Consequently, Proudhon rejected any imitation of a Parliamentary regime that would bind too closely the free nations. What he called for was a federation not so much of the states as of the peoples, united by common consent rather than by any au-

thoritative constitution. There would be delegates, meeting in a central council, not to issue imperative decrees on all questions interesting the international community, but to deliberate and discuss, compare notes and tender evidence, and finally publish recommendations whose reasonableness, expediency, justness, and conciliating spirit would carry assent. To be sure, such means of arbitrating differences and opposition of interests could be practiced only if the peoples were ready to submit to reason and justice and to give up all feelings of aggressive pride, irreducible selfishness, or petty resentment. Proudhon's federative union of nations is possible only if it rests on the spontaneous and permanent consent of the conscience of humanity. When all is said, what other foundation can be found for a durable entente and peace among nations?

Let the world remember and meditate the wisdom of Proudhon.

The practice of equality and justice in the home governments is the first step toward the mutual respect and the conciliating spirit among nations. It is only men accustomed

to political and social equality in individual relations and realizing the usefulness of a variety of mental powers and intellectual tendencies to further general prosperity, that will be favorably inclined toward co-operation in international relations. Democracy is the necessary condition for the prevalence of peace. Democracy is the school of tolerance and justice in everyday intercourse under republican laws and in an atmosphere of friendly feeling. All democratic nations are bound to enter, in time, the great union of peoples for the prevention of war and to assume their share of burdens to make it live and play its part effectively. France, guided by her liberal traditions and the doctrines of her best-inspired thinkers, is not likely to conceive this union in the shape of a super-government threatening to tie and trammel the independence of nations. America may take confidence that France sincerely wishes to fashion the League or Conference (whatever name is adopted) in such a way that no encroachment on the liberty of any nation shall be tolerated. May it not be hoped that Amer-

ica, when she feels assured on the score of the individual independence of each participant in the League, will trust her democratic instinct and resolve, some day, to concur unreservedly with those who strive to cause the spirit of democracy and of peace to triumph in the world?

As Professor McLaughlin said from this chair, with his great authority and warm eloquence: "We are sometimes told America will now live unto herself, scorn companionship, flout cooperation, shield herself from duty, assume irresponsibility. Such words would be funny were they not so serious. . . . We must cherish companionship, recognize life as a series of readjustments and accommodations, shoulder responsibilities, and cast out mean fear, even though it be called danger to the Monroe Doctrine."

Such words are of a nature indeed to thrill the hearts of Frenchmen, as I feel sure they did not leave indifferent this audience of idealistic and enthusiastic young Americans. Before the Great War, France was eager to work side by side with America and England

for the solution of international differences by arbitration. While the Teutonic countries held back, at The Hague, from signing an agreement for compulsory arbitration, Monsieur Bourgeois, along with Mr. Choate and Sir Edward Fry, did all that was possible, in the stormy atmosphere there prevailing, to obtain the substitution of judicial procedure for force of arms in case of acute conflict. A few years later the United States, England, and France adopted the policy of arbitration treaties, solemnly recognizing for the settlement of whatever difficulty might arise between them, the competence and authority of the International Tribunal at The Hague. Germany did not dare keep away altogether from the movement, but she gave her signature chuckling to herself that such engagements, like the promise to obey the conventions of Geneva in warfare or to respect the inviolability of neutral countries, were mere "scraps of paper" which she could easily tear up and fling to the wind.

Has the Great War and its lessons changed the mentality of Germany? Some

people, who will listen only to the voice of the German popular elements, declare that Germany has been converted to democratic principles and peaceful feelings. Great Britain, eager to see the world restored to quiet—and to conditions favorable to business and profits—persuades herself that the republican professions of the Social Democrats express the deeper meaning of the German soul. Should the Allies, she contends, trust Germany, do away with all measures of constraint, reduce her debt to a minimum, and bid her take her time to pay it, Germany would reenter the comity of nations sobered, instructed, and desirous to show herself true to her obligations and loyal to the code of international honor.

We, the French, less absorbed in motives of business and profits, think that there are moral issues to be taken into consideration over and above any questions of commercial exchange or foreign markets.

Not until Germany has realized her liabilities, shown willingness to make amends for the crimes committed in cold blood against defenseless populations, and done her utmost

to compensate for the devastations, can we reestablish with her normal relations. In so doing we are confident that we act as the true realists, for moral values in international affairs have more importance than the mere balance of trade. As next neighbors of the country that put the world to fire and to the sword we are bound to take the realistic point of view, again, in watching what is going on behind the seeming meek shabbiness of the façade. What do we see? An impoverished government, while German industry (the only industry that does not know unemployment) carries on a large export trade and heaps up gold reserves in foreign banks; a rate of taxation inferior per head to that which the belligerent countries have imposed upon themselves. What scanty resources fall into its exchequer, the German government squanders in subsidies to trade, in large salaries to public officials, in huge public works, as if bent on emptying the public treasury before beginning any payment for the war debt. Secret war preparations are going on, signs of which crop up now and then in spite of precautions

taken to hoodwink the Commissioners of the Allies.

Democratic Germany is weak in the presence of the arrogant and scheming reactionary party, who intimidate the government into deferring to take the needed financial measures, to give up the manufacturing of armaments, to disband the association of veterans. So that France, single-handed in the presence of a population double the size of her own, with no regret for the crimes committed by her rulers and soldiery, full of hardly repressed desires for revenge—France, with her wounds still bleeding, with her soil devastated, her mines flooded, her factories destroyed, feels upon her the obligation of keeping an army ready for defense, until the world decides to take some positive steps to make it possible to reduce armaments on land as was decided for naval armaments.

From what I have said, from what all may learn about France's record in the past—her literature, her creativeness in the field of thought, her sacrifices for the progress of civilization, the temper of her people, her

noble attitude during the war—France does not appear to-day, as slanderous and perfidious rumors would represent her, in the character of an imperialistic and militaristic nation.

Under the Third Republic democratic France has been peaceful, taught moderation and reasonableness by dire experience with autocratic regimes in the past (a costly experience by which she has fully profited). France has learned to practice realistic idealism in the light of clear reason and disinterested enthusiasm. France has been friendly to other peoples, following the natural bent of her social temper and of her staunch loyalty to the great principle of solidarity. France was attacked in 1914; her children fought and died to defend her age-old heritage of sunny plains and sacred traditions, buoyed up by the hope that they sacrificed their lives to put an end to war forever. France has, unwillingly, unyieldingly, for four years and a half borne the terrible stress of war. She longs to settle down to her work of reconstruction and give her boys a chance of doing something for themselves after sac-

rificing so much for the sake of the country. Let not France be lightly taxed with ambition (which is preposterous) or an unduly suspicious mind (which is a flippant judgment). Having to deal with an enemy that proved devoid of faith and honor, who resorted to low cunning and despicable dissembling (as you yourselves experienced on your own soil), how can she feel reassured when no decided change of mind has shown itself in Germany?

Let not France be accused of any lack of idealism. We are the same idealistic people whose noble young messenger, La Fayette, in 1776, carried to the American Revolution his friendship and help, whose patriots, in 1789, declared themselves supporters of world-democracy and universal peace, whose poet, Lamartine, in 1860, indited the "Marseillaise of Peace," whose great historian Michelet wrote, "In the twentieth century France will declare peace to the world." Our idealism is no less earnest because we are obliged to face hard facts. The fact of danger compels us to view peace not as a dream (which we cannot afford to indulge

in, however beautiful) but as a fact. We feel it is not with impassioned appeals or eloquent speeches, with optimistic expectations that all will turn out for the best if swords be forged into plowshares, that the peace long wished for but never yet consummated will be reached. Good dispositions are needed, education will do much, propaganda and prayers are excellent. But, with all willingness to concur loyally in all measures to win men over to the cause of peace, we French believe that actually working for peace means assuming inevitable burdens (including that of military preparedness), taking proper financial steps (including appropriations for defense), tying oneself by definite engagements, even were it at the cost of some "entanglements."

France understands, indeed, how differently nations with different traditions, historical precedents and conditions of existence, may feel regarding foreign affairs and relations with foreign countries. France is too much attached to the individualistic point of view and too respectful of the spiritual as well as material independence of na-

tions not to adopt the attitude of friendly, tactful, sympathetic reserve with regard to the position of America. America's entrance into the Great War was a great departure from her traditional policy. No wonder that, after taking such a momentous step (which saved the world), she needs time to consider the distant consequences of this act. France is content to wait till America has surveyed the world-situation, weighed her immediate and mediate interests, matured her thought, and let her feelings ripen. France asks only that, in reciprocity, her own point of view may be taken into consideration, namely, that stable and permanent peace can only be secured by a Conference or League of well-meaning and reliable nations, with some sort of definite agreement to apply sanctions—not necessarily military sanctions. This would be no supergovernment: the consent of each country would be required before any action should be entered into. Common action would proceed from a commonalty of judgment and of feelings. Without the union of minds and hearts could lip-adhesion have any force or meaning?

France places her trust in America, with whom she feels in close communion regarding essentials. France will respond to calls for disarmament under the guarantee of a universal agreement of the peaceful peoples to provide for common defense against aggression. France will always be ready to reach out her hand from over the ocean toward the great sister republic on this side to join in any practicable scheme of world-organization for peace and the cooperation of nations. Her reason is at one with your reason; her idealism meets your idealism; her heart beats in unison with the heart of the United States of America, in eager hope for the United States of the World.

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